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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the limitations of how political subjectivity is conceptualized in 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. By approaching this analysis 
through the work of R.B.J. Walker and his notion of the constitutive subject of sovereign 
politics, what is highlighted is how its existing statist starting point for theorizing political 
subjectivity fails to allow for an understanding of how other types of subjectivity, which 
cannot be defined in terms of a sovereign binary, might also need to be theorized in 
respect of the question of migration. The ambiguous subjectivity of Irish citizen children 
born to migrant parents – as those neither ‘included in’ or ‘excluded from’ the state but 
in-between both positions – is pointed to in this thesis as an example of the type of 
complex subjectivity which is denied a place in the ‘politics’ of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum, as currently theorized. Drawing on the work of Julia Kristeva, the thesis 
considers what an alternative framework for exploring citizenship outside of the 
dominant framing of sovereign subjectivity, would look like. By approaching the 
question of citizenship from the perspective of her work, this thesis shows how political 
subjectivity can also be understood as embodied in experiences of relative and contingent 
spacetime of ‘being’. It uses the metaphor of ‘trace’ to conceptualize these alternative 
spatiotemporal experiences. As such the thesis contributes to our understanding of the 
politics of dominant ‘critical’ citizenship scholarship; the impact of migration on 
conceptions of belonging; and to broader theoretical attempts to recognize how political 
subjectivity is experienced outside of a statist political discourse. It concludes that 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is limited by its inability to 
theorize political subjectivity outside of a specific conception of space as independent of 
its physical content and of time as linear and progressive.  
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Line. 
A Trace. 
Understanding a space. 
Our relationship, 
Mapping. 
Putting ourselves into context, 
By which we measure ourselves, 
Time. 
Repeating. 
Process.  Material.  Marks.  
Priya Chohan1
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Introduction  
 
 
Gradations of rights between citizens and non-citizens…have 
emerged in a number of western countries that as recently as a 
century ago operated few restrictions on immigration. In such a 
context citizenship becomes not just a set of rights but also a 
mechanism of exclusion. It becomes a mechanism of civic 
stratification; a form of inequality in which groups of people are 
differentiated by the legitimate claims they can make on the 
state. Fanning and Mutwarasibo1 
 
 
This thesis is an exploration of existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum, and the assumption underpinning this body of analysis that we must 
understand the politics of citizenship in the context of migration in terms of subjects who 
can always be defined vis-à-vis their relationship with the modern territorial state. It is 
motivated by the desire to understand the challenges which migration poses to the notion 
that we can continue to think about subjectivity unproblematically in terms of such an 
inclusion/exclusion framework and thus in terms of a subject which is connected to, but 
ultimately separate from political community. It asks instead whether the emphasis on 
mobility and fluidity which migration assumes does not undermine precisely this idea of 
subjectivity as sovereign and autonomous in the last instance. Given acknowledgement of 
the increasingly complex overlapping and fragmented claims to political subjectivity 
which are associated with the intersection of migration and citizenship, can we really 
continue to make sense of these according to dominant political horizons associated with 
the sovereign state and the ideas of clear cut distinctions between national and 
international, particularism and universalism, inside and outside which these reproduce? 
The aim of this thesis, as such, is to problematize the reliance in existing interpretations 
of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum on the notion of the individual subject (albeit 
often via a very deconstructed understanding) as the lowest unit of analysis who is 
understood in terms of their ability to hold rights against the state. The research question 
                                                 
1
 Fanning, B. and Mutwarasibo, F. (2007) ‘Nationals/Non-Nationals: Immigration, Citizenship and Politics 
in the Republic of Ireland’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30, Issue.3, p.450 
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which drives it is: what are the limitations of how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum conceptualizes political subjectivity? 
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is interrogated in this 
thesis through the work of R.B.J Walker, in particular by considering how state 
sovereignty implicates a particularly modern way of knowing and being in relation to the 
question of citizen-subjectivity. What is emphasized is how this reinforces an assumption 
about political life which is associated with a specific conception of space as independent 
of its physical content and of time as linear and progressive. Drawing on the work of 
Julia Kristeva, the thesis explores what an alternative framework for exploring citizenship 
– based on a historicization of subjectivity in relation to sovereignty – would look like. It 
concludes that such an alternative framework would allow us to begin to conceptualize 
the possibilities of becoming ‘citizen’ in the context of migration beyond what is 
currently theorized. Instead of being exclusively conceptualized as extended in time 
across the absolute space of modern subjectivity, I argue that this would allow us to 
consider how becoming citizen might also be based upon disruptions and discontinuities, 
figuring in indeterminate times and spaces outside of modern subjectivity and its 
emphasis on autonomy and sovereignty.  
Whereas the politics of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is currently 
defined in terms of an ‘opposition’ between critical and non-critical approaches to 
citizenship, this thesis is directed at highlighting the reliance which certain critical 
approaches continue to have on modern subjectivity through appeals to sovereignty. It 
emphasizes the need to distinguish instead between two types of possible ‘critical’ 
attitudes to theorizing the politics of citizenship in relation to the question of migration: 
one which works within a modern conception of what political subjectivity can be, and 
another which sets out to specifically problematize modern conceptions of time and space 
within which it is assumed political subjectivity must be located.  
     
***************** 
 
In 2004 a referendum was held in the Republic of Ireland in which the existing 
automatic entitlement to birthright citizenship was abolished by way of an amendment to 
 3 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).2 The existing automatic 
constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship, inserted in 1998 as Article 2, declared 
that it was both the entitlement and birthright of “every person born in the island of 
Ireland...to be part of the Irish Nation and to be citizens of Ireland.”3 Article 2 had been 
the result of a compromise made in 1998 under a peace negotiation (the Good Friday 
Agreement) between the Irish and British governments. Here it was agreed that the 
existing territorial claim by the Republic to the whole of the island of Ireland (Article 2 
inserted in 1937) would be replaced with a constitutional entitlement of all those living 
on the island to become Irish citizens, but only should they wish to do so. Prior to 1998, 
universal entitlement to birthright citizenship on the island of Ireland had been provided 
for in statute (from 1937) and preceding that in the founding Freestate Constitution 
(1922-1937).4  
In 2004 an amendment was proposed that would qualify (eventually via a 
residency requirement in law) for the first time Irish citizenship at birth for children born 
to non-national parents. A ‘non-national’ is defined under the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 2001 as “a person who is not an Irish citizen.”5 In 2001 the term non-
national replaced the existing references to ‘alien’ which had been in Irish legislation up 
until that point since the Aliens Act 1935.6 The new clause to be inserted in 2004 as 
Article 9 read as follows:  
                                                 
2
 ‘Republic of Ireland’ and ‘Ireland’ will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis to denote the 26- 
county Irish state. ‘Island of Ireland’, on the other hand, refers both to the 26-county Irish state and the 6 
counties of Northern Ireland which form part of the United Kingdom (UK). References to ‘the Irish 
Government’ should be understood as referring to the government of the 26-county Republic of Ireland. 
3
 This agreement is also known as ‘The Belfast Agreement’ and ‘The Stormont Agreement’.  
4
 Saorstát Éireann (The Irish Free State) was founded in 1922. From 1922 until 1937 automatic entitlement 
to birthright citizenship on the island of Ireland was enshrined constitutionally. In 1937 the Irish Free State 
was abolished and a new constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann) was passed. From 1937-1998 automatic 
entitlement to birthright citizenship was enshrined in statute until it was enshrined once again 
constitutionally in Article 2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann under the Good Friday Agreement.  
5
 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001, Section 2(c) 
6
 Recently the term ‘foreign national’ has been introduced into draft legislation in the Immigration, 
Residence and Protection Bill (IRPB) 2008. This term refers more specifically to non-EEA citizens as those 
who are neither Irish citizen nor automatically entitled to enter and be present in the State under the 
European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 656 of 2006), the 
European Communities 5 (Aliens) Regulations 1977 (S.I. No. 393 of 1977), or the European Communities 
(Right of Residence for Non-Economically Active Persons) Regulations 1997 (S.I. No.57 of 1997). The 
IRPB 2008 was withdrawn by the Government in May 2010 however and therefore the term ‘foreign 
national’ has yet to be enshrined in law through this new Bill.   
 4 
Article 9.2.1 Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in 
the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time 
of his or her birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish 
citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless otherwise provided for by 
law.  
 
This was eventually passed via referendum on 11 June 2004 by a four to one majority.7 
The 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is significant within a global context. At 
an international level the referendum can be linked to a larger worldwide trend by 
common law countries of revising provisions for automatic entitlement to birthright 
citizenship. It followed the introduction of similar restrictions previously introduced in 
the UK (1983), Australia (1986), India (1987) and South Africa (1995), and preceded by 
two years the introduction of a similar restriction in New Zealand (2006).8 The emphasis 
itself on the need for such a change can be shown also to resonate globally:  both in the 
context of the remaining common law countries around the world which have not yet 
made such a change but which have seen calls for it (most notably, the United States of 
America (USA)9), as well as within several countries outside the common law context 
where provisions allowing for automatic birthright citizenship have been constructed as a 
problem (see, for example the case of the Dominican Republic10).  
 Although exploring the issue from a variety of perspectives (namely, 
cosmopolitanism, gender, race, class, and human rights), existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum emphasizes the need to understand this issue first and 
foremost in terms of the role of the modern territorial state and how this is understood to 
                                                 
7
 The following are exact figures for the Referendum: Electorate: 3,041,688, Turnout: 59.95% (1,823,434), 
Spoilt Votes: 20,219, Valid Poll: 1,803,215, Yes Vote 79.17% (1,427,520), No Vote 20.83% (375,695). 
McVeigh, R. (2010) ‘United in Whiteness? Irishness, Europeanness and the Emergence of a “White 
Europe” Policy’ In: C. McCall and T.M. Wilson (eds) Europeanisation and Hibernicisation: Ireland and 
Europe (Amsterdam,/New York: Rodobi), p.272 
8
 Mancini, J.M. and Finlay, G. (2008) ‘“Citizenship Matters”’: Lessons from the Irish Citizenship 
Referendum’, American Quarterly, Vol.60, Issue.3, p.578 
9
 Mancini and Finlay note ten amendments which have been introduced in the USA Congress between 
1993 and 2005 which propose to introduce conditionalities for some immigrants to the existing automatic 
constitutional birthright citizenship entitlement enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. Mancini and 
Finlay, ‘“Citizenship Matters”’, pp.578-579; Elsewhere Priscilla Huang discusses attempts since 1990 to 
lobby members of congress to restrict birthright citizenship to the children of U.S citizens and legal 
permanent residents. She considers the resulting bills introduced into Congress in 1993 and 2007 proposing 
constitutional repeals in keeping with this. Huang, P. (2008) ‘Anchor Babies, Over-Breeders, and the 
Population Bomb: The Reemergence of Nativism and Population Control in Anti-Immigration Policies’, 
Harvard Law and Policy Review, Vol.2, Issue.2, p.400  
10
 Lacey, M. ‘Dominican crackdown leaves children of Haitian immigrants in legal limbo’, The New York 
Times, 25/05/2008  
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either accurately control, or unfairly limit migration. Existing analysis of the referendum 
argues that “racialized hostility mobilized towards asylum seekers and their Irish born 
children” can be traced back to specific state policies targeted at ‘controlling’ 
immigration and/or to the Irish statist national project more generally.11 The ‘politics’ of 
citizenship is defined in this existing analysis as a clash between inclusive and exclusive 
perspectives on political community.12 Within this framework, the exclusive perspective 
is conceptualized as that which appeals to a particular concept of citizenship by relying 
on the primacy of the nation-state as the rightful (and only realistic) basis for Irish 
political community. It promotes an understanding of citizenship as tied to rights, but also 
to duties and responsibilities (referred to as ‘connections’) which individuals have to a 
particular state and emphasizes the need to qualify entitlement to citizenship accordingly. 
In contrast to this, the universal perspective is defined in terms of how it undermines the 
former – emphasizing how this is based on narrow exclusive (often referred to as 
racialized) understandings of Irishness. This promotes a more inclusive notion of 
citizenship by appealing to post-national or inter-national imagery which is not dictated 
by a statist monopoly on understandings of modern political community and identity. 
This thesis will call this opposition into question, however, and show how even the 
universal perspective is still based on a modern statist spatio-temporal conception of 
citizenship and the citizen-subject.  
The decision to focus on the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum in this thesis 
derives specifically from recognition that this existing analysis of the Referendum 
reinforces dominant trends in international citizenship scholarship regarding the 
understanding of a distinction between particular exclusivist and universal inclusivist 
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 Fanning and Mutwarasibo, ‘Nationals/Non-Nationals’, p.442 
12
 Brandi, S. (2007) ‘Unveiling the Ideological Construction of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum: A 
Critical Discourse Analytical Approach’, Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social 
Transformation Review, Vol. 2, Issue.1, Summer, pp.26-47; Crowley, U., Gilmartin, M. and Kitchin, R. 
(2006) ‘“Vote Yes for Common Sense Citizenship”: Immigration and the Paradoxes at the Heart of 
Ireland’s “Céad Míle Fáilte”’, National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) Working Paper 
Series, Issue.30, pp.1-35; Fanning and Mutwarasibo, ‘Nationals/Non-Nationals’; Lentin, R. (2004) ‘From 
Racial State to Racist State: Ireland on the Eve of the Citizenship Referendum’, Variant, Issue 20, pp.1-6; 
Lentin, R. and McVeigh, R. (2006) After Optimism? Ireland, Racism and Globalisation (Dublin: Metro 
Éireann Publications); Mancini and Finlay, ‘“Citizenship Matters”’ 
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models of citizenship.13 International scholarship explores changes in citizenship 
legislation in terms of how the state constructs groups differently in society according to 
degrees of inclusion and exclusion.14 Although this international scholarship explicitly 
advocates a move away from the statist monopoly on understandings about political 
community and identity, there is an assumption therefore that subjectivity must continue 
to be discussed in relation to the state, as that which defines the parameters of ‘political’ 
community and identity as against all other types of community and identity. Despite 
concerted attempts to interrogate separately the notions of ‘individuality’ and ‘the state’, 
these concepts continue to be taken as analytical categories in their own right by this 
international scholarship; the idea of the need to conceive of the relationship between 
them is maintained. The lowest unit of analysis remains the notion of the citizen-subject 
(albeit often a very deconstructed understanding) who is understood in terms of their 
ability to hold rights against the state. The result is to leave unproblematized a 
specifically modern account of subjectivity insofar as ‘being’ is presumed to have to be 
autonomous and sovereign in the last instance. Given that existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum reflects this wider acceptance about how the politics of 
citizenship should be posed in the context of migration, the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum analysis is taken as an ideal focus for considering the limitations of this 
dominant critical approach.  
This thesis interrogates existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum by drawing on the work of R.B.J. Walker which emphasizes the need to 
explore the relationship between politics and its constitutive subject.15 What is argued is 
                                                 
13
 For a stark illustration of this opposition, see the two chapters written as a debate between particular 
‘bounded’ and universal ‘cosmopolitan’ citizenship by David Miller and Andrew Linklater. Miller, D. and 
Linklater, A. (1999) ‘Part II: The Debate’ In: K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) Cosmopolitan 
Citizenship, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd), pp.35-80 
14
 Cohen, R. (2006) Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State 
(Hampshire: Ashgate); Goldberg, D.T. (2002) The Racial State (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing); Kabeer, N. 
(ed.) (2005) Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions (London and New York: Zed Books); Lutz, 
H. (1997) ‘The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe’, Feminist Review, Vol.57, 
pp.93-111; Yuval-Davis, N. (1991), ‘The Citizenship Debate, Ethnic Processes and the State’, Feminist 
Review, Vol.39, Winter, pp.58-68; Yuval-Davis, N. and Anthias, F. (eds) (1989) Woman-Nation-State 
(London: Macmillan); Yuval-Davis, N., Kannabiran, K. and Vieten, U.M. (eds) (2006) The Situated 
Politics of Belonging (London: Sage Publications); Yuval Davis, N. and Werbner, P. (eds) (1999) Women, 
Citizenship and Difference (London: Zed Books)  
15
 Walker, R.B.J. (1999) ‘Citizenship after the Modern Subject’ In: K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) 
Cosmopolitan Citizenship (London: MacMillan Press Ltd), pp.171-200 
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that Walker’s work presents a very different approach to the question of theorizing 
political possibility to that of the ‘particular versus universal’ focus considered in existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. His is an approach which does not 
take for granted, but instead specifically historicizes the assumption itself that ‘political’ 
subjectivity has to be defined vis-à-vis its relationship with the (sub, supra or, 
transnational) state and understood as that which necessarily engages ‘in’ politics. It 
problematizes this understanding that political subjectivity must be conceptualized in 
terms of sovereign autonomy in the last instance.16 What is explored is how Walker’s 
work encourages us, through a historicization of subjectivity in relation to sovereignty, to 
imagine alternative political expression outside of the dominant statist narrative ‘time’ 
and absolute ‘space’ of the subject of modern politics currently taken for granted by 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. It does so by emphasizing 
that “the notion of politics as something that occurs in a bounded space, in which 
peoples, movements, ideas and technologies can be contained, has come to seem rather 
strained.”17 Subjectivity theorized in terms (always) of an ability to resist against and/or 
transcend the boundaries of the state is shown in this thesis to reinforce a particular 
assumption about what and where political life (citizen-subjectivity) can be, which is 
associated with an (often neutralized, yet nonetheless persistent) us/them dualism. What 
is highlighted is how this existing starting point for theorizing political subjectivity fails 
to allow for an understanding of how other types of subjectivity, which cannot be defined 
in terms of this sovereign binary, might also need to be theorized in respect of the 
question of migration.  
The implications of R.B.J. Walker’s work is that we need to be open to the 
different ways in which political subjectivity can be conceptualized beyond that of 
modern subjectivity and the idea that autonomous subjects necessarily engage ‘in’ 
                                                 
16
 Walker, R.B.J. (1995) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press); Walker, ‘Citizenship after the Modern Subject’; Walker, R.B.J. (2000) ‘Both 
Globalization and Sovereignty: Re-Imagining the Political’ In: P. Wapner and L.E.J. Ruiz (eds) Principled 
World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publications Inc), pp.23-34; Walker, R.B.J. (2003) ‘Polis, Cosmopolis, Politics’, Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political, Vol.28, Issue.2, pp.267-286; Walker, R.B.J. (2004) ‘Sovereignties, Exceptions, Worlds’ 
In: J. Edkins, V. Pin-Fat and M. Shapiro, (eds) Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics (London: 
Routledge), pp.239-249; Walker, R.B.J. (2010) After the Globe, Before the World (Oxon: Routledge)  
17
 Walker, ‘Citizenship after the Modern Subject’, p.198 
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political community. The thesis draws on the work of Julia Kristeva to consider what an 
alternative approach to exploring citizenship which is based on such a historicization of 
subjectivity in relation to state sovereignty, might look like. There are arguably other 
theorists through whom the question of rethinking subjectivity might be pursued. 
However, the strategy offered in this thesis is derived primarily from the work of Julia 
Kristeva because her work best brings together the issues of political subjectivity, 
migration, citizenship, temporality and spatiality raised by R.B.J. Walker’s critique of 
modern subjectivity.18 The thesis argues that Kristeva’s work provides an alternative 
basis for exploring citizenship outside of the need for modern subjectivity by 
conceptualizing a different way of thinking about human ‘being’. This is an 
understanding of human being which is no longer based on a metaphysics of presence 
vis-à-vis the state but instead on an ontology of plurality and hybridity. This presents a 
different conception of time and space for how the ‘politics’ of citizenship could be 
articulated.19 The ambiguous subjectivity of Irish citizen children born to migrant parents 
– as those neither ‘included in’ or ‘excluded from’ the state, but in-between both 
positions – is pointed to in this thesis as an example of the type of complex subjectivity 
which is denied a place in the politics of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as 
currently theorized, but which can be theorized by thinking about human ‘being’ through 
Kristeva’s work. What is pointed out is that these children experience citizenship in 
disjunctive spaces and at particular (mostly inconsistent) moments, and not as 
‘individuals’ who either are or are not included in the state and eventually become full 
citizens of the (pre-existing) political community.  
Instead of continuing to conceptualize citizen-subjectivity as always extended in 
time in the absolute space of modern subjectivity, as is done in existing analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, what is argued is that there is a need to also think 
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 An alternative avenue through which the question of subjectivity could be pursued is through the work, 
for example, of Jean Luc Nancy. See, Nancy, J.L. (2000) Being Singular Plural (trans. R. D. Richardson 
and A. E. O’Byrne), (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press)  
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Kristeva, J. (1986), The Kristeva Reader (ed. T. Moi), (New York: Columbia University Press); Kristeva, J. 
(1991) Strangers to Ourselves (trans. S. Leon Roudiez), (New York: Columbia University Press); Kristeva, 
J. (1993) Nations Without Nationalism, (trans. S. Leon), (New York: Columbia University Press); Kristeva, 
J. (1996) Julia Kristeva Interviews (ed. R.M. Guberman), (Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University 
Press) 
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about subjectivity as indeterminate in its own right, figuring as contingent spaces and 
fragmented temporalities. The notion of citizenship as ‘trace’ is introduced in the final 
chapter of the thesis as a way of reconceptualizing the type of political subjectivity which 
is embodied in experiences of relative/contingent spacetime of ‘being’ such as those 
experienced by citizen-children born to migrant parents.  
This thesis concludes that the limitations of how existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum conceptualizes political subjectivity come down to its 
inability to theorize political subjectivity outside of a specific conception of space as 
independent of its physical content and of time as linear and progressive. The original 
contribution of this thesis, as such, is to provide a way of recognizing the significance, 
yet rethinking the ‘truth’ that the necessary starting point for theorizing the politics of 
citizenship is the understanding that citizen-subjects hold rights against the modern 
territorial state (political community). It does so by reengaging with the way in which we 
have been told the ‘self’ must be conceptualized in terms of absolute spatial and linear 
temporal boundaries between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion. It emphasizes 
instead the alternative ways in which political subjectivity is being experienced. Doing 
so, this thesis needs to be seen as increasing the range of possible political subjectivities 
through which citizenship can be theorized in the context of migration, and not 
attempting to simply replace one ontology with another.  
This original contribution is provided in four principal ways. First, by arguing that 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum – which is presented as a 
clash between particular and universal conceptions of citizenship – can be taken as 
representative of a more general debate (what I am calling ‘The Citizenship Debate’) 
which reflects important assumptions about what a politics of citizenship must look like. I 
discuss how these assumptions can be traced back to the necessity of the idea of 
sovereign autonomous subjectivity. This argument is introduced in chapter one and 
developed throughout the thesis. Secondly, the thesis advances an alternative Kristevan 
understanding of human ‘being’ as based on a metaphysics of process in the context of 
citizen-subjectivity. It uses this to develop further the implications of R.B.J. Walker’s 
work which emphasize the need to think about political subjectivity other than as that 
which is defined in terms of sovereign presence. This Kristevan understanding of human 
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‘being’ is outlined in chapter one for the first time. Chapter two then explores how her 
work helps to further undermine the ‘truth’ of a self-authorizing autonomous subject 
which opposes itself to the world, as developed in Walker’s work. Her work does so by 
building upon the notion of a subject based around a lack; as that which is ruptured 
within itself. The implications of Kristeva’s work for rethinking political subjectivity in 
the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum specifically, and then in the context of citizenship 
in general, are developed respectively in chapters four and five. Thirdly, the thesis 
develops an important empirical contribution to discussions about the politics of 
citizenship in Ireland by demonstrating how citizen-children born to migrant parents 
interrupt these discussions. These children most notably interrupt the assumption in these 
discussions that questions of belonging in respect of citizen children born to migrant 
parents can be explored in the same context as their parent’s experiences of belonging. 
This is as people who have been excluded from the dominant community and who are in 
need of being brought (back) into this community. Instead, what is shown is that citizen 
children, unlike their migrant parents, are not simply marginalized subjects who have 
been positioned ‘outside’ the dominant political community and are in need of 
‘inclusion’, but people whose subjectivity is defined in the tension between inclusion and 
exclusion, particularism and universalism. This is subjectivity which is experienced as an 
ambiguous (contingent) political effect rather than a sovereign one. Fourthly, the thesis 
demonstrates how the shift which is made here from presuming that political subjectivity 
must be theorized in terms of a metaphysics of presence to recognizing how it can also be 
experienced as a metaphysics of process, can be understood as a shift from 
conceptualizing citizenship in terms of absolute space to (re)conceptualizing it in terms of 
contingent trace. The notion of citizenship as ‘trace’ is introduced in chapter five as a 
way of conceptualizing how space can be understood as other than infinitely divisible by 
lines extended in continuous, progressive time. What is argued is that this understanding 
of citizenship as trace provides an alternative to the determinative dominant logic of the 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion binary so often deployed as a starting point for 
questions about the politics of citizenship. It does so by allowing for the possibility that 
subjectivity comes into play via processes of differentiation which are irregular, 
discontinuous and strange as well as sovereign and continuous. Conceptualizing 
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citizenship as trace undermines the idea that citizen-subjectivity can only be defined in 
terms of a coherent ‘who’. It allows us to move beyond the endless discussions about 
who is or who is not abusing citizenship, who is or who is not entitled to citizenship 
which take place in the citizenship debate and concentrate instead on the increasingly 
momentary fragments of self through which citizenship can operate beyond the idea of a 
sovereign marginalized subject that can be pointed to.  
The line of inquiry pursued in this thesis acknowledges and aims to build upon, 
but differs in several important ways from another strand of migration scholarship which 
has similarly sought to rethink how the configurations of space, power and knowledge 
that manifest themselves in citizenship cannot simply be traced back to the nation-state as 
the basis of ‘politics’. This is scholarship which, it has been argued, could also be used to 
rethink existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum.20 The work of Didier 
Bigo on ‘the banopticon' and the work of Jonathan Xavier Inda on ‘anti-citizens 
technologies’ are two examples of this type of scholarship.21 This work provides an 
extremely important analytics of government which is no longer based on tracing the 
politics of citizenship back to specific regimes and/or their governmental institutions. 
Instead, it offers a framework for apprehending how citizenship works through 
“ensembles of government as overlapping and ongoing in dynamic ways.”22 This work, 
however, concentrates mostly on analyzing the operation and management of ‘illegal’ 
immigration and the detention of so-called ‘foreigners’. It thus speaks first and foremost 
to how distinctions between conceptions of ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ are constructed. 
Doing so, it differs in emphasis from the perspective taken in this thesis, which draws 
upon R.B.J. Walker’s work. I highlight instead the need to understand how political 
subjectivity is internally differentiated within the concept of citizen-subjectivity.23 The 
second difference is that the former strand of migration scholarship emphasizes the 
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 Conlon, D. (2010) ‘Ties that Bind: Governmentality, the State, and Asylum in Contemporary Ireland’, 
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governmental mechanisms which enable the regulation of particular sections of society – 
asylum seekers, irregular migrants etc. – having already moved away from theorizing 
subjectivity vis-à-vis the state (and therefore as necessarily sovereign). In contrast, R.B.J. 
Walker’s work re-emphasizes the need to understand how subjectivity often continues to 
be conceptualized as sovereign even in critical citizenship scholarship. Walker’s work 
highlights the need to understand how attempts which set out to challenge assumptions 
regarding sovereign political order often reinscribe these in the last instance by failing to 
problematize modern spatio-temporal understandings of ‘being’.24 Doing so, he 
introduces a specific treatment of how sovereignty continues to operate as a strategy of 
power and identity despite the growing prevalence of non-sovereign techniques such as 
bio and disciplinary power. 
 
 
Sources 
This thesis approaches the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum through discourse theory. I 
acknowledge that the notion of ‘discourse’ is integral to existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum; however, the notion of discourse can be used in different 
ways. Existing analysis theorizes the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as a series of 
(gendered, racial, nationalist etc.) discourses which ascribe various meaning to how 
individuals are conceptualized as ‘citizen’ or ‘non-citizen’. This thesis, however, takes its 
inspiration from Michel Foucault’s emphasis on the need to understand discourse as more 
than a group of signs which ascribe different meanings to (already) existing objects such 
as ‘individuals’, but rather “as practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak.”25 With this in mind, I approach the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as a 
discourse in its own right (‘The Citizenship Debate’) which produces as an object the 
idea of ‘individual’ subjects. It is important to note that both primary material 
(Parliamentary debates; Government publications and information documents; 
Government party speeches and press releases; civil society organization reports and 
statements; and media coverage) and secondary literature (academic analysis) are 
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 Ibid; Walker, After the Globe 
25
 Foucault, M. (1980) The Archaeology of Knowledge, (trans S. Sheridan), (London: Routledge), p.49 
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recognized as being integral in defining how citizenship-subjectivity could be articulated 
here. Therefore both forms of source material are considered part of the ‘discourse’ 
which is analyzed in this thesis. The thesis does not seek to emphasize, as such, the need 
to introduce or uncover new information about the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, 
but considers a different way of approaching existing discussions about citizenship in 
respect of this referendum. Where interviews have been carried out, these serve to 
increase the depth and breath of these discussions.   
          Analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum discourse is based in the first 
instance on a series of key Oireachtas (Parliament) discussions. This includes Oireachtas 
discussions undertaken in the lead up to proposed announcement of the referendum on 10 
March 2004. Most notably discussions about ‘The Immigration Bill 2004’ which was 
proposed, debated and passed in Seanad Éireann (upper house) on 30 January and later in 
Dáil Éireann (lower house) on 4 and 5 February; as well as the report and final stages of 
‘The Social Welfare (Miscellaneous provisions) Bill’ discussed in the lower house on 11 
March. These debates were chosen for their direct relevance to discussions about 
migration and citizenship during the immediate lead up to proposed referendum 
announcement.26 Analysis is also based on the entirety of discussions in the Oireachtas 
during the period March 2004 to May 2004 in which the referendum proposal bill itself, 
‘The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Referendum Bill 2004’ was presented, 
discussed and voted upon. All of the text produced from the various stages of this bill 
debated in Dáil Éireann (from 6 April to 29 April) and later in Seanad Éireann (from 30 
April to 6 May) was examined. These texts have been chosen because of their 
authoritative status, and the frequency to which they are referred within the discourse. In 
total, the number of pages of key Dáil and Seanad discussions (between January and May 
2004) which form the basis of the source material analysed in this thesis is substantial, 
being in excess of 957 pages.  
                                                 
26
 The Immigration Act 2004 was introduced in haste following a High Court Judgement on 22 January 
which questioned the validity (having deemed unconstitutional) the existing statutory provisions dealing 
with the control of entry into and stay within the state of non-nationals (non-Irish citizens); The Social 
Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 significantly introduced new provisions for certain social 
welfare payments to be based on a habitual residency test (a two year residency requirement) for all non-
Irish citizens. It was proposed in March 2004 as a ‘requirement’ given the imminent 1 May 2004 date for 
accession of ten new countries into the European Union.  
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Competing positions were recorded at the time of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum. These broke down into the Yes side (those in favour of the proposal) and 
the No side (those critical of the proposal) camps. Analysis of these competing positions 
is explored in the thesis through key submissions by the Government, civil society 
organizations and Opposition parties in which they outlined their arguments regarding the 
referendum proposal. Arguments in favour of the referendum were analysed through 
three key coalition Government publications which outlined the need for the referendum 
proposal27 as well as additional documentation which the Government placed in the 
Oireachtas library outlining correspondence between Government ministers and health 
officials.28 A series of statements made by the Taoiseach (Prime Minster) and leader of 
the majority Government party, Fianna Fáil (FF); the Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minster) 
and leader of the minority Government party, Progressive Democrats (PD); the Minister 
for Justice Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell; as well as by several other 
ministerial and non-ministerial members of both parties, also formed part of this source 
material. These statements were posted on the FF website, the Department of the 
Taoiseach website and the PD website and were chosen on the basis that they were 
influential statements which outlined important justifications for the referendum 
proposal.29 Arguments that were (mostly) critical of the referendum proposal were 
elsewhere analysed through key submissions made by civil society organizations as well 
                                                 
27
 Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2004) Proposed Citizenship Referendum: Article by 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Mr. Michael McDowell, T.D., Published in Sunday 
Independent on 14 March 2004; Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2004) Citizenship 
Referendum: The Government’s Proposals, April; Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, (2004) 
Information Note: Proposal for Constitutional Amendment and Legislation Concerning the Issue of the 
Irish Citizenship of Children of Non-National Parents  
28
 Oireachtas Library (2004) Correspondence Regarding Use of Irish Maternity Hospitals by Non-
Nationals (Dublin: OPUB). This document also contains statistical data gathered on maternity service 
provision according to nationality for the years 2000 to 2002. This document is not available to the general 
public. It can nonetheless be obtained through an Oireachtas member. The condition of doing so, however, 
is that it can not be reproduced in any form; it can only be referred to.  
29
 Arguments in favour of the referendum were also analysed through material obtained from the civil 
society organization Immigrant Control Platform (ICP). This material included bi-annual newsletters 
(Numbers 6-13 dating from 2000 to 2004) as well as submissions (dating 2000-2003) to the Department of 
Justice from ICP. It was not deemed necessary in the end to refer to these arguments, however. This is 
because apart from presenting slightly more openly hostile anti-immigrant views, they did not differ in any 
substantial way from (but merely repeated) the arguments made by the Government itself in favour of the 
need to amend citizenship legislation. Namely that it was an issue of needing to prevent abuse of Irish 
citizenship by those wishing to circumvent the existing immigration/asylum system.  
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as Opposition parties (namely the Green Party and the Labour Party).30 These 
submissions speak both to issues leading up to the referendum proposal and the 
referendum proposal itself. They include reports produced by civil society groups which 
initially sought to detail the expected outcomes (as well as reports which later sought to 
document the actual outcomes) of the decision to abolish automatic entitlement to 
birthright citizenship on the island of Ireland. Statements and reports were chosen here 
with the aim of including as many as possible from civil society organizations which 
expressed an opinion in respect of the referendum. The civil society organizations from 
which statements and reports were gathered include Akina Dada wa Africa (AkiDwA): 
The Migrant Woman’s Network; Children’s Rights Alliance; Coalition Against the 
Deportation of Irish Children (CADIC); Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC); 
Integrating Ireland; Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL); Irish Refugee Council; and 
National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI). Not all 
organizations had statements which they had issued in 2004 still available online and 
therefore where possible the organizations themselves were contacted to request these. 
Documents available on the internet are indicated in the bibliography as is the material 
obtained directly from civil society organizations. 
 Media coverage of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum – as that which in 
theory was purported to provide coverage of both positions on the referendum proposal – 
formed an important addition to the aforementioned sources.31 There was a huge range of 
possible media articles to choose from of those written in the months leading up to the 
referendum proposal, and in the period between the referendum proposal being 
                                                 
30
 As was to be expected, not all of the statements or reports issued by these organizations immediately 
rejected the referendum proposal. Two notable examples of documents issued which outlined both sides of 
the argument without necessarily advocating a rejection of the referendum proposal, include IHRC (2004) 
Observations on the Proposed Referendum on Citizenship and on the 27th Amendment of the Constitution 
Bill 2004, 25 May, pp.1-32; and Irish Refugee Council (2004) Asyland, Magazine of the Irish Refugee 
Council, Summer, pp.1-23 
31
 It was important to keep in mind here, however, that certain media articles were in fact written by 
Government officials who had already indicated their position as being tied to specifically promoting the 
referendum proposal. These included, for example, McDowell, M. (Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform) ‘Putting a value on citizenship is not racist’, The Irish Independent, 09/04/2004; and O’Dea, W. 
(Minister of State at the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform) ‘Irish citizenship: labouring the 
point’, The Sunday Independent, 25/04/2004. Similarly, it was important to keep in mind that there were 
accusations of certain media ‘framing’ of the referendum. This is most notably discussed by Breen, M., 
Haynes, A. and Devereux, E. (2006) ‘Citizens, Loopholes and Maternity Tourists: Media Frames in the 
Citizenship Referendum’ In: M. P. Corcoran. and M. Peillon (eds) Uncertain Ireland: A Sociological 
Chronicle 2003-2004 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration), pp.58-70 
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announced and the referendum being held. The media articles chosen to eventually act as 
source material were those which were referred to first by other sources, and which were 
considered authoritative in the context in which they were used. Given its status as 
‘newspaper of public record’ in the Republic of Ireland due to its authoritative reputation, 
articles from the daily periodical The Irish Times appeared most frequently in this 
respect. However, this did not preclude articles from other newspapers also appearing. 
Other media articles consulted came from The Irish Independent, The Irish Examiner, 
The Sunday Business Post, The Sunday Independent and The Sunday Times. The 
Referendum Commission booklet on the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum also formed 
part of the source material consulted here. The Referendum Commission was specifically 
set up to present arguments both for and against each referendum held in the Irish state. It 
therefore represented another source which was not supposed to be either predominantly 
in favour, or else critical, of the referendum proposal.  
Analysis in the thesis of the theoretical basis of critiques of the referendum 
proposal drew heavily on academic discussions about the referendum published as 
articles in scholarly journals, as working papers, as chapters in edited collections or as 
edited and joint-authored books. The articles, books, working papers and chapters chosen 
were those that specifically sought to engage with (normally interrogating) moves made 
by the Government immediately preceding the referendum proposal in 2004 and/or which 
speak specifically to the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum proposal itself. They 
therefore range across a diversity of authors and span a publication period from 2003 to 
2010. Where relevant, other academic publications were used to contextualize the 
historical contexts identified in these texts (namely, racial, ethnic and gendered) as 
underpinning important constructions of the nature of ‘Irishness’ in terms of inclusion 
and exclusion. The wider relevance of the arguments made in these articles, working 
papers and books identified as part of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum was explored 
through international citizenship scholarship texts that are widely considered 
representative of a critical stance.32 These texts were chosen given their authoritative 
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status in speaking to the importance of understanding the role which gender, race and 
ethnicity play in decisions regarding the management of solidarity and belonging in the 
context of cross-culturalism.   
Given the lesser emphasis in available sources on justifications for the referendum 
proposal, I decided that there was a need to supplement my understanding of the 
arguments underlying this with some interviews.33 These interviews are listed in 
appendix A. Seven semi-structured interviews in total were undertaken and all were 
conducted in Dublin. Six interviews were conducted face-to-face and one was a 
telephone interview. These were elite interviews (rather than a representative sample). 
Those selected for interview were selected on the basis of their expertise in articulating 
core arguments in favour of the referendum proposal in the discussions surrounding the 
referendum. Whilst further interviews would have doubtlessly contributed to even more 
depth and perspective, when combined with the existing source material, seven 
interviews was deemed adequate to build up a sufficiently detailed and reflective 
understanding of these arguments. Given the time and space limitations of the research, 
the law of diminishing returns was applied to the interview process. Interviews 
themselves were structured around a prepared list of questions and topics designed 
around the specific area of expertise and experience of the interviewee. These 
accordingly varied from interview to interview, but included common questions such a 
‘What do you think was the significance of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum?’ and ‘Why 
do you think some people were hostile towards the proposal to amend the constitutional 
basis for birthright citizenship in Ireland?’ Interviews were recorded where the 
interviewee consented, and transcripts were prepared from these recordings, or from 
interview notes where consent was refused. The transcripts were communicated to 
interviewees for their comments and clarifications. Ethical implications of interviewing 
were considered throughout the whole process. All interviewees were offered initial 
anonymity and the choice to waive this at a later stage. All but one interviewee chose to 
waive anonymity after the interview.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Nation-State; Yuval-Davis et al., The Situated Politics of Belonging; Yuval-Davis and Werbner, Women, 
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The potential for triangulating interviews with the primary and secondary source 
material gathered elsewhere was vital for the purposes of building up a sufficient 
textually layered account of the various discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum. The readiness of people to respond to requests to provide copies 
of old statements, reports and press releases from this period was truly invaluable, as was 
the willingness by others to recall in detail the events of 2004 and their involvement in 
articulating arguments in relation to the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal.  
                
 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter sets out an alternative approach 
to theorizing political possibility via an engagement with R.B.J Walker’s interrogation of 
the limits of the modern statist understanding of political subjectivity; the second chapter 
accounts for this approach within a wider theoretical context; whilst chapters three, four 
and five focus on how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
forecloses the domain of political subjectivity, before moving to consider how it might be 
opened anew.  
Chapter one argues that R.B.J. Walker’s emphasis on the need to consider the 
relationship between politics and subjectivity (rather than the question of how the subject 
necessarily always engages ‘in’ politics) forces us to rethink the assumption that existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum completely exhausts all possible 
historical and normative judgments as currently defined in terms of a clash between 
‘particular’ exclusionary and ‘universal’ inclusionary concepts of political community 
and identity.34 The chapter maps out how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum can instead be reconceptualized as presenting a spectrum of possible (yet 
limited) interpretive choices which are defined by a certain ‘reality’ of what it means to 
be a political subject in terms of sovereignty and autonomy (as ‘individuals’) in the 
context of migration. This is what Walker refers to as “the citizenship debate”.35 What is 
considered is how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum takes for 
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granted rather than interrogating early-modern conditions which emphasize spatial 
differentiations at the expense of hierarchical modes of allegiance, as the necessary 
conditions for the ‘possible’ expression of political identity. What is pointed out is that 
the notion of autonomous sovereign beings, which exist in the last instance in relation to 
the state and can be included and excluded, is retained regardless of whether an inclusive 
(universal) or an exclusive (particular) model of citizenship is promoted in this existing 
analysis. The implication of R.B.J. Walker’s work is that we need to be open to the 
different ways in which political subjectivity can be conceptualized beyond that of 
sovereignty and autonomy, regardless of how hard these are to imagine. The last part of 
this chapter therefore draws on the work of Julia Kristeva – as someone who provides a 
different understanding of human ‘being’ to a metaphysics of presence vis-à-vis the state 
– in order to consider what an alternative framework for exploring citizenship outside of 
the need for modern subjectivity would look like. Kristeva’s work emphasizes the 
manner in which the geographical and the corporal experience of lived borders (between 
national and international, between self and other) can be shown to meet in images of 
foreignness. This understanding of foreignness undermines the notion of unified selfhood 
by simultaneously haunting identity and difference, inside and outside.36 What is 
discussed is how the new framework proposed is therefore based on the rethinking of 
human ‘being’ as one of rupture within the notion of the sovereign self and within 
sovereign ‘selves’ (a metaphysics of process), as opposed to across sovereign self and 
selves (a metaphysics of presence).  
Chapter two contextualizes Walker’s work within a broader theoretical field.37 It 
argues that drawing upon these certain bodies of work posits another way of thinking 
about and understanding citizenship insofar as they identify the notion of autonomous 
presence as the basis of a specific type of ‘sovereign politics’. As opposed to assuming 
that individuality (sovereign presence) has an essence in and of itself which merely 
(pre)exists the state and which must be appealed to when exploring the ‘politics’ of 
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citizenship, these bodies of work allow us to consider how excluded or included selves 
can be shown to be produced as ‘individuals’ vis-à-vis the notion of sovereignty. Within 
this context, the chapter considers how Julia Kristeva’s work presents an alternative form 
of human ‘being’ to that of sovereign presence. This is one which builds upon the notion 
of a subject which is instead based around a lack. Foucauldian theory and Freudian 
psychoanalysis – the latter upon which Kristeva’s work is based – are presented in the 
chapter as theoretical frameworks which, when taken together, help us to consider how 
the constitution of the subject is inextricably linked with the constitution of a particular 
social or symbolic order.  It is pointed out that they allow us to rethink the ‘self’ as 
having to conform to a particular type of sovereign presence (for example, as migrant, 
ethnic minority or as racialized other) which engages ‘in’ discourse (the symbolic order). 
And instead to recognize how sovereign presence (the idea of the ‘individual’ migrant, 
ethnic minority, racialized other) is not inevitable but is produced as a discursive effect. It 
is this understanding of how the self is problematized into ‘being’ in terms of rules and 
practices, which is considered in detail in this chapter. This chapter argues that an 
interrogation of subjectivity as presence in this manner allows for a reassessment of what 
currently counts as ‘political’ possibility in respect of citizenship by forcing us to revisit 
(repoliticize) the boundaries of what we have come to know as the subject and 
accordingly what we imagine as possible political subjectivity.   
Chapter three turns specifically to the question of how the existing analysis of the 
2004 Citizenship Referendum, mirroring trends in international citizenship scholarship, 
can be understood to foreclose the domain of political possibility. It argues that this needs 
to be understood in terms of how this analysis fails to challenge the basis of the 
citizenship debate as this has been defined in terms of a particular/universal 
(citizenship/humanity) dualism. What is looked at is how existing analysis of the 
referendum continues to emphasize that the politics of citizenship is a trade-off between 
these two options. It merely insists that universalism should be prioritized over that of 
particularism, and not visa-versa. It ‘reframes’ the terms of the existing citizenship debate 
rather than challenging these outright. This chapter explores the interdependence, 
however, of claims to humanity and the idea of a universal citizenship with those of 
claims about particularism and the idea of bounded citizenship. It considers how they 
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both work together to define our political horizons. What the chapter emphasizes is that 
while existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum provides a way of 
rethinking the statist monopoly on understandings of the nature and possibility for 
political community – as that which prioritizes claims to citizenship over humanity – it 
does not provide a way of rethinking the statist political discourse through which political 
subjectivity (‘being’) came to be understood in the first place in terms of this sovereign 
dualism. It fails to undermine our understanding of political subjectivity as that which is 
defined in the last instance always in terms of sovereignty; this is an understanding of 
‘being’ that oscillates between, and can therefore be traced back to a located presence in 
either, ‘Humanity’ (as universal identity) or ‘citizenship’ (as particular identity). Rather, 
this analysis reinforces this idea by emphasizing the need to consider how particularism 
and universalism can continue to be reconciled in an understanding of subjectivity which 
is one and the same time multiple and universal while individual and specific. This 
chapter argues that this ignores the possibilities of political subjectivity which exceed the 
discursive space made available by this statist account of ‘political’ necessity.  
Chapter four considers how the domain of political possibility can be opened up 
again in respect of how citizen-subjectivity is conceptualized. It argues that this can be 
done by rethinking the sovereign time and space of citizenship. It takes the subjectivity of 
Irish citizen children born to migrant parents, and their experiences as political subjects, 
as an example of the type of complex citizen-subjectivity which is denied a place in the 
existing politics of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. It points out that these 
children are neither entirely ‘inside’ the Irish state as their citizenship is (only) deferred, 
but nor are they ‘outside’ of the Irish state either as they remain Irish citizens. They are 
instead defined in the tension between inclusion and exclusion, particularism and 
universalism (the “scar” between ‘Man’ and ‘citizen’38). As such, their experiences of 
citizenship are temporally interrupted and spatially dislocated rather than temporally 
progressive and spatially coherent. What is argued is that existing ‘critical’ analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum fails to theorize this ambiguous role of Irish citizen 
children born to migrant parents in its own right. This is given its need to conceptualize 
subjectivity within a sovereign framework in the last instance and the understanding 
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regarding lines of separation between self and world, self and other, this ‘particular’ 
community and that ‘universal’ community, which this assumes. While existing analysis 
of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum merely attempts to think ‘different’ times and 
spaces of existing statist concepts of politics, however – most notably by theorizing this 
in terms of the dualisms of Woman and citizen or Human and citizen, in addition to the 
dualism of Man and citizen – Julia Kristeva’s work is considered as that which 
emphasizes how this dualism (between a particular and a universal identity) is based on a 
specific understanding of time and space which can also be problematized in its own 
right. Through Kristeva’s work, experiences of belonging among migrant youth in 
Ireland are recast in the chapter in light of the possibility that the political subject itself is 
fragmented in terms ‘of’ many different types of contingent spaces and fractious 
temporalities, rather than only ‘in’ space without limits. The chapter argues that this is the 
difference between simply ‘maintaining’ (as looked at in chapter three) as opposed to 
challenging the existing terms of the citizenship debate.  
Chapter five explores the implications of challenging the citizenship debate in this 
manner (as opposed to simply maintaining it), and opening up the question of political 
subjectivity beyond temporality contained within absolute space to that of fractious 
spacetime. The notion of ‘trace’ is introduced in this chapter to conceptualize the shift 
which is made here away from thinking about citizenship in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion and therefore in terms of absolute space, to thinking about citizenship as that 
which is also based upon disruptions and discontinuities, figuring in indeterminate and 
incalculable times and spaces outside of modern subjectivity and its emphasis on located 
presence. The latter forces us to think time and space differently thus redrawing the 
conditions of possibility for ‘politics’, and not merely to think ‘different’ times and 
spaces of existing statist conceptions of politics. What is explored is how this results in 
the need to problematize the notion of a boundary as a line across which ‘migrant’, ‘non-
national’ etc. simply move between being ‘citizen’ and being ‘human’, and consider 
instead how being ‘citizen’ in the context of migration is that which is produced in 
boundaries as spaces of tension. What is pointed out is that citizen children born to 
migrant parents indicate how the citizen-subject is also produced through such processes 
of tension – between being ‘migrant’ (human) and being ‘citizen’. Doing so, they 
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represent a form of political subjectivity which stands in stark contrast to that of the 
image of the modern subject which is conceptualized merely in terms of how it traverses 
such lines.  
 The thesis conclusion shows the importance of recognising that migration not 
only challenges the various ways in which modern subject-citizens are included and 
excluded from the imagined political community (as partial, full or denizens). Migration 
also challenges the idea of the sovereign autonomous subject who can be included or 
excluded from political community, as the only way in which ‘being’ citizen can be 
imagined or experienced. It demonstrates that existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum, and the critical citizenship scholarship that it echoes, is limited 
by its inability to consider political subjectivity in terms ‘of’ different times and spaces in 
the manner experienced by Irish citizen children born to migrant parents. This is given its 
reliance on statist political imaginary (and therefore on absolute space and linear time) in 
defining the essence of ‘political’ possibility in respect of the question of citizenship in 
all instances. By emphasizing the importance of a second ‘critical’ response to crisis and 
the question of sovereignty which is based on problematizing the notion of ‘boundary’ 
itself and what we have been told this must be, an alternative understanding of the 
possibility of ‘being’ citizen is explored in this thesis in the concept of ‘trace’. This is a 
type of citizen-subjectivity which is conceived of in terms of encounters and 
confrontations in comparison to that of citizen-subjectivity conceived of in terms of the 
temporal progression within particular co-existing spaces (an us/them dualism). Through 
the notion of trace we are left to imagine ‘citizens’ as a form of subjectivity which can 
also manifest as a cluster of time-space coordinates which are constantly changing within 
and across what is normally conceptualized as the absolute space and horizontal time of 
sovereign political community. As such, this thesis contributes not only to our 
understanding of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum and the manner in which 
subjectivity was conceptualized here, the impact of migration on conceptions of 
belonging, and the politics of dominant ‘critical’ citizenship scholarship, but finally to 
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broader theoretical attempts to recognize how political subjectivity is also experienced 
outside of a statist political discourse.39  
This concern with the question of what it is to ‘be’ citizen in the context of 
migration is a timely one. It is commonly accepted that we now live in a world in which 
discussions about belonging and the nature of political community are dictated by 
understandings of cultural diversity rather than cultural homogeneity.40 What is 
emphasized is the fact that we live in a globalized world where millions of people now 
have multiple citizenships and many spend time living in more than one country. This is a 
world in which, however, it is increasingly understood that “[p]orous boundaries and 
multiple identities undermine ideas of cultural belonging as a necessary accompaniment 
to political membership.”41 Yuval-Davis, Kannabiran and Vieten highlight, for example, 
“the…constant expansion of classes that are excluded, the creation of new minorities and 
the drastic shrinking of democratic spaces, nationally and internationally.”42 Increasingly, 
people are asking how political belonging can be realized in a way which is more 
equitable for all. As Bryan Fanning points out, “Difference is inevitable. However, 
belonging can be defined by the necessity of living together in a shared space as well as 
in terms of cultural particularism.”43 Within the context of this discussion, this thesis 
considers what a mistake it would be to assume nonetheless that the only possible ground 
for a different ‘politics’ of citizenship is that which continues to be based on sovereign 
autonomous subjectivity in the last instance. Instead it points out how this serves to 
ignore citizenship experienced through ambiguous, less coherent subjectivity which 
cannot be tied to a located presence – one either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the nation.  Whereas 
so many argue that belonging must be based on understanding how subjects hold rights 
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always in opposition to (i.e. as connected to, but ultimately separate from) political 
community, what is emphasized in this thesis is the importance of recognising the 
evolution of subjectivity beyond this existing spatio-temporal ideal of modernity if we are 
to “take into account the full ambivalence of the conditions of its operation.”44 
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Chapter 1:  
Exploring the Citizenship Debate: An interrogation of the relationship 
between modern subjectivity and citizenship1 
 
 
Citizenship will continue to name a political practice that is 
plausibly monopolized by the modern state… [yet it] also names 
a site at which our constitutive account of what we are supposed 
to be will become less plausible, and where the highly 
problematic character of what we think politics is and where it 
occurs will become increasingly pronounced….[T]here is no 
point in pushing at these limits…without also pushing at the 
account of modern subjectivity which has been produced by, and 
is productive of, those limits. R.B.J. Walker2  
 
 
Introduction 
The 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has been described as “[t]he most significant 
event in the politics of immigration in the Republic of Ireland”.3 Reflecting dominant 
trends in citizenship scholarship, existing analysis of this referendum frames the issue in 
terms of two opposing perspectives: one particularistic (exclusive), one universalistic 
(inclusive). It posits the question of the ‘politics’ of citizenship as a trade-off between 
these diverging models. This chapter argues that the work of R.B.J. Walker provides an 
alternative focus through which to explore the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum by 
challenging this dualistic framework as the necessary basis for discussions about 
citizenship. His work does so by problematizing the premise upon which it is based, 
which is the taken-for-granted autonomous existence of persons (individuals) who are 
understood to be connected to, but ultimately separate from, ‘the state’, and by suggesting 
instead that we need to consider how political subjectivity can be conceptualized in terms 
of a constitutive subject of politics.4 I argue that this perspective presents a different 
starting point from which to approach the question of how the politics of citizenship 
could be articulated to the prevalent form of a timeless dialectic of inclusion and 
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exclusion, particularism and universalism, nationalism and post-nationalism currently 
determined by the boundaries of the (Irish) state.  
As the above quotation indicates, Walker’s work emphasizes the link between 
politics and subjectivity. Doing so, it historicizes the assumption that citizenship must be 
discussed in terms of how individual citizen-subjects are included in, or excluded from, 
‘the state’ as that which defines the essence of politics. Rather, it emphasizes the need to 
reconsider the manner in which subjectivity has been defined in relation to a particular 
understanding of ‘politics’, as that which is unproblematically divisible and continuous 
and is therefore understood as something which can always necessarily be ‘included’ or 
‘excluded’ in this manner. What will be argued in this chapter is that this presents a 
challenge to the belief that the existing framing of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
completely exhausts all “understandings of historical tendencies and…judgments of 
normative possibilities” as these relate to the question of the politics of citizenship.5 
Instead, what will be discussed is how the ‘particular versus universal’, ‘inclusion versus 
exclusion’ lens through which citizenship is currently articulated here, reflects important 
assumptions about what a politics of citizenship must look like due to its attachment to a 
specifically modern account of autonomous subjectivity.6 The result is to allow us to 
reconceptualize existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as a debate in 
and of itself, rather than a series of competing debates. This is a debate which presents a 
spectrum of possible (yet limited) interpretive choices which are defined by a particular 
‘reality’ of what it means to ‘be’ citizen (a political subject) in terms of sovereignty and 
autonomy.   
The chapter proceeds by considering the main arguments which have been put 
forward in favour and against the 2004 Citizenship Referendum. It then explores the 
dominant intellectual and theoretical explanations for these arguments and discusses why 
and how these are normally articulated in terms of opposing models of citizenship. The 
aim of this first section is to highlight the reliance of both models on the notion of the 
individual (albeit often via a very deconstructed understanding) as the lowest unit of 
analysis who is understood in terms of their ability to hold rights always against the state. 
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The second section then considers how this framework is challenged by the notion of a 
constitutive subject of (sovereign) politics as theorized by R.B.J. Walker. This 
specifically problematizes the notion of individuality as a form of being – not only in its 
own right, as has been done already in critical citizenship scholarship via gendered and 
ethnic understandings of subjectivity – but as that which is understood as connected to, 
yet ultimately separate from the (Irish) state.  
The final section outlines what a reconceptualized concept of citizenship would 
look like. It suggests that the notion of a constitutive subject of citizenship presents us 
with a different starting point from which to approach questions regarding the politics of 
citizenship in the Republic of Ireland, to that which is currently offered. Doing so, it 
destabilizes the inevitability of the current framework. This current framework takes for 
granted that we must read citizenship via an understanding of subjectivity as autonomous 
and separate from the state, and therefore in terms of inclusionary versus exclusionary 
models. In contrast to this, Walker’s work indicates that we need to think about 
conceptions of subjectivity outside of individuality. Julia Kristeva’s work is introduced to 
provide an alternative understanding of political subjectivity for this framework. She 
presents an understanding of subjectivity which is no longer based on a metaphysics of 
presence vis-à-vis the state (sovereignty), but on a metaphysics of process via plurality 
and hybridity. This is an understanding of human ‘being’ based on rupture rather than 
unity. Unlike the existing framework, I emphasize that the aim here is no longer to 
attempt to ‘resolve’ the question of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland post 2004 via 
understandings of a more inclusive Irish statist project. Instead the aim of this alternative 
framework is that of providing the possibility of reconceiving of subjectivity in terms 
other than those (pre)determined by the sovereign autonomous boundaries of the Irish 
state. These are terms which expressly complexify the clean lines which have been 
imposed on understandings that the relationship between politics (of citizenship) and 
subjectivity must be conceptualized in terms of identity (inside) versus difference 
(outside).  
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The 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum Debate 
This section outlines the two sides of the debate as structured at the time of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum according to existing analysis. However, the point in doing so 
here is not to engage in yet another discussion as to whether in 2004 the proposed 
amendment to the constitution was based on a legitimate civic (sovereign) understanding 
of citizenship or, alternatively an ethnic (racist) understanding of citizenship. Rather, as 
will become increasingly clear, these positions are outlined in this chapter in such a way 
as to provide a basis for exploring throughout the remainder of the thesis the manner in 
which both, as articulated, leave unquestioned a modern concept of subjectivity which 
sits at the heart of this debate itself. As such, it should be noted that these positions are 
not presented here in order to be analysed as part of this thesis, as if these presented an 
infinite array of possible options for interpretation, as this would follow the format taken 
in existing analysis of the referendum. Instead, my insistence on outlining the discussions 
surrounding the Citizenship Referendum in the manner below should be seen as part of 
the process through which this existing analysis is reconceptualized here as a very 
specific “spectrum of interpretive dispositions”7 – what R.B.J. Walker refers to as ‘the 
citizenship debate’ – which relied upon a modern concept of subjectivity within which 
the ‘reality’ of Irish Citizenship was constructed in the first place in 2004.  The outline 
given below should therefore be seen as part of the analysis underlying this thesis which 
is based on considering how we can reconceive of the referendum as a debate in its own 
right rather than as a series of competing debates. This is an analysis which is based on 
refusing to simply engage in the terms of this aforementioned citizenship debate which 
existing analysis reinforces, and which dictates that we must choose between the options 
of universalism and particularism, inclusion and exclusion, nationalism and 
postnationalism, identity and difference; or alternatively, that we must negotiate a middle 
ground between them.  
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Sovereign Statehood  
On 10 March 2004 the Irish Government announced its plans to hold a referendum on the 
right to citizenship on the island of Ireland. It indicated that this referendum would be 
held at some point in 2004. Approximately one month later on 8 April, The Twenty-
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004 was initiated in Dáil Éireann. This 
proposed that the following additional wording be inserted into Article 9 of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann:  
Article 9.2.1 Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in 
the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time 
of his or her birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish 
citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless otherwise provided for by 
law.  
 
Article 9.2.2 This section shall not apply to persons born before the date of the enactment 
of this section. 
 
Initially an initiative of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (henceforth 
‘the Department of Justice’), the referendum proposal was nonetheless backed by the 
then FF/PD coalition and presented as a Bill with full Government support. At first the 
Government declared that it was undecided as to when to hold the referendum. It 
eventually confirmed, however, that in the event of this Constitutional Bill being passed 
by both Houses of the Oireachtas the proposal contained therein would be put to the 
people of Ireland in a referendum to be held in conjunction with European and local 
elections on 11 June that same year.  
The argument in favour of inserting a qualification into Article 9 in the manner 
outlined in the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill was articulated in 
several key documents issued by the Department of Justice in March and April of 2004.8 
These highlight the Irish Government’s belief in its sovereign duty to regulate entry into, 
as well as residence within the state, but specifically identify several factors impeding 
this. They explain that the 2002 Programme for Government had indicated a commitment 
to deal with two issues which had been identified as impeding the Government’s ability 
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to assert its sovereign duty in this regard.9 In the piece written by the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform (henceforth ‘the Minister for Justice’) he identifies these as the 
“apparently strong legal claim on the part of non-national parents of a child born…[in 
Ireland] to remain in the State, based on the Fajujonu case”; and second, the entitlement, 
inserted in 1998 under Article 2 of the Constitution, of all those born in Ireland to 
become Irish citizens.10 Whereas it is pointed out that the first of these issues had been 
dealt with through the Supreme Court in 2003 in the Lobe and Osayande case, the 
Minister for Justice argues that the latter – which elsewhere the Government points out 
was “unique in the European Union and unusual world wide” 11 – can only be dealt with 
through a referendum which would remove the automatic entitlement to citizenship at 
birth on Irish soil.12 According to all three briefing documents this needed to be done 
urgently in order to put a stop to what had been identified as “a high incidence” of non-
national women arriving into Irish maternity hospitals in late pregnancy, or in the early 
stages of labour; a phenomenon which the Government argued “is directly related to the 
fact that Irish law at present gives to the children [of said pregnant women] the 
entitlement to Irish citizenship and thus to citizenship of the European Union”.13  
 
Fajujonu ruling  
The 1990 Fajujonu case referred to a Supreme Court ruling involving two undocumented 
migrant parents (one of Moroccan nationality and one of Nigerian nationality) who were 
the parents of Irish citizen children and who sought for the right to remain in Ireland on 
this basis.14 Prior to Fajujonu there had been several cases in the 1980s involving 
undocumented migrant males seeking to remain in Ireland on the basis of being married 
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to Irish citizens and having Irish citizen children, yet these had failed.15 Under Fajujonu 
what was emphasized by the Supreme Court however, was the length of time which the 
parents had been living in Ireland (nine years) and the extent to which the family were 
integrated into Irish society as a result of this. The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the 
parents did have a strong case to remain in Ireland to provide ‘company, care and 
parentage’ to their citizen child within the state on the basis of a child’s entitlement to 
company and protection of their family as set out in Articles 41 and 42 of the 1937 
Constitution.16 As one of the two Judges who delivered the judgement (which was 
endorsed by the three remaining judges) explained at the time, their belief was that:   
where, as occurs in this case, an alien has in fact resided for an appreciable time in the 
State and has become a member of a family unit within the State containing children who 
are citizens . . . there can be no question but that those children, as citizens, have got a 
constitutional right to the company, care and parentage of their parents within a family 
unit . . . prima facie and subject to the exigencies of the common good . . . that is a right 
which these citizens [are] entitled to exercise within the State17 
 
Subsequent to the Fajujonu ruling, a precedent was set which allowed Irish citizen 
children to invoke their right to the care and company of their parents in the Republic of 
Ireland. According to the Government’s own figures18, between 1999 and 2003 
approximately 10,000 non-EEA nationals were granted the right to remain in Ireland on 
the basis of being the parents of an Irish citizen child.19 In 2003 however, a landmark 
ruling undermined this precedent. This landmark ruling came several years after the 
Department of Justice readjusted its policy and began mid-way through 2001 to refuse 
applications from parents of Irish citizen children in those cases where it was deemed that 
the family had not been spent “an appreciable length of time” in the state.20 Eventually in 
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2003 a test case presented itself in the Lobe and Osayande case. Lobe and Osayande 
involved the case of a Czech Roma family (the Lobes) and a Nigerian family (the 
Osayandes) seeking a similar right to residence in Ireland to provide ‘company, care and 
parentage’ for their Irish born child as sought in the Fajujonu case.21 This was rejected 
however for a series of reasons which the Supreme Court eventually upheld: these 
included what was perceived to be a relatively short period of time during which the 
families had been living in Ireland (the Lobes, nine months and the Osayandes, seven 
months) and the fact that several members of both families had applied for asylum in the 
United Kingdom (UK) before moving to Ireland and were therefore in breach of the 
Dublin Convention.22 What was also specifically stressed by the Supreme Court judges 
was the fact that there had been a sizable increase in asylum applications in Ireland 
during the previous decade (from 424 in 1992 to 10,934 in 2000, and to 11,503 as of 
January 2003).23 Given that many asylum seekers could be shown to have eventually 
applied for leave to remain on the basis of the parentage of an Irish citizen child or 
sibling, what was implied was that this process was working to circumvent the asylum 
process.24 As a result, in the Lobe and Osayande case it was ruled for the first time since 
1990 that a non-national parents’ right to remain in Ireland to bring up their child needed 
to be weighed against the additional importance of the integrity of the asylum process and 
the state’s need to control entry into, as well as residence within, the state.25  
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In its ‘information note’ on the proposed referendum, the Government argued that 
it had, as a result of this ruling, been able to begin to reassess the situation in which non-
national parents sought to remain in Ireland on the basis of their Irish-born child. In his 
article published initially in The Sunday Independent, the then Minister for Justice 
insisted that this was because “[t]he Court made clear that the factors to be taken into 
account went beyond the location of birth alone – the length of stay of the families and 
their circumstances and the general requirements of the common good were also 
relevant”.26 The information note goes on to explain that the Government had since 
begun to clarify the new position regarding these changes. On 17 July 2003 the 
Government announced that its strategy for the handling of claims for leave to remain in 
the state on the basis of an Irish born child was that these would no longer warrant a 
separate process to other migration/asylum claims. It subsequently sent letters to all 
persons who had submitted applications under this previously alternative legal basis for 
remaining in the state, explaining to them that there was no longer an ‘Irish born child’ 
status and that their claims would not be considered on this basis any longer.27 The 
Government did not give figures at the time but it was subsequently estimated that 
approximately 10,000 applications (made before January 2003) for leave to remain on the 
basis of an Irish born child or sibling, remained outstanding.28  
 
Article 2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann  
Having begun to deal with this first issue, the Government argued that there was one 
more issue to deal with which was impeding its ability to control entry into and residence 
within the state. This was the wording of Article 2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. Article 2 of 
the Constitution was a result of negotiations made under the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement between the Irish and British governments. It was agreed here that the 
existing territorial claim by the Republic to the whole of the island of Ireland (the 
previous Article 2) would be replaced with a constitutional entitlement to all those living 
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on the island to become Irish citizens, but only should they wish to do so.29 Under the 
Good Friday Agreement, the existing Article 2 was therefore replaced with the following:  
Article 2 It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island Ireland, 
which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the 
entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of 
Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish 
ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.30 
 
According to the Government, this right to Irish citizenship at birth had previously only 
been provided for in Irish law (Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 and 1986). The 
reason this distinction was important, it was explained, was because this meant that the 
Oireachtas had always previously retained the power to legislate (and therefore to 
control) the exact conditions necessary for the acquisition of citizenship on the island. 
What it argued was that when citizenship at birth was eventually enshrined 
constitutionally under the Good Friday Agreement, this removed the Oireachtas’ power 
to legislate in this matter. In outlining its proposals for a citizenship referendum in 2004, 
the Government therefore argued that the need for the referendum on citizenship was 
based on a requirement to restore power to the Oireachtas: 
power, which is in line with the general statement at Article 9.1.2 of the Constitution, 
[and which] has not been available since the incorporation of the present wording of 
Article 2 by the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, effective from 2 
December 1999.31  
 
As an explanation for why the constitutional entitlement to citizenship at birth 
needed to be changed specifically at that point in 2004, the Government pointed to how 
much the immigration situation on the island of Ireland had changed since 1998 when the 
Good Friday Agreement was negotiated. Having previously always been a country of net 
emigration, Ireland had become a country of net immigration in the twenty-first century. 
This phenomenon was due to large numbers of Irish citizens who had left Ireland in the 
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previous decades (mostly 1980s and 1990s) returning to Ireland once again, as well as 
equally large numbers of people coming to live in Ireland for the first time.32 It was 
however only the latter group which was the focus of concern in discussions surrounding 
the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. In light of a sustained increase in the numbers of 
persons born outside of the island of Ireland taking up residence over the previous 
decade33, the argument made by the Government was that the universal automatic 
constitutional entitlement to citizenship at birth in Ireland was permitting children of 
persons (referred to as ‘non-nationals’) who did not have sufficient connection with 
Ireland, to acquire significant rights (which they might otherwise not be entitled to) 
simply by virtue of being born in Ireland. This, according to the Government, was an 
abuse of the system and needed to be rectified via referendum so as to remove the 
universality of this entitlement from the Constitution. They further argued that despite the 
change in Government policy since the Lobe and Osayande ruling which effectively 
abolished the ‘Irish-born child route’ as a means for parents to gain residency and remain 
in Ireland, the constitutional right to citizenship at birth agreed to under the Good Friday 
agreement was proving to be an enduring incentive (described as ‘a loophole’) for non-
national parents to give birth in Ireland. The Government insisted that the proposed 
referendum was necessary to remove this incentive.34  
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As proof of the abuse to which it referred, the Government pointed first to a high 
proportion of asylum seekers arriving pregnant to Ireland in the preceding few years.35  It 
also pointed to a general increase since 1998 of births to non-nationals in the state and in 
recent years to the specific experience at certain Dublin maternity hospitals of “a 
disproportionate number” of non-national women presenting unannounced in both late 
pregnancy and in the early stages of labour, only to leave the country soon after giving 
birth.36 The Government insisted that the Masters (Medical Directors) of the three main 
maternity hospitals in the capital city Dublin had come to them indicating serious 
concerns: that this practice was both endangering the lives of pregnant women and 
presenting a great strain on the existing maternity services.37 Described as ‘citizenship 
tourism’ by the Government, it eventually concluded that “[t]he inescapable conclusion is 
that non-national parents, whether based in Ireland or not, quite reasonably perceive an 
advantage by giving birth in Ireland to a child who thereby becomes an Irish, and thus an 
EU citizen.”38  
The rationale behind the proposed citizenship referendum was accordingly 
presented as a “simple” and “sensible” effort to deal with this issue by both parties in 
government.39 Both insisted above all on the need to preserve the ‘integrity’ of Irish 
citizenship arguing that regardless of the actual numbers, the practice itself of “conferring 
Irish citizenship on the future children of these estranged Irish-born citizens…is an 
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unacceptable abuse of our citizenship laws and it undermines the…value of what it 
means to be an Irish citizen”.40 The Tánaiste argued that the simple fact of the matter was 
that “our constitutional provisions are being used in a way we did not intend”.41 The 
current situation, she argued, was “not…[one] in which citizenship is sufficiently valued 
and honored”.42 The largest party in Government (FF) subsequently launched its 
campaign for a Yes vote in the citizenship referendum with posters which read ‘Vote Yes 
to Common Sense Citizenship’. The leader of FF and Taoiseach put it equally simply 
thus:  
the constitutional referendum on citizenship has a single and straightforward purpose. 
There is a loophole in our citizenship law that is open to abuse. Voting Yes will close that 
loophole. Ireland is the only EU country that allows an unrestricted right to citizenship at 
birth. The Governments [sic] proposals are to change that.43  
 
The deputy Prime Minister insisted that a Yes vote on 11 June would merely bring Irish 
citizenship legislation in line with other European countries by “end[ing] the situation 
where people who have no connection with Ireland, and may continue to have no 
connection with Ireland, can acquire citizenship for their children”.44  
In May of 2004 the Irish Government identified what it argued was a further 
‘impetus’ for the referendum in a ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice’s 
Advocate General on the case of baby Catherine Chen that month.45 Catherine’s mother, 
a pregnant Mrs. Chen (a Chinese national) had been due to be deported from the UK 
when, under advice from her lawyer Mrs. Chen had flown to Northern Ireland to give 
birth. Upon securing Irish (and therefore European Union (EU)) citizenship for her 
daughter, Mrs. Chen had eventually been allowed to return to the UK.46 The Irish 
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Government argued that the judgment by the Advocate General to allow Mrs. Chen to 
reside in the UK following the birth of her Irish citizen daughter – on the basis that 
Article 18 of the European Community (EC) Treaty provides for the right of every citizen 
of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States – 
“highlighted the fact that having an Irish-born child is a passport to residency in wider 
Europe”.47 It argued that this case signaled even more clearly the need for an urgent 
change in the nature in which Irish citizenship could be acquired to prevent Ireland from 
being further used as a backdoor into Europe.48  
In existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum the pro-referendum 
stance articulated by the Irish Government has been associated with the belief that 
genuine citizenship must be based in the nation-state. According to this reading of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, the model of citizenship invoked here by the Irish 
Government is a particular or ‘bounded’ model of citizenship.  Tracing the idea back to 
Rousseau and his “small-is necessary perspective on citizenship”, David Miller equates 
bounded citizenship with the republican understandings of citizenship as an active ideal.49 
Here a specific political community is constructed around a bounded unit, understood as 
a finite single entity which is defined on the basis of shared characteristics.50  
 
Racial Statehood 
The proclamation of 1916 promised to ‘cherish all of the children of the nation 
equally’…yet this has been rendered effectively valueless by the Citizenship Referendum 
and subsequent legislation. The Irish state was able to strip some of its most vulnerable 
children of citizenship with the support of 80 per cent of the population. This reality is at 
the very core of the racism that we confront in 21st century Ireland. Ronit Lentin and 
Robbie McVeigh51 
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The argument against the removal of the constitutional entitlement to birthright 
citizenship in Ireland in 2004 was articulated by most of the main Opposition parties in 
conjunction with various sections of Irish civil society. The largest Opposition party at 
the time (Fine Gael (FG)) objected to the timing of the referendum but did not oppose the 
basis of the referendum proposal itself.52 Those who did object to the substance of the 
proposal included the Green Party, the Labour Party, Sinn Féin (SF), the Socialist Party, 
ICCL, the Children’s Rights Alliance, Integrating Ireland, IHRC and NCCRI.53 In the 
first instance, these bodies pointed out between them that the term itself ‘non-national’ 
was highly misleading as it lumped together a range of categories of persons who could 
be living in the state for a variety of different reasons, most of which involved a long-
term commitment to living and working in the state.54 They also challenged the statistical 
evidence presented, as well as the ‘fact’ of a direct correlation between the constitutional 
entitlement to birthright citizenship and the arrival of pregnant women in late stages of 
pregnancy or early stages of labour at Dublin maternity hospitals.55  
            One of the main arguments at the time was that the Government could provide no 
satisfactory breakdown for the overall numbers of births to non-nationals in order to 
confirm that they were in fact ‘disproportionate’.56 A damning report by the Children’s 
Rights Alliance exploring the Government’s argument found, on the contrary, that these 
numbers were in keeping with increasing volumes of inward migration to Ireland over the 
previous decade and the simple fact that a large percentage of migrant women were of 
childbearing age. This report also significantly points out – looking specifically at one 
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Dublin Maternity Hospital, the Coombe, but implying that these are consistent statistics 
across the other Dublin maternity hospitals – that it was not only non-nationals that had a 
tendency to arrive unannounced or in the late stages of pregnancy. It indicates rather that 
many Irish citizens did this during the same period as the Government emphasized the 
incident of non-national women doing so.57 Overall, the lack of disaggregated statistics in 
this area is criticized. This report points out, for example, that even where it did exist the 
statistical data gathered to date in 2004 on births to non-Irish nationals in Dublin’s 
maternity hospitals was not very useful. This is insofar as the term ‘non-national’ 
included women with British and/or other EU citizenship as well as those from outside 
the European Economic Area (EEA). It therefore did not distinguish between those for 
whom citizenship would not be a major pull factor given the increasingly narrowing gap 
between national and EU citizenship rights, as against those for whom it might be.58 This 
report pointed out that those who were non-EEA citizens needed furthermore to be 
differentiated in terms of whether they were tourists, persons with refugee status (who 
therefore have Irish citizenship), or persons who had been granted a work visa or a work 
authorization permit in order to fill a gap in the labour market. It notes that “[w]omen in 
each category will have different reasons for their presence in Ireland at the time of 
giving birth” but points out that this is not acknowledged in existing statistics as 
maternity hospitals simply do not collect what is referred to as “comprehensive data” 
relating to the residency status of mothers.59  
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            In addition to definitional and statistical issues, the idea that the referendum 
proposal itself was a ‘simple technical’ adjustment which would restore power to the 
Oireachtas to legislate on citizenship where this had been removed with the insertion of 
the amended Article 2 under the Good Friday Agreement, was refuted. Instead what was 
argued was that jus soli (birthright citizenship) had formed the fundamental basis of Irish 
citizenship since the foundation of the Irish Free State in 1922: initially through article 3 
of the Constitution of the Irish Free State and later without interruption through 
successive legislation (Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935, 1956 and 1986) under the 
1937 Constitution Bunreacht na hÉireann. Insisting that “jus soli has been the consistent 
and defining leitmotif of Irish citizenship law since 1922”, what was asserted was that the 
proposed referendum would result therefore in a fundamental shift in how the principle of 
citizenship was to be regulated in Ireland: from being based predominantly on birthright 
citizenship (jus soli) to that of citizenship by descent (jus sanguine).60 It was argued 
furthermore that the so-called ‘loophole’ identified by the Government in Article 2 of the 
Irish Constitution was in fact the result of an overwhelming decision by the majority of 
the population to support the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. What was denied was 
that this attempt to engender a more inclusive concept of Irish citizenship could be 
written off so easily.61 Finally, it was pointed out that despite the implication by the 
Government, there was no imperative for Ireland to harmonize its citizenship legislation 
with that of other EU countries.  
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             Other criticisms which were levelled at the Government were that they had 
allowed very little time for consultation and debate of the issues at hand. Instead they 
guillotined the referendum proposal bill in the Oireachtas and ignored calls for an all-
party committee or hearings on this legislation.62 Existing provisions in Irish citizenship 
legislation which would continue to allow for people of second and third generation Irish 
families to acquire Irish citizenship (often despite having never set foot on Irish soil), 
along with inadequate provisions for affording residency within the state to those who 
were living and working in Ireland for considerable periods of time, were also pointed at 
to indicate the weakness as well as the inconsistency of the Government’s argument that 
its aim was to maintain the ‘integrity’ of Irish citizenship.63 Teachta Dála (Member of 
Parliament) M. Higgins of the Labour Party perhaps best articulated the opposition stance 
to the referendum proposal in this respect: 
To summarise the current position: there has been no European request [to harmonize 
Irish citizenship legislation]; fundamental change to the Constitution is sought; the 
problem has not been quantified and has been distorted; and there has been no 
consultation.64  
 
Without the statistical evidence deemed necessary to back up the Government’s 
arguments regarding ‘citizenship tourism’, serious suspicions were raised about the 
proposal itself.65 Where statistics did indicate abuses of Irish citizenship it was pointed 
out that these were so small that they did not warrant a change in the constitution. “We 
have been told that the number of people affected is 442. That does not represent a 
crisis…The Government is using it and it is opportunism.”66 What was suggested instead 
was that the Government was trying to cover up for a lack of funding in hospitals over 
the previous decade and that immigrants were ultimately being used as scapegoats for 
their failures in this regard.67 The referendum was posited as an attempt by the 
Government to shift attention away from their record at the ballot box on 11 June when 
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local elections were also to be held, “by chang[ing] the agenda to issues of race and 
ethnicity, and to raise scares that do not exist.”68  
It was put forward that the referendum proposal was an attempt to promote “a 
racist notion of citizenship and what it means to be Irish by creating a formal category of 
second-class citizen.”69 What was argued was that differentiating between ‘genuine’ and 
‘non-genuine’ citizens should be seen as a practice in exclusion, one of the main results 
of which was that “migrant women in Ireland have been signified as ‘Other’ and 
stereotyped as sexually active child-makers, deliberately subverting Irish norms of 
citizenship and nationality”.70 Basing this argument on the understanding that “states 
have become the gated communities of the globalised world”,71 what has been invoked 
here is the idea of Ireland as a ‘fortress’ and the state as that which holds the power to 
decide who gets in and who is left out. As Harrington elaborates, the argument is that 
“[w]hat marks the Irish state out, as such, is no longer its exceptional virtue or piety, but 
the powers of exclusion and expulsion which it shares with all states receiving 
immigrants and asylum seekers”.72 Mancini and Finlay associate the pro-referendum 
stance with a narrow understanding of republicanism where the sovereign ‘people’ is 
defined as those who founded the republic “making it impossible to redefine ‘the people’ 
in light of changing circumstances.”73 Bryan Fanning makes a similar point, identifying 
the pro-referendum stance as an essentialist (as opposed to ‘civic’) type of 
republicanism.74 
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Ronit Lentin explains that to refer to ‘racialized exclusions’ in this context is to 
emphasize the “new ethnicized spaces’ in what Sibley calls “Ireland’s geographies of 
exclusion”.75 Here, racism is no longer understood as individual prejudice but as “a 
system of subordination [which…] makes and keeps people different, separate and 
unequal”.76 The suggested alternative is a post-racial citizenship model which promotes 
“less restrictive understanding of Irish citizenship and belonging”77 by encouraging “an 
interrogation of how the Irish nation can become other than white (Christian and 
settled).”78 Crowley, Gilmartin and Kitchin among others have argued that this 
specifically involves an exploration of the idea of a decidedly heterogeneous Irish 
society. They point out that Irish society has always been multi-ethnic (comprising 
Travellers, Black Irish, Jewish among other migrants) despite the myth of the 
monocultural Gael.79  
The point is then that in contrast to an exclusive model of bounded citizenship 
based on national ideals of citizenship proposed by the Government, those who oppose 
the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal are understood to have put forward a inclusive 
model of citizenship which promotes universal ideals regarding the possibilities for 
rethinking citizenship outside of existing narrow statist parameters. As Kimberly 
Hutchings points out, normally the distinction between the particular exclusivist and 
universal inclusivist models of citizenship, and the theories on which they draw, is seen 
to revolve around the manner in which one model sees morality and politics as only 
reconcilable within the nation-state, whereas the other argues that these can be bridged 
outside the nation-state as well.80 In this regard it is widely accepted that they are 
opposing perspectives. However, my argument is that this opposition can be called into 
question by looking specifically at the ideal of subjectivity as autonomous and sovereign 
in the last instance, which underpins both these models in their analysis of the 2004 
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Citizenship Referendum. I use the word ‘ideal’ here to emphasize that as well as an 
attempt to capture how citizenship does work, there is also a normative assumption 
common to both models regarding how citizenship must work.  
 
Sovereign Foundations: The Theoretical Underpinnings of Existing Analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum  
Prior to 2004, the question of Irish citizenship had been defined comprehensively by 
critical scholars in terms of the issue of the exclusion of women, Travellers, Jews and 
African females from the Irish statist project as embodied in the 1937 Constitution.81 
What was emphasized in this work was the existence of “a particular construction of 
…the very substance of what it meant to be Irish” as white, male and settled, and the 
corresponding exclusion of certain groups of people who are constructed as ‘Other’.82 
The 2004 Citizenship Referendum has been interpreted as an extension of this process of 
Othering and there has been a correspondingly heavy emphasis in analysis of it on the 
role which gender, race, class, ethnicity and ideology play in this process. Some authors 
writing here have focused on the dominance of one of these factors,83 whereas others 
have looked at the dominance of particular combinations of these factors.84 Such analysis 
reflects dominant trends in international citizenship scholarship. This is insofar as it 
echoes existing work in this area similarly concerned with the issue of immigration which 
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takes as its starting point how individuals and groups thereof are positioned vis-à-vis the 
state; the emphasis being on how the state constructs groups differently in society 
according to degrees of inclusion and exclusion.85 As Yuval-Davis and Anthias point out 
in their seminal book Women-Nation-State, what has occurred here is a movement away 
from focusing on the way the state acts upon individuals to that of attempting to 
understand how “the state itself forms the political project”.86  
The title of Eleonore Kofman’s paper ‘Citizenship for Some but Not for Others: 
Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe’ indicates here how the aim has been to 
challenge the assumed natural boundaries of the state by underlining their fluidity in 
relation to how individuals are positioned as included and excluded in different ways and 
according to different discourses.87 To this extent T.H. Marshall’s famous definition of 
citizenship (as “full membership of a community”88) has been problematized in how it 
implies that citizenship entails full membership of an established or a static political 
community.89 What has been highlighted is the need to interrogate how the parameters of 
a particular society become fixed, as opposed to merely assuming that they reflect the 
pre-existing ‘reality’ of a particular cohesive community. The notion of an uneven 
struggle through which the terms of membership of a community are ultimately realized 
is paramount in this literature.90 The emphasis on ‘Fortress Europe’ is particularly 
instructive here as that which emphasizes the exclusive nature of what Lutz calls 
‘European-ness’.91 The result is the opposition of two generalized models of citizenship –
the exclusive and the inclusive. As Kabeer explains, this is because the notion of 
inclusive citizenship stands opposed here to “the standpoint of the excluded”92; the latter 
identified with narrow conceptions of ‘European-ness’ in contrast to the former which is 
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associated with the possibility of “a non-sexist, non-racist, non-westocentric theory of 
multilayered dialogical citizenship.”93 
 Within this literature, the importance of ‘the state’ in defining citizenship has 
been challenged and the question of citizenship has been explored from sub (local) and 
supra (global) level perspectives as well as from the national level.94 There has also been 
enormous importance placed on deconstructing the notion itself of ‘individuality’ as 
referring to gender or ethnic neutral, bounded and unattached subjects who willingly 
engage in the social contract.95 This notwithstanding, there remains, however, an 
understanding within this literature that the state (or a sub category thereof) and the 
(deconstructed) individual are still analytical categories in their own right. Yuval-Davis 
and Werbner perhaps best capture this in their introduction to The Situated Politics of 
Belonging. Here they explain that the T.H. Marshall understanding of citizenship as 
embodying three layers (the civil, political and social) permits an expansion of the notion 
of citizenship beyond “the right to carry a passport” and as such as always (and only) 
related to the nation-state, to that of “membership in all kinds of polities from local to 
global in which people participate in multi-layered ways”.96 At the same time they 
equally insist, however, on the necessity of continuing to maintain an understanding of 
the difference between realms of cultural and economic, as against ‘political’, inclusion 
and exclusion in relation to this membership; the latter which we are told is always 
determined by the boundaries of the subnational, national or supra national state.97  
What this indicates is that the emphasis on sub-national (local) and supra-national 
(global) perspectives of citizenship on one hand and the deconstructed notion of 
individuality on the other, does not undermine an understanding of the inter-connected, 
but ultimately autonomous, relationship between the statist realm where politics is 
understood to be taking place and people’s interaction ‘in’ the statist realm (political 
community). This is to point out that despite moving away from understanding 
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citizenship as something which is exclusively “bestowed by the state”98, and towards an 
understanding of it as something which is constructed in terms of other realms, there 
remains an emphasis in this literature on the need to always focus in the last instance on 
how citizenship (and hence the citizen-subject) is defined vis-à-vis the state (political 
realm) as that which delineates the boundaries of these other realms. The result is that the 
notion of autonomous sovereign beings, which exist in the last instance in relation to the 
state and can be included and excluded, is retained regardless of whether an inclusive or 
an exclusive model of citizenship is promoted.  
Emphasizing the inclusive/exclusive citizenship framework within which 
dominant international citizenship studies literature operates is not an attempt here to 
ignore how the positions within this framework can also be broken down along the lines 
of liberal, communitarian, radical (new social movement and feminist) and cosmopolitan 
theories.99 Similarly, it is not to ignore Robin Cohen’s comments regarding a notable 
effort elsewhere within this literature to also consider a compromise to the exclusionary 
focused racial theories of the state in more inclusively focused cosmopolitan 
alternatives.100 It is rather to draw attention to the manner in which the framework within 
which all these theories operate is one which is based on the overall assumption of the 
need to consider how membership of a fluid, universal humanity can be reconciled with 
membership of a particular and bounded community.  
For example, in existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum people 
were only able to vote Yes or No to the proposal and this can be seen to have encouraged 
extremes of opinion. What then of the self-professed more nuanced options which have 
been also offered in existing analysis of this event? Many people have argued that these 
break with the ‘inclusive versus exclusive’ citizenship framework insofar as they attempt 
to provide a model of citizenship which is a combination of the two; a middle ground if 
you will. Bryan Fanning in particular argues, for example, that concentrating on racism as 
the only underlying factor of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum as some people have done 
– by arguing that Ireland, previously a racial state, turned upon the passing of the 2004 
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Citizenship Referendum into a ‘racist’ state101 – is too simplistic.102 He and others have 
instead suggested that the referendum might be better understood in terms of the role 
which nationalism has played as a concept which is bound up with processes of both 
exclusion and inclusion.103 Elsewhere Iseult Honohan has attempted to consider how 
bounded citizenship need not necessarily embody notions of exclusion and particularism 
but, in and of itself “may be conceived of in ways that are more inclusive and open to 
diversity”.104 She does so by outlining “a civic conception [of bounded citizenship] that, 
while still particular, entails criteria that are less exclusive and less demanding of 
homogeneity than other conceptions of membership”.105 Honohan looks here at the 
implications of shifting the emphasis within the concept of bounded citizenship from 
strict regulation (as was focused on in the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal) to that 
of ‘closure’ which is based also on inclusion. She suggests that this allows for more 
nuanced distinctions between conceptions of citizenship than those which are embodied 
in the civic versus ethnic dichotomy normally taken for granted here.  
I would point out, however, that despite moving from emphasizing exclusive and 
inclusive models of citizenship as opposites, to that of exploring how these models can be 
interwoven within certain concepts, the framework which is presented here by those such 
as Cohen and Fanning or Honohan still presents the politics of citizenship as that which 
must be defined in terms of the relationship between autonomous persons, or groups of 
autonomous persons (the universal), and the state (the particular). I therefore argue here 
that these more ‘reasonable’ options are not more reasonable in terms of an infinite range 
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of possibilities. They need to be understood in terms of how they are simply more 
reasonable in light of the existing options outlined in the aforementioned trade-off 
between exclusion and inclusion, particularism and universalism that created the ‘reality’ 
that gave rise to a range of limited possibilities through which the politics of citizenship 
could be debated in the first place.  
To conclude, the point being made in the first section of this chapter is that 
existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum mirrors dominant trends in 
international critical citizenship scholarship. It does so by always positing the question of 
the politics of citizenship in terms of the relationship between subjectivity and the state 
via an emphasis on inclusion and exclusion in the statist project. It accordingly both 
reflects and reinforces a certain ideal that the character and location of modern political 
identity must be located in the claims of state sovereignty.106 This places an emphasis on 
the institution of the state and divides responses into either those that justify, or those that 
critique the patterns of exclusion which can be traced through it. Despite a differing of 
opinion regarding the degree of inclusive-ness or exclusive-ness of the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum, the point is that the lowest unit of analysis always remains the individual 
(albeit a thoroughly deconstructed notion) who is understood in terms of their ability to 
hold rights against the state.  
 
 
Challenging the Citizenship Debate 
I will now consider how R.B.J. Walker’s notion of the constitutive subject of citizenship 
poses a challenge to the existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum. As I will 
discuss, his work specifically questions the emphasis in this type of analysis (which is 
then used as a departure point to plot all subsequent trajectories) on the notion of the state 
(or sub category thereof) and (deconstructed) individual, as analytical categories in their 
own right. Walker highlights the manner in which the relationship between citizenship 
and the modern sovereign territorial state is a historically specific resolution of the 
question of politics (via diversity and unity) which is extremely significant but not ‘true’ 
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(timeless) beyond its ability to facilitate a modern expression of political identity. The 
result is to force us to think about dominant concepts of citizenship as being tied to a 
particular concept of subjectivity, as opposed to allowing us to presume that subjectivity 
has always been theorized via a framework through which a (subjective) self is theorized 
as sometimes included, sometimes excluded, (and often both) from the (natural) world of 
states and societies. I thus argue that another way of thinking about the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum is possible (albeit extremely difficult to imagine) insofar as this presents us 
with an alternative starting point to conceptualizing the ‘politics’ of citizenship beyond 
how this is defined vis-à-vis the state.   
 
Theorizing Modern Subjectivity  
Unlike existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum and that of critical 
citizenship scholarship more generally in which the emphasis is on how individuals and 
groups of individuals are positioned vis-à-vis the state, R.B.J. Walker identifies a need to 
think about subjectivity in terms of how it is embedded in a historically prior resolution 
of particularism and universalism which is concentrated in the notion of statehood 
itself.107 He does so by pointing to how, with the collapse of the authority structures of 
Christendom and the Roman Empire, there was a shift from a pre-modern to a modern 
framing of the problem of sovereignty. This was a shift in claims about what and where 
political life could be. Walker’s point is that there is a need to consider the difference in 
how politics was based in medieval Europe on a fragmented system of rule – as Camilleri 
discusses, this was a system of “overlapping loyalties and allegiances, geographically 
interwoven jurisdictions and enclaves” (for example, city-states, principalities, trading 
cities, small kingdoms, and ecclesiastical estates).108 This only subsequently, with the 
collapse of Christendom and the secularization of life in general, came to be organized 
around a more centralized system of rule via monarchies (through the employment of 
civil servants, the collection of taxes and dispensation of justice and the hiring of armies 
of mercenary troops) which resulted in an eventual clear-cut distinction between the 
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domestic and external spheres of organization. Political units were not conceptualized in 
the former as self-contained (autonomous) parts which could come together with other 
such parts outside to make up a more universal whole, but as parts of a universal 
(transcendental) whole which had been fragmented from within.  
Although territorially segmented, the constituent units of the cosmopolitan order did not 
manifest the characteristics of possessiveness and exclusiveness associated with the 
modern concept of sovereignty. They saw themselves as municipal embodiments of a 
universal whole.109 
 
The major difference here, as identified by Walker and as further discussed in 
detail by Bartelson in The Genealogy of Sovereignty, is the manner in which political 
entities were not conceptualized in medieval society as fully individuated units but as part 
(instances) of a pre-existent universal. To “distinguish what was within states and what 
was between states was not fully possible, either in theory, or in practice.”110 Rather, the 
notion of ‘an outside’ as that which could be clearly differentiated from ‘an inside’ in 
space and time is something which came about in the shift from medieval hierarchies to 
modern claims to state sovereignty.111 Bartelson refers to the process which took place 
here as that of “inventing outsides”:  
[T]he state was no longer derived from the divinely ordained harmony of the universal 
whole; it was no longer explained as a partial whole which was derived from, and 
preserved by, the existence of the greater: it was simply explained by itself.112 
 
With this in mind, Walker’s argument is that at some point between Machiavelli 
and Hobbes – who he argues can be read as two authors who most infamously attempted 
to respond to the new conditions of early-modern Europe113 – “the political and 
communal creatures envisaged in Aristotelian traditions” gave way to an “unstable 
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modern insistence on a world of free and equal subjects”.114 No longer political or 
communal as they had been under theological authority, this was the moment at which 
people became divisible from ‘politics’ and from each other. It was the moment when 
people became recognized for the first time as ‘individuals’, as the authority of God was 
replaced by the authority of ‘Man’.115 In Citizenship after the Modern Subject, Walker 
specifically explores how, as a result of the redrawing of lines in early-modern Europe 
our understanding of citizenship shifted at this point: from being based in a theologically 
legitimizing feudal status, defined in terms of the status of others above and below 
(hierarchical exclusion), to that of a self-legitimizing status, defined in terms of 
membership of a territorial community (spatial exclusion). Most importantly, Walker 
points out that in the shift from medieval hierarchies to modern autonomies, a particular 
understanding of subjectivity – as citizen-subject who is “at once multiple, specific, 
individual, and (at least potentially) universal, human, rational” – also became crucial to 
our understanding of how our political options should be resolved.116 Walker does not 
deny therefore that states systems have existed in various guises throughout history. He 
does, however, insist that the modern claim to state sovereignty as that which is based on 
the “decisive demarcation between insides and outsides, between self and other, identity 
and difference, community and anarchy that is constitutive of our modern understanding 
of political space”, needs to be understood as a very specific historical achievement 
which is constitutive of modern subjectivity and our conception of the possibilities of 
what it is to be a ‘citizen’.117 
Having drawn our attention to the “assumptions about the past, present and future 
of what we call politics”118, Walker is at pains to stress that despite their historical nature, 
we now take for granted as if they had always been thus “[t]he lines that are drawn 
through early-modern Europe…designated to guarantee separation: of a (subjective) self 
from the (objective, natural) world”.119 Walker does not deny that there are concerted 
resistances to this dominant framing. However, he argues that these too attest to the 
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difficulty of engaging in discussions about citizenship on any other terms than through 
the understanding that it is possible to distinguish the inside from the outside, the 
particular from the universal and therefore via the question of the state and the notion of 
autonomous subjectivity as tied to the state.120 The problem, as Walker points out, is that 
most of the alternatives offered – whether these emphasize a specific theory of 
postnationalism such as cosmopolitanism, or merely promote greater inclusion via 
challenges to statist conceptions of political community – are themselves already 
assumed in the prior formulation of the problem as one of particularism and exclusion 
defined according to the state as analytical category in its own right in the first place.121 
The implication here is that the state has become both the problem and the solution 
regarding questions about the possibilities for political life, and that this framing makes 
the question of citizenship itself when referred back to these statist terms, a “crucial but 
irresolvable problem”.122 As Vaughan-Williams points out, this is because it is the state 
which defines the boundaries of exclusion which are then used to (re)define who needs to 
be ‘included’ in the state; “it is precisely the state that produces the foreigner, immigrant, 
exiled, deported or state-less person in need of greater levels of universal hospitality in 
the first place”.123  
In an attempt to separate out understandings of what political life is supposed to 
be from understandings of how the modern territorial state has become inherent in the 
natural resolution of this question, Walker suggests that citizenship should be 
(re)conceived: not only in relation to where we draw the boundaries of the state or those 
of the individual, but also in relation to how we take for granted the sovereign 
autonomous ‘we’ which supposedly exists separate from the boundaries of the state in the 
first place. He asks us, in other words, to think about citizenship as being tied to a 
particular notion of subjectivity rather than assuming that subjectivity is naturally 
autonomous and sovereign. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two, 
Walker’s notion of a constitutive subject of politics (which he refers to as the modern 
subject) builds on the Foucauldian idea that there is a specific “kind of individuality 
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which has been imposed on us for several centuries”.124 Walker specifically links this 
idea to our current understanding of politics as located in claims to state sovereignty and 
our understandings of time (as linear and progressive) and space (as absolute and infinite) 
associated therewith.125  
There is, however, little evidence that the understanding of the sovereign 
autonomous ‘we’ which supposedly exists separate from the boundaries of the state – to 
which Walker draws our attention – has been anything more than merely assumed in 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. In this analysis, the 
boundaries of the Irish state have been deconstructed: both by the interrogation which has 
taken place of  the notion of ‘Irishness’ as a homogenous or coherent category126 and of 
the underlying foundational category upon which ‘Irishness’ is based which is Irish 
republicanism.127 Similarly the notion of a gender or ethnic neutral self has been 
thoroughly challenged in these accounts. However, there is a relatively unproblematic 
retention in these existing accounts in the last instance of a claim to the original dualism 
of modern subjectivity which Walker identifies – between ‘citizen’ (as particular identity 
defined in terms of the Irish state) and ‘Man’ (as universal identity defined in terms of 
humanity).128 This is despite the challenge which the presence of the Irish citizen/non-
citizen child of non-national parents poses to this dualism. I am referring here to the 
challenge posed by the exceptional status of citizen-children born to undocumented 
migrant parents on the island of Ireland who have (had) an unqualified right to Irish 
citizenship but whose right, as a result of the Fajujonu ruling in 1990, to live in Ireland 
has been suspended (as opposed to being revoked) temporarily by a need to secure the 
‘care and company’ of their parents in the first instance. These children are not entirely 
‘inside’ the Irish state and therefore part of its present national narrative as their 
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citizenship is deferred momentarily, but nor are they ‘outside’ of the Irish state and 
therefore only potentially part of its future national narrative either as they remain Irish 
citizens in law. These Irish citizen children of migrants are in the unusual position of 
being people who can only be conceived of as potential (rather than definite) abusers of 
Irish citizenship therefore; people who could be deported but not necessarily so. This 
challenge forms “a conceptual, empirical and physical breach in the relationship between 
‘human’ and ‘citizens’”, between past and present because both possibilities are deferred 
here, if only momentarily.129 Yet, this is ignored in existing analysis of the referendum 
which focuses instead on the marginalized and exclusionary status of the migrant parents 
of these children. This is arguably because this focus ‘makes sense’ according to existing 
understanding of where we assume ‘political’ subjectivity lies – as either particular (state 
citizenship) and therefore located in the present or, alternatively as universal (a form of 
humanity) and therefore located in the future.  
 
Problematizing Modern Subjectivity 
References by Walker to a specifically modern account of subjectivity which is tied to 
our understanding of what politics is and must be, can be read as shifting the focus in 
debates on citizenship with regard to how subjectivity is conceptualized. Instead of an 
emphasis on coherent categories of subject such as ‘foreigner’, ‘Black’, ‘immigrant’, 
‘African woman’ as in the existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, the 
assumptions underlying the coherency of these subjectivities are questioned. This is done 
via an exploration of the appeals themselves to sovereign and autonomous subjectivity 
(as that which can always be included or excluded), upon which a (modern) notion of 
subjectivity is based. The word coherency is used here to capture a dependency on “the 
lines of analysis that we rely on ‘to make sense’ of our established political 
categories”.130 The alternative proposed is not ‘incoherency’, but rather ‘making strange’ 
the lines which we have come to take so much for granted, which tell us “how 
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universality and diversity must be related”.131 As opposed to starting with a framework 
wherein lines are (always already) drawn between a (subjective) self and an (objective) 
world of states, as is done in existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, 
Walker intimates at a different framework here which starts from the question 
specifically of how understandings of being have been required in the last instance to be 
articulated in terms of a coherent unified entity (a located presence) which can be pointed 
to as ‘included’ or ‘excluded’, as supposedly ‘abusing’ Irish citizenship or as supposedly 
‘not abusing’ Irish citizenship. As Edkins and Pin-Fat discuss in detail elsewhere, this is 
to ask us to consider how a particular symbolic or social order is facilitated through an 
inscription of sovereign subjectivity as that which defines ‘reality’ in terms of modern 
politics, as opposed to presuming that modern politics (a sovereign political order and a 
sovereign autonomous subject) is the only possible political reality.132 Walker’s work 
essentially calls for a historicizing of the basis by which the question of ‘being’ has been 
posed specifically in terms of, and by way of, a particular framing of subjectivity 
(Irishness) via sovereignty (the Irish statist project). To respond to this call therefore is to 
take a new starting point for analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum. It is to start 
specifically with the interruptions into assumptions that the modern state is the primary 
site of legitimate sovereign authority and ask how these interruptions cannot, rather than 
how they can, be subsumed (by redrawing its boundaries) into this dominant 
understanding of political community.  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum takes as its natural starting 
point for questions about citizenship an inclusive/exclusive framework. It then considers 
on the basis of this the relation between understandings of ‘abuse’ (of Irish citizenship) 
and those of exclusion (from the Irish statist project). This (re)produces a modern account 
of subjectivity as coterminous with the boundaries of the statist project insofar as the 
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notion itself of abuse is correlated with ‘being’ outside the state (difference) and the 
notion of non-abuse is correlated with  ‘being’ inside the Irish state (identity). The point 
is that positing the politics of citizenship in 2004 in this way merely reinforces the statist 
monopoly on understandings of political community in the final instance. It does so by 
(re)affirming the binary nature of the issue: either people are inside the state because they 
are not considered to be abusing Irish citizenship, or outside the state because they are 
considered to be abusing Irish citizenship. It then defines the solution – when certain 
people are found to be outside the state – as widening the scope of the statist project to 
prevent further such accusations of abuse, thus reaffirming the state as the legitimate 
sovereign authority. This results in closing down any political possibility which is not 
defined in terms of a subjectivity which is divided into permutations of identity (inside) 
versus difference (outside). It is, as Jabri points out, “a politics which results in the 
exclusion of that which defies easy categorization.”133 There is no room for ambiguous 
in-between spaces because any challenge to the statist monopoly on understandings of 
political community which is opened up, for example, by the transient position which the 
Irish citizen child of non-nationals born in Ireland occupy, is immediately closed down 
by ‘making sense’ of it according to existing political categorizations – in this case their 
parent’s marginal status as non-Irish citizens. As an alternative to this, what I am 
focusing on is the transient position which the children of non-nationals born in Ireland 
occupy as potential abusers of Irish citizenship, despite being Irish citizens. This enables 
an exploration of the possibilities opened up by this ambivalent positioning via its 
challenge to existing understandings regarding the boundaries of political authority, and a 
refusal to merely fit this ambivalence back into the dominant statist framework which 
clearly delineates between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘included’ and the ‘excluded’, ‘old’ and 
‘new’ citizens.  
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Citizenship ‘After’ the Modern Subject 
In existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum the emphasis on “privileging the 
voices of the racialised”134 reveals that there is an assumption that ‘they’ can be brought 
‘inside’ relations of power to counteract exclusive understandings of community with 
more inclusive ones. This takes for granted a coherency; a tangible inside which opposes 
itself to a tangible outside (if only in the last instance). It assumes a resolvability within 
spatially defined communities along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity and culture. In 
other words, although the boundaries of this community (understandings of ‘where’ the 
lines of the (Irish) state should be drawn) are no longer being taken for granted in critical 
explorations of the referendum, the location of (modern) political identity 
(understandings of how it is necessary to think about borders as absolute space between 
inclusion and exclusion) is still bound to the inscription of sovereign subjectivity. This is 
to point out that subjectivity is understood as that which can be defined in space and 
across time in the same way as the modern statist political community is defined.  
Yet, citizenship is a site which marks the highly problematic nature of what and 
where politics occurs – as the debate about Irish citizen children born to non-national 
parents makes clear. Citizenship asks difficult questions about who and how we 
understand ourselves to be and confirms that the drawing of these lines is always much 
more complex than the eventual borders which emerge between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and 
between ‘racialized’ and ‘non-racialized’, would suggest. Irish citizen children born to 
non-national parents straddle several positions at once. They do so as agents and 
therefore as subjects. Their subjectivity cannot be defined in terms of singular agency 
because they are both agents as Irish citizens who belong and also deprived of agency as 
people who can be deported because they do not belong.  
To consider Walker’s work, I propose, is therefore to consider more generally 
how to interrogate “the image of clean lines…which prevails as a regulative ambition of 
modern political life.”135 Edkins and Pin-Fat identify an important difference in recent 
attempts to retheorize the political through the notion of ‘subjectivity’ which is 
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instructive here in considering what is at stake in Walker’s work. This is the difference 
which they identify between attempts which have been made to simply question the 
notion of the subject as the authentic source of action of meaning, and attempts which 
have been made to reconceptualize the subject by thinking of it in a new displaced or de-
centred position. Edkins and Pin-Fat point out that in the latter attempts, the emphasis is 
on a subject without any fixed, essential or permanent identity. Here, the subject is left 
“not only fragmented but irretrievably split” and it calls the idea itself of sovereignty and 
its linearities (the self versus the other, inside versus outside) into question.136 The result 
is an emphasis on the possibility of a politics based upon the ambivalence of subjectivity 
as an accumulation of encounters and synthesis which cannot be defined in terms of 
particular groupings or levels of inclusion and exclusion in an overarching sovereign 
statist project. 
 
The Politics of Sovereign Statehood  
In response to the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal which identified certain people 
as abusing Irish citizenship, a call was made for “possibilities for other, less restrictive 
understandings of citizenship and belonging”.137 This was a call to conceptually enlarge 
the boundaries of the imagined Irish community (those entitled to citizenship). The aim 
here was defined as that of a “challenge [to] essentialising views of immigrants and 
Irishness” in order to point to how those excluded can also be seen as increasingly 
intertwined within the Irish statist project.138 The starting point for doing this, as already 
discussed, has been via an exploration specifically of the statist monopoly on 
understandings of political community with a view to deconstructing this. The problem 
having been thus defined in terms of the question of conceptions of abuse of citizenship 
by those located outside the Irish state, the solution is understood in terms of an emphasis 
on a more cosmopolitan Irish community whose existing narrow (white, settled and 
Catholic) boundaries have been broadened. As Bryan Fanning’s book New Guests of the 
Irish Nation discusses, the aim is to replace, via “adaptive nation building”, the ‘old’ 
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understanding of two separate communities (Irish and guests) with an understanding of a 
‘new’ large community which has a broader range of identifications.139  
What this indicates is that while existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum allows for a conception of the politics of citizenship in terms of fluid and 
overlapping identities, it does so only insofar as these can be theorized in relation to the 
sovereign autonomous boundaries of political communities which are enabled by the 
state. Despite constant deconstruction of understandings of ‘them’ as outsiders and ‘us’ 
as insiders, identity (Irishness) has continued to be conceptualized as ontologically 
against difference (newness) in terms of how they are two interlinked yet separate unitary 
entities. These are the categories which are “constitutive of our modern understanding of 
political space.”140 The question of the political possibility of citizenship in the Republic 
of Ireland continues to be understood in relation to the Irish statist project by emphasizing 
the solution as a more broadened conception within this of what it means to be Irish. We 
are told how those who have been excluded from the Irish statist project can now be 
included and how this is to be realized. Yet, there is little room to explore the 
implications of how our desire to ‘include’ in the national narrative – to think of 
subjectivity in terms of sovereign autonomous entities existing in linear progressive time 
– presupposes that ‘exclusion’ must be defined according to these spatial and temporal 
understandings associated with the state. There is no conceptual space to question the 
basis of the assumption that the Irish state is always the proper legitimate authority in this 
regard. 
 
Political (Im)possibilities   
Walker’s work destabilizes the truth that we must take state sovereignty as the necessary 
starting point for thinking about political subjectivity. It indicates instead that we need to 
think about the possibility that political subjectivity also operates outside of a sovereign 
framework. Moving deliberately away from defining the possibility of politics in terms 
first and foremost of the state is to refuse a specifically modern form of understanding 
                                                 
139
 Fanning, B. (2009) ‘The New Irish’ In: New Guests, pp.145-156 
140
 Walker, Inside/Outside, p.174 
 63 
ourselves of ‘being’ associated with the metaphysics of presence.141 In the case of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, this is to refuse the existing positioning of ‘being’ in 
terms of immigrant versus Irish, them versus us, those inside understandings of 
citizenship versus those outside understandings of citizenship, just because these 
groupings make sense according to established political categories. Instead of taking 
these boundaries as a starting point to try to understand how conceptions of subjectivity 
remain embedded in statist understandings of political community, the autonomy of these 
categories and the manner in which they derive their meaning from the state as analytical 
category du jour becomes that which needs to be explained.  
I argue that an alternative to the dominant sovereign framing of subjectivity can 
be found in the work of Julia Kristeva. In Strangers to Ourselves Kristeva considers the 
lived political experience of groups classified as ‘migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’.142 
What Kristeva emphasizes is how the geographical and the corporal experience of lived 
borders (between national and international, between self and other) meet in these images 
of foreignness. Using Freud’s explorations of the unconscious, as that which divides and 
(re)divides the internal self, to further explore how borders act as symbolic as well as 
physical signifiers of difference, Kristeva then considers how ‘foreignness’ can be 
theorized as “a symptom” which undermines the notion itself of unified selfhood by 
haunting both identity and difference, inside and outside.143 In doing so, Kristeva rethinks 
the human condition as one of rupture within the notion of the (coherent) self and within 
(coherent) ‘selves’, as opposed to across them. The point is that instead of merely 
questioning the identity/difference, inside/outside framework within which conceptions 
of what it is to ‘be’ a subject are framed by the statist political discourse – this idea of the 
space of borderline as coterminous with the state – Kristeva indicates at how ‘being’ can 
be reconceptualized as “a strange land of borders and otherness ceaselessly constructed 
and deconstructed.”144 What we are left with then, as Jabri points out, is an “ever-shifting 
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location of the borderline that…is no longer at the geographic boundaries of the state [nor 
at the physical boundaries of the subject] but permeates society [and ‘self’] within.”145  
Unlike existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, Kristeva’s 
work cannot be read as an attempt to think how a ‘fractured’ subject and their various 
parts can be (re)conceived of in sovereign coherent terms as ‘hyphenated-Irish’ or as 
‘new guest of the nation’. Rather, she provides a re-reading of the ontological status of 
subjectivity itself – in terms of rupture rather than unity. In Kristeva’s work the lines 
between foreigner and native, identity and difference, us and them, blur. Not only 
because they are more difficult to identify but because in concentrating on how 
“foreignness…creeps into the tranquility of reason itself”146, the metaphysics of presence 
that sovereignty brings which is required to speak these lines, is displaced by “an 
ontological rift that an absence of any sovereignty suggests”.147 This is to leave the reader 
with an alterative understanding of ‘being’ as divided in its reliance on the notion of 
selves which implicates oppositional otherness, rather than an understanding of ‘being’ as 
divided in terms of ‘the self’ which can oppose otherness. The only way of 
conceptualizing human ‘being’ is no longer through a metaphysics of presence vis-à-vis 
the state (sovereignty) – “substance ontology”148 – but also through a metaphysics of 
process (an ontology of plurality and hybridity). This understanding presents a very 
different conception of how the ‘politics’ of citizenship might be posed to what is 
currently presented in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
As Vicki Squire points out, a refusal to engage in an analytical framework that 
automatically supposes the logic of an inside/outside binary in relation to the question of 
citizenship, is not to ignore moments when this type of logic does come into play. It is 
rather to avoid “automatically presume[ing] such a logic to be manifest” and instead 
allow for the possibility that marginality can be conceived of via processes of 
differentiation which are “irregular, abnormal, strange” as well as sovereign and 
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autonomous.149 Thinking in terms of the strategy offered in the work of Julia Kristeva is 
not to ignore, therefore, the exclusion which is defined in statist terms but to provide an 
alternative to the constant renegotiation of the categories of ‘them’ and ‘us’ according to 
this inside/outside binary logic where the focus is (always) on that of replacing ‘excluded 
immigrant’ and ‘included Irish’ with other coherent and self-contained understandings 
such as ‘host’ and ‘newcomer’ or ‘old’ and ‘new’ Irish. This allows for the possibility of 
a politics of citizenship that specifically recognizes the incompleteness of the subject and 
its fragmented being before lines are drawn along hierarchies of class, status, social order 
and territorial place and it can be authoritatively declared that ‘you’ have been 
constructed as belonging there, ‘we’ have been constructed as belonging here. This is to 
move away from the question of what ‘makes sense’ as to rethink citizenship without the 
modern subject is precisely not to make sense in the normal way. It is rather to think 
contemporary politics in terms of how we might “exceed the discursive space made 
available by an apparent binary but in effect mutually constitutive choice between 
state/nation/republic and some half-remembered, half-forgotten cosmopolis”.150  
The alternative lines of analysis advocated by Walker therefore do not provide a 
new ‘solution’ to the politics of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland in 2004 and since, 
nor elsewhere. What they do offer, however, is an(other) starting point for approaching 
the question of how the ‘politics’ of citizenship could be articulated in such a situation. 
This is one which tries not to fix possible responses according to the lines inscribed by 
modern subjectivities, but which actively encourages engagement with the patterns of 
continuity and diversity that eschew the clear, clean lines which tell us who we are and, 
where the (legitimate) boundaries of political community (must) lie.  
 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has looked at how, in keeping with the assumption that the state is the site of 
proper authority, existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum makes sense of 
the precarious positioning of children born to non-national parents in Ireland as Irish/non-
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Irish citizens, in terms of their degree of inclusion and exclusion from the Irish statist 
project. In contrast to this singular focus, this chapter has sought to consider how moves 
could be made to explore instead the precariousness of this subjectivity outside of 
established understandings of where the boundaries of citizenship normally lie. This has 
been done by introducing R.B.J. Walker’s notion of the constitutive subject of 
citizenship, as that which interrupts the existing citizenship debate as based around 
questions of inclusion and exclusion ‘in’ the statist project by contesting the assumption 
that subjectivity has to be defined vis-à-vis its relationship with the state. His work 
allows us to consider instead the assumptions regarding autonomy and sovereignty which 
this assumes and (re)produces. In so doing, this chapter has sought to rethink our 
understanding of the existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. Instead 
of presenting an infinite range of options according to which citizenship can be 
understood (a series of competing debates about citizenship), this is reconceptualized as 
presenting a spectrum of interpretive dispositions within which a certain ‘reality’ 
regarding citizenship has been constructed in and around the image of modern 
subjectivity (a general citizenship debate made up of various positions). 
Sara Salih argues that “making the ordinary world seem strange (rather than 
unintelligible) constitutes a move towards a more capacious understanding of 
otherness.”151 Our task, however, she explains, is not to emancipate ourselves from 
existing understandings of who we are but rather to “replay and recite them in order to 
reveal the[ir] instabilit[ies]”.152 Walker’s work as applied here should not therefore be 
taken to imply that we can move ‘beyond’ the state, nor beyond a modern conception of 
subjectivity as sovereign and autonomous. As Foucault pointed out, “the political, ethical, 
social, philosophical problem of our days” is not to liberate ourselves from the state but 
from “the type of individualization which is linked to the state.”153 What is proposed is 
rather the refusal of a certain kind of subjectivity which has monopolized our 
understanding of ourselves as beings which exist vis-à-vis our relationship with the state, 
as the only kind of subjectivity. What has been emphasized is our need to consider how 
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ordinary concepts such as ‘foreignness’ do not only confirm existing assumptions 
regarding marginalization but can be repeated and replayed to reveal instabilities in 
existing understandings about where ‘the margins’ are located, how they are negotiated 
and what they imply. 
Imagining a politics “beyond the horizons of a sovereign space” where the 
completeness of the subject is constantly reaffirmed, is no easy task.154 Yet, it is evident 
that attempts are already being made to engage with this possibility in the context of the 
question of citizenship and belonging on the island of Ireland. Calls have, for example, 
been made for a counter history of the story of Ireland and its multiple peoples and 
diasporas, which moves away from the tribal narrative of a core nation of ‘old’ Celtic and 
successive invasions of ‘new’ Irish.155 This is to call for imaginations of political 
horizons which take account of, rather than neutralize the multiple and overlapping 
encounters and syntheses which result from uneven combinations and ambiguous 
margins. The next chapter of this thesis considers this question further. In particular it 
looks at how Walker’s work, and that of other theorists which share a concern regarding 
the limits of sovereignty, permit us to begin to imagine these alternative political horizons 
“that ask after the silences, the margins, the excluded” rather than the sovereign and the 
coherent.156
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Chapter 2 
Beyond Sovereign Politics:  
An alternative perspective on the construction of citizen-subjectivity 
   
 
[R]ather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like 
from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple 
bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are 
gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as 
subjects, or as the subject. Michel Foucault 1 
 
 
Introduction  
In chapter one I argued via engagement with R.B.J. Walker’s work that the notion of 
‘sovereignty’ (as that which pertains to understandings about what and where politics can 
be) has come to implicate a particular way of knowing and being. This is a way of 
knowing which became associated with the state in early-modern Europe as well as with 
an understanding regarding the type of subject(-citizen) which can be traced to the state: 
one which can clearly be distinguished from those ‘above’ (popes, emperors) and from 
those ‘outside’ (aliens and barbarians).2 The aim of this chapter is to consider how 
exactly Walker’s work and that of certain other theorists (including Richard K. Ashley, 
Judith Butler, David Campbell, Barbara Cruikshank, Jenny Edkins, Roxanne Lynn Doty 
and Veronique Pin-Fat) helps us to imagine alternative forms of political expression to 
that of modern subjectivity by attending to the limitations of subjectivity as defined in 
terms of the individual subject-citizen which exists vis-à-vis the state as sovereign 
presence.  I argue that drawing upon these works posits another way of thinking about 
and understanding citizenship. They allow us to consider how excluded or included 
selves can be shown to be produced as ‘individuals’ vis-à-vis the notion of sovereignty, 
as opposed to assuming that individuality (sovereign autonomy) has an essence in and of 
itself which merely (pre)exists the state and which must be appealed to when exploring 
the ‘politics’ of citizenship. The chapter considers how Julia Kristeva’s work – which 
presents a distinctly non-modern theory of the self – provides a way of undermining the 
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truth of a subject based around sovereign presence, as called for here. Her work does so 
by building on the idea of the psychoanalytical subject which, on the contrary, is based 
around rupture (the impossible subject). Kristeva theorizes this subject in terms of how it 
is constructed by virtue of exile, separation and foreignness as that which is always 
already within the subject, as opposed to that which it is defined against (its constitutive 
outside). 
Analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has focused (and continues to 
focus) on the question of how notions of ‘them’ and ‘us’ are constructed by culturally 
circumscribing located embodied selves in terms of race, gender, class etc. In his analysis 
of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum Anwen Tormey, for example, describes how  
the notion of immorality is laminated upon black bodies – specifically black pregnant 
women – and…the presence of black migrant workers, refugees and asylees consequently 
comes to be experienced in Irish national space as transgressive, their political subject 
hood constrained by the supposedly legible abjectivity of their bodies.3  
 
Elsewhere Ronit Lentin similarly emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
decision undertaken in the Lobe and Osayande case in January 2003 as that which led up 
to the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, in terms of how  
contemporary political and media accounts of ‘floods’ of actual black babies have 
arguably been used by the state and its agents to condition Irish people in preparation for 
the reversal of the right of ‘non-nationals’ to remain in Ireland…[even though] they are 
parents [of Irish citizen children].4 
 
A way of characterizing this type of approach is in relation to how it emphasizes 
processes of social construction by way of a distinction between social subjectification 
(meaning) and material objectification (substance).5 This is to point out that it 
concentrates on the ways in which ‘citizens’ are classified (socially constructed) on the 
basis of understandings which are gathered by inscribing particular meanings on bodies 
in terms of notions of inclusion and exclusion. Here the object of investigation and the 
basis for theoretical analysis is the embodied individual whose presence is taken for 
granted. The name sometimes given to this type of approach is ‘social constructivism’ or 
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‘soft constructivism’.6 This chapter will discuss how the work of R.B.J. Walker and 
others stands as an alternative to this approach insofar as it emphasizes the need to 
explain the way in which excluded or included selves are produced as ‘individuals’ in 
terms of the notion of sovereignty (understood as located presence), rather than assuming 
that sovereign selves always already exist vis-à-vis the state and can necessarily be taken 
as a starting point in respect of the question of political subjectivity more generally.  
It is important to note that the bodies of work considered in this chapter are not 
taken – neither here nor elsewhere – to represent a unifying theory in and of themselves. 
This is not least because it is recognized that they are works which span (as opposed to 
converging upon) a range of subject areas within global politics (including, but not 
limited to gender, security, famine, migration and democracy). They embody vastly 
different concerns and draw on a multitude of approaches, not least deconstruction, 
psychoanalysis and genealogy. Rather, what this chapter aims to do is to consider how a 
common concern regarding the need to problematize the notion of the sovereign subject 
as a necessary starting point for understanding ‘politics’ across these certain works allows 
us to draw from them an alternative perspective on the construction of citizen-
subjectivity.  
The first part of the chapter explores how this style of thinking centres upon a 
different articulation to that of modernity in respect of how subjectivity and power are 
conceptualized. This can be traced back to Michel Foucault’s work. Foucault calls for a 
political philosophy which is not “erected around the problem of sovereignty, or therefore 
around the problems of law and prohibition”7 but instead around the ‘orders of 
problematizations’ through which “being offers itself to be, necessarily thought”.8 His 
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work is used to consider three very important theoretical concepts which underpin this 
thesis: these are the notion of a de-centered subject, the idea of discourse as practice, and 
the importance of understanding power as productive. What is stressed is the manner in 
which this thesis attempts to rethink the sovereign ‘self’ as a discursive effect in the 
discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. This is contrasted with 
the emphasis in existing analysis of 2004 Citizenship Referendum on the need to think 
the sovereign self as located presence which is merely (re)constructed ‘in’ discourse.  
The second part of the chapter discusses in detail the manner in which this thesis 
attempts to rethink the problematic of subjectivity as that which presents itself in the form 
of a particular problem to which ‘we’ seek solutions rather than as something which 
exists ‘out there’ as sovereign presence. In seeking these solutions we construct ourselves 
and other ‘subjects of knowledge’ as discursive effects. It contrasts this with the reliance 
in existing analysis of 2004 Citizenship Referendum on an understanding of the non-
discursive (or extra-discursive) historical and social practice of self as presence. The final 
section of the chapter looks at the implications of interrogating citizen-subjectivity as 
sovereign presence in this manner. It argues that this allows us to re-emphasize ‘the 
political’ (the moment of contestation) by forcing us to revisit (repoliticize) the 
boundaries of what we have come to know as ‘the self’ and accordingly what we imagine 
political subjectivity can be.  
  
 
Interrogating Sovereign Politics  
The question of sovereignty (as that which defines what politics can be) and what we 
mean by ‘sovereignty’ as the basis for politics, is one which is increasingly problematized 
by those aware of the complexity of histories and the variety of competing authorities. 
While the simple fact of state sovereignty is itself often problematized however, state 
sovereignty tends to remain the starting point nonetheless for interrogating alternatives to, 
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as well as the basis of modern politics. This is insofar as use of the word ‘sovereignty’ is 
assumed to refer to power or authority and therefore to indicate an attribute of the state. 
What tends to be focused upon from this perspective is how the particularity of state 
sovereignty as the basis of politics needs to be ‘resisted’ or ‘transcended’ by more 
universal concepts of political community and identity. The emphasis therefore remains 
here on the simultaneity of political subjectivity as both particularistic as well as 
(potentially) universalistic in its aspirations and possibilities.   
For others, however, it is precisely this supposed obviousness of the idea of state 
sovereignty and the binary nature of political subjectivity as always already (and only) 
informed in terms of dualistic claims about humanity and precise particularity which 
requires further interrogation.9 What is focused on here is the difficulty which appeals to 
state sovereignty (even as that which must be resisted or transcended) have in accounting 
for the complexities and the fluidities of non-centralized productions of power. 
Phenomena such as the internationalization of economic activity, technological 
virtualization, the globalization of social justice movements, and the diversity of flows of 
people across the world are understood here as contradicting and undermining our 
understanding of ‘politics’ as associated with the state, rather than simply transcending or 
working against state sovereignty as the basis of politics.10 What is emphasized is how 
the (by now, almost clichéd references to) temporal and spatial convergence in many 
aspects of modern day life – these include transnational capital or diasporic flows that so 
confuse sharp distinctions between what is presumed to be here and there, us and them, 
past and present – contradict the notion of seemingly stable and fixed foundations (the 
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idea of its presence as given11) implied in the limited spatial and temporal discriminations 
which are authorized by state sovereignty. What is emphasized is how these undermine 
further the assumption itself that we must take this presence juxtaposed with more 
(equally stable and fixed) universal accounts of community and identity, as the ground of 
all ‘politics’. 
The response of these scholars has been to interrogate therefore the meaning of 
‘sovereignty’ (understandings of what politics can be) as tied to statehood and the 
emphasis here on infinite divisibility in space across continuous time. They have sought 
to understand how the state, rather than simply being the locus of power, is also first and 
foremost an effect in and of itself of certain relations of power which specifically assume, 
yet are required to reproduce on an ongoing basis, a particular spatial and temporal basis 
for political possibility. This is a particular spatio-temporal basis understood in terms of 
absolute spaces of politics inside (where power, authority, history and legitimacy reside) 
which are distinct from those of anarchy outside (where power, authority, history and 
legitimacy are absent).12 This is what Walker calls “the articulation of political 
space/time”.13 Karena Shaw refers to it as “the architecture through which discourses and 
practices of sovereignty constitute political possibility.”14 Walker therefore insists that we 
recognize how “the principle of state sovereignty not only suggests how it is necessary to 
defend the borders, but also how it is necessary to think about borders, about the 
delineation of political possibility in both space and time.”15 Doing so he and others draw 
attention to how political ‘borders’ and ‘limits’ have been constructed along a scale from 
the bounded system of sovereign states through the bounded sovereign to the bounded 
individual.16  
Roxanne Lynn Doty has coined the term ‘statecraft’ in order to attempt to capture 
the practices identified here that produce seemingly stable and fixed spatio-temporal 
foundations along a scale from ‘the West’ to ‘Nation’ to that of ‘Citizen’. I suggest that 
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her work presents a very useful way of thinking about the alternative to continuing to 
examine anomalies and deviations which supposedly exist from some fixed 
understanding of sovereignty as located presence.17 This is because her use of the notion 
of statecraft serves to reinscribe normalized appeals to state sovereignty as an active 
process to fix meaning and authority, as opposed to a coherent presence whose meaning 
or authority has already been fixed. The result is that state sovereignty is retheorized as 
an ongoing contingent effect rather than as a thing or object which can be pointed to as 
complete and which opposes ‘anarchy’ (understood as that “problematic domain yet to be 
brought under the controlling influence of a sovereign centre”18).  
Doty explores the notion of statecraft vis-à-vis state responses to illegal 
immigration. She argues that the state produces itself as a territorial entity with fixed 
boundaries through the practices of maintaining and securing its boundaries rather than 
by virtue of said fixed boundaries. She demonstrates this by exploring how these 
boundaries are constantly being renegotiated in terms of how people pass between 
‘illegal’ (outside) and ‘legal’ (inside) status within domestic spaces rather than how they 
unproblematically pass between domestic and international spaces.19 However, she 
argues that this process is difficult to see – evident in how most attention in respect of 
illegal immigration continues to remain on the notion of the physical border between the 
domestic (inside) and the international (outside) – given that international theory is based 
upon the assumption of the prior existence of the state as a fixed spatial entity within 
which time unfolds. She argues that this assumption masks how state practices only 
retrospectively reproduce the existence of the fixed boundaries (which are subsequently 
seen to have been ‘transgressed’ by the migrant) as the starting point for (as opposed to 
the result of) the notion of ‘the sovereign state’.  Essentially her argument is that the state 
assumes itself as an entity with fixed territorial boundaries and with a historical narrative 
into existence but that this goes unquestioned due to the manner in which the spatial and 
temporal imaginary which undergirds conventional understandings of the state – the 
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notion of containers of domestic society which can be clearly distinguished from a realm 
of anarchy outside – also undergirds international political theory more generally: “The 
ontological commitment to the state ensures that the starting point is the existence of 
boundaries that are then transgressed, rather than the always-in-process practices that 
effect the construction of contingent, and never finally fixed, boundaries.” 20 
What Doty’s work emphasizes here therefore is not just the need to problematize 
the notion of the sovereign state as a type of political community which could be replaced 
by another type of political community, but the importance of considering how 
sovereignty, as Walker points out, in the first place acts as “an expression of claims about 
temporality and history enabling constitutive discrimination between those who belong 
…and those who do not”.21 For Doty, “[t]he power of the nation-state derives from the 
presumption of a pure authorizing presence, a center that is itself in no need of 
explanation”.22 With this in mind Jenny Edkins has notably argued for greater awareness 
of how the notion of ‘political community’ itself has been formulated. She points out that 
it implies a distinction from other types of community and retains the notion of ‘politics’ 
as a subsystem which is always engaged ‘in’ by someone and can therefore continue to 
be differentiated from an ‘outside’.23 Her suggestion is that we need to begin to recognize 
the manner in which understandings of ‘politics’ in Western society have become 
monopolized by ‘sovereignty’ (coining the term “sovereign politics” inspiring the title of 
this chapter) as that which, since early-modern Europe, is indelibly tied to the notion of 
divisibility in space and continuity in time.24 What we in Western modernity call 
‘politics’, Edkins points out, “entails a sovereign political order and a sovereign, 
autonomous subject” which we continue to take for granted.25  
The result is that concepts which define the terms of membership of political 
communities in terms of political possibility such as that of ‘democracy’, 
‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘citizenship’ – which are normally discussed in terms of how they 
exist in and of themselves in relation to the state – are retheorized from this perspective; 
                                                 
20
 Doty, ‘The Double Writing of Statecraft’, p.176 
21
 Walker, After the Globe,  p.99 
22
 Doty, ‘The Double Writing of Statecraft’, p.184 
23
 Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations, p.139 
24
 Ibid, p.6 
25
 Ibid  
 76 
they are retheorized in terms of how they also derive their meaning from the spatio-
temporal coordinates of the state and more specifically from how the notion of state 
sovereignty reproduces an image of the subject ‘of’ democracy, cosmopolitanism and 
citizenship as that which always holds rights against the state and thereby is separable 
‘from’ politics in the first place. What is furthermore focused on from this perspective is 
how the idea of ‘political possibility’ as defined in terms of this modern subject capable 
of moving between different types of ‘politics’ (from, for example, repressive towards 
more emancipatory types), which is conceptualized to deal with existing problems of 
state sovereignty, does not challenge claims to state sovereignty but is based on 
reproducing the sharp, coherent spatio-temporal distinction between subject and world, 
knower and known; the dualisms through which the practices of state sovereignty were 
produced in the first place.26 Rethinking the limits of sovereignty, as such, is seen as 
rethinking the limits of ‘politics’ and what this can be.27 Instead of seeking to retheorize 
political subjectivity on the one hand and/or that of the possibilities for social political 
order, on the other, the emphasis from this perspective is on how neither is prior to the 
other. Rather, what is explored is how “the constitution of the subject [‘being’] entails, 
and is inextricably linked with the constitution of a particular social or symbolic order 
[‘being in common’]”.28  
Edkins has suggested that Michel Foucault’s work provides one of the best ways 
of coming to grips with the theoretical terrain considered here. She has suggested that this 
is because this line of thinking can be traced back to the inter-relation of two concepts 
indebted to his work: a de-centred subject and an alternative view of power.29 This should 
not be taken to mean that this critical attitude is limited to the work of Michel Foucault. 
Rather, as R.B.J. Walker explained in respect of his own engagement with searching 
critiques of claims to autonomous subjectivity: 
Here my main inspiration comes from Michel Foucault, but only because I have found 
him to be a particularly challenging and sensitive entry into ways of thinking about 
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language, identity and power that seem to me to be indispensible for thinking about 
politics in the late twentieth century.30  
 
The next two sub-sections explore the notion of a de-centered subject and the alternative 
concept of power found in Michel Foucault’s work, which underlie this alternative 
theoretical terrain.   
 
The De-centred Subject 
The dethroning of “the heroic figure of reasoning man who is himself the origin of 
language, the maker of history and the source of meaning in the world” is one which has 
taken place in various stages.31 I will begin here by outlining some of the most important 
stages in this process before then exploring how these came together in the work of 
Michel Foucault.  
 
From sociological subject to postmodern subject  
Stuart Hall identifies two stages in the process whereby the Cartesian subject which 
formed the basis for Enlightenment epistemology and whose articulation was based on a 
distinction between certainly and doubt and between truth and illusion, was ‘de-
centred’.32 The first stage of this process was the move from Enlightenment subject to 
sociological subject. The Enlightenment subject was a unified individual with a centre 
and inner core from the moment of birth which was then understood to develop as the 
individual grows. It is this inner core which functioned as the source of the subject’s 
identity. In comparison to this, the sociological subject appeared as the embodiment of an 
interactive conception of identity and self. As Hall explains, however, the sociological 
subject still had “an inner core or essence that is the real me” which was merely modified 
though “dialogue with the cultural worlds outside and the identities which they offer”.33 
His point is that the distinction between society and the individual, inside and outside – 
also known as ‘Descartes’ dualism’ – upon which the original Enlightenment subject was 
based did not ultimately become displaced or de-centred but still held true in relation to 
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the sociological subject as it did for the Enlightenment subject. The second stage which 
Hall identifies of this de-centring process is the move from sociological subject to the 
postmodern subject which he explains is a subject without fixed, essential or permanent 
identity. Hall argues that it is this move to the postmodern subject which has seen the 
“final de-centring of the Cartesian subject”.34 Hall attributes this second stage to five 
major theoretical moves which he associates with the works of Karl Marx, Sigmund 
Freud, Ferdinand de Saussure, Feminism and finally Michel Foucault.35 
 According to Hall, Marx was among the first to put forward a theoretical anti-
humanism as an alternative way of thinking to that of “some notion of a universal essence 
of Man lodged in each individual subject.”36 In declaring as he did during the nineteenth 
century to the effect that ‘men [sic] make history, but only on the basis of the conditions 
which are not of their own making’, Hall notes that Karl Marx displaced an abstract 
notion of Man.37 He questioned the notion of individual agency as a consciousness 
independent of social structures by putting social relations (modes of production, 
exploitation of labour power etc.) at the centre of his theoretical system. Hall quotes 
Althusser as saying that “[h]e [Marx] drove the philosophical category of the subject, of 
empiricism, of the ideal essence from all the domains in which they had been supreme.”38  
An equally important stage which Hall identifies in this de-centring process was 
Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. This, he explains, saw Freud put into doubt the 
idea of thought as characteristically rational and accessible. This is because Freudian 
philosophy saw consciousness as a particular aspect of the mind and not its most general 
feature. This effectively destabilized the basis for Cartesian philosophy which took for 
granted that consciousness was primary.39 The importance of this moment is something I 
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will come back to later in this chapter when I consider the work of Jacques Lacan and 
Julia Kristeva. 
Another stage which Hall considers is the questioning by feminism of the 
traditional distinction between ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and later ‘public’ and ‘private’, 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Feminism started out as a movement directed at querying the 
social position of women. It later, however, moved on to challenging outright the 
dominance of one form of subjectivity as a position of neutral universality; in particular 
“the disembodied, sexless, and gender-blind character of the Cartesian subject.”40 The 
notion of ‘Mankind’ was replaced, in other words, with the notion of sexual difference 
with the result that “it exposed, as a political and social question, the issue of how we are 
formed and produced as gendered subjects”.41  
One of the final theoretical moves which contributed to the de-centring of the 
Cartesian subject is to be found, we are told by Hall, in de Saussure’s work. This 
emphasized languages as systems of cultural meaning and not as neutral tools used by 
subjects to invoke pre-existing thoughts or to name pre-existing objects. de Saussure 
queried the assumption that the subject speaks language. This was contrary to the image 
of the controlling will of the subject. By focusing on the cultural nature of language 
systems, de Saussure questioned the supposed natural link between signifier (sound 
image) and signified (concept) and the accepted understanding of the process of naming 
as that in which the subject points to an objects and names it by merely invoking a 
‘ready-made’ idea.42 For de Saussure the link between signified and signifier was an 
arbitrary one which was based on a contingent, as opposed to a stable cultural 
designation. According to Hall, this emphasis on linguistic patterns as rule-governed 
systems which eluded individual and collective will contributed, in the same way as 
Freud’s theorizations about the unconsciousness, to the further undermining of Cartesian 
philosophy which was until then based upon the secure foundations of the rational, 
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conscious subject at the core of knowledge: summed up in Descartes well-known phrase 
‘Cogito, ergo sum’.43  
The work of Ferdinand de Saussure is often seen to have produced two traditions 
of analysis: structuralism and poststructuralism. Structuralism was seen as an attempt to 
replace meaning and the subject with “objective laws which govern all human activity”; 
to replace ‘Man’ as a meaning-giving subject with a meaning-given humanity.44 In 
contrast to this, the approach referred to as ‘poststructuralism’ is defined by its rejection 
of the humanist notion of the subject as substance and its affirmation of it as position. 
Gadet calls this “the abandonment of transcendental subjectification”.45 It is often 
suggested that the work of Michel Foucault has served as the basis for the style of 
thinking which is associated with the latter tradition of analysis. Yet this should not be 
taken to mean that the work of Michel Foucault has been interpreted in only one way. On 
the contrary, there are many ways in which Michel Foucault’s work has been interpreted 
and only some of these interpretations have contributed to the latter tradition of analysis. 
The origins of this approach, however, can be understood in relation specifically to the 
distinction which Foucault draws between a traditional ‘history of ideas’ which is based 
on a theory of the subject which engages in discourse, and his ‘theory of knowledge’ 
which focuses on how questions of power and knowledge are implicated in 
understandings of how the subject is produced as a discursive practice.  As I will now 
discuss, the important distinction here is that the latter refuses to privilege any centre 
including the idea of presence itself.  
 
Discourse as practice: from ‘the subject’ to relations of power  
Dreyfus and Rabinow have argued that the structuralist alternative to objective causal 
laws, subjective rules and the horizon of meaningful practices was “to claim a formal 
level of explanation which is not physical and not intentional”.46 They insist, however, 
that Foucault rejected all levels of formal explanation and as such he eventually rejected 
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structuralism.47 Foucault explained in the Archaeology of Knowledge that he wanted “to 
operate a decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre.”48 He argued that traditional 
historical methods promoted an overall pattern to history which could be traced back to 
an original centre at some point or other by positing a founding human subject that serves 
as the origin of history and as that which guarantees its continuity and identity.49 He 
strove, as such, to emphasize that “[h]istory does not simply analyze or interpret forces: it 
modifies them.”50 The rules of history for Foucault were therefore not rules of universal 
reason but rules which are “empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are 
impersonal and can be bent to any purpose.”51 Foucault claimed that ‘Man’ was the hinge 
which connected different ways of thinking in the modern period insofar as it was “that 
transcendental reflection with which philosophy since Kant has identified itself; which 
concerns the theme of the origin, that promise of the return…that orders all these 
questions around the question of man’s being”.52 Following Nietzsche’s challenge to the 
pursuit of origin, Foucault rejected this image of what he called “a primordial truth” 
which he saw as necessitating “the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an 
original identity.”53 And, as an alternative to the traditional ‘history of ideas’ which was 
based on the idea of an immediately available area of certainty in the form of ‘Man’, 
Foucault developed ‘a theory of knowledge’ which incorporated a set of philosophical 
reflections on questions of truth, method and knowledge.54 
The point is that Foucault’s alternative approach to history was based on more 
than a simple critique of the human subject. It incorporated more importantly a refusal to 
extend what he saw as “faith in metaphysics”.55 This referred to faith in all immediately 
available areas of ontological certainty and not only those areas which were directly 
associated with a humanist discourse. Foucault was particularly interested in how the 
body had become the basis for self-recognition of experience. He wished to understand 
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how and, by way of what technologies of power, the body had become “the inscribed 
surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a disassociated 
self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity)”.56 He instead built his approach, which 
he called ‘genealogy’, around the belief that “[n]othing in man – not even his body – is 
sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self recognition or for his understanding other 
men.”57 To this extent it is important to note that Foucault’s theory of knowledge was 
anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist insofar as it denied ‘Man’ his position at the 
centre of history. It was also, however, anti-teleological in that it rejected the traditional 
obsession with “the anticipatory power of meaning” (i.e. the search for the meaning of 
events) and instead sought to emphasize “the hazardous play of dominations.”58 It 
replaced the traditional search for the meaning of events in terms of a linear cause and 
effect relationship with an appreciation of the overall war of interpretations which 
ultimately undermines the supposed ‘natural’ direction of such a relationship. Instead of 
the history of subjects which unfolds via the minds of great thinkers, the anti-teleological 
history which Foucault sought to record is the history of morals, ideals and metaphysical 
concepts as they emerge on the stage of historical process in terms of discursive 
regularities. This results in a record of the history of themes through which human 
being(s) are defined as subjects in terms of “objects, rules of action and modes of relation 
to oneself” and, not a history since the beginning of time of the trajectory of persons 
understood as individuals with pre-existing rights and capabilities.59 It is a history of the 
present and therefore of how ‘we’ have come to understand ourselves as individual-
subjects with rights and capabilities, instead of a history which traces a line from the past 
to the present on the basis of, and therefore taking for granted, these processes of 
subjectification.  
 Foucault conceived of the notion of ‘problematization’ to describe the alternative 
understanding of knowledge which he sought to introduce through the work of 
genealogy. This knowledge was not about freedom operating in opposition to power (as 
that which is repressive) but about how claims to ‘freedom’ can be understood to operate 
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from within particular power relations. What Foucault was interested in here was how 
particular subjects become recognized as ‘free’ or as other than free (for example as 
enslaved or oppressed) through particular meaning systems. His is a method of inquiry 
which is “not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject” who is presumed 
to negotiate language and its meaning systems therefore, but to the need to understand 
how the subject is created through general meaning systems themselves. This refers to 
the collection of narratives, statements, groups of images, actions, modes of 
representation through which the world is known: what Foucault called ‘discourse’.60 The 
notion of ‘discourse’ in the work of Michel Foucault is associated with the idea that 
meaning is constructed through language. As discussed by Stuart Hall, what is 
emphasized here is the difference between this and the assumption that language reflects 
a meaning which already exists in a world of objects, peoples and events.61 As Hall 
further notes, Foucault’s work has resulted in a shift in attention from discourse as 
language and the associated notions of speech and writing, to ‘discourse’ as a more 
general system of representation which includes rules and practices.62 It is this 
understanding of how the self is problematized into ‘being’ in terms of these rules and 
practices which is emphasized in this chapter and in this thesis more generally.  
Foucault argued that the Enlightenment had formulated certain problematizations 
which defined objects in terms of rules of actions, objects and modes of relation to 
oneself.63 He saw the notion of ‘orders of problematization’ as a way of thinking about 
how human beings are made subjects – made to understand themselves in certain 
particular ways, most notably as free and sovereign – as a product of the Enlightenment. 
Instead of the search for origins by way of a general knowledge detached from its 
empirical roots, this was to focus on “the process by which we construct origins and give 
meaning to our past” in terms of struggles in relation to particular types of knowledge.64 
Foucault sought in The History of Sexuality to demonstrate, for example, how ‘sexuality’ 
was constituted historically as a product of the Enlightenment by way of the discourses 
                                                 
60
 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p.96 
61
 Hall, S. (1997) ‘Representation, Meaning and Language’ In: S. Hall (ed.) Representation: Cultural 
Representations and Signifying Practices (Milton Keynes: Open University Press), pp.15-21 
62
 Ibis, pp.41-46 
63
 Foucault, M. (2000) ‘What is Enlightenment’, p.318 
64
 Bleiker, R. (1997) ‘Forget IR Theory’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol.22, Issue. 1, p.61  
 84 
through which it was made problematic. Foucault defined discursive practices as 
“characterized by the demarcation of a field of objects, by definition of a legitimate 
perspective for a subject of knowledge, [and] by the setting of norms for elaborating 
concepts and theories”.65 He argued that ‘knowledge’ (in particular, knowledge of the 
self) could be traced back to the different discursive practices that frame and formulate 
this knowledge within them. The struggles which Foucault chose to explore in this 
respect were madness, illness, death and crime. What these had in common was that they 
were based on specific rationalizations of individualization. Foucault was interested in 
how we come to understand ourselves as (as a mad, sane, insane, sexual etc.) individuals, 
as opposed to presuming it had always been so. It was through the concept of 
problematizations that Foucault was able to move from the emphasis which was 
traditionally placed on ‘experiences’ to explore that of practices as the games of truth 
through which people “were led to focus their attention on themselves” in terms of 
sovereignty and therefore in terms of the notion of freedom (autonomy) or lack thereof.66  
To take this point of view in relation to citizenship is to reject the idea that 
citizenship simply positions pre-existing subjects as either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the law 
and thus that a citizen ‘is’ something in and of itself. It is to consider instead how 
discourses of citizenship construct a particular notion of what it means to ‘be’ a subject in 
terms of certain specific assumptions regarding the supposed natural state of individual 
autonomy. This is to look at how certain interpretations have dictated a ‘truth’, insofar as 
it is something which can be pointed to, of what it means to be a subject in respect of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. In doing so, ‘the subject’ as a sovereign entity is not 
taken as the natural unit of analysis or starting point as it is in existing analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. Instead the emphasis is entirely on power 
relationships and the process through which subjects are manufactured as an effect of 
particular “relations of subjugation” or a ‘will to knowledge’.67 For,  
rather than starting with the subject (or even subjects) the elements that exist prior to the 
relationship and that can be localized, we begin with the power relationship itself, with 
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the actual or effective relationship of domination and see how the relationship determines 
the elements to which it is applied.68 
  
Starting with the notion of power relations instead of ‘the subject’ and therefore 
with the notion of fragmented, decentralized (dispersed) subjectivity is very different to 
starting with an appreciation of power relations in conjunction with the notion of the 
subject as a particular source of power – as has been done in the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum. The difference is that the latter presents the subject as potentially 
fragmented but nonetheless retains the notion of a coherent subject (located presence) 
which can be pointed to in the last instance as the continued potential holder of a 
diversity of identities or subject positions. Unlike the former, this retains the idea of an 
essential core of person-hood (often more subtly replacing that of an overarching notion 
of humanity) which is pre-existing and which is then socialized into a particular cultural 
setting.69 What is (re)produced in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum is the notion of an alternative source of power to that of the state, but 
nonetheless an alternative “sovereign vantage point from which the history of political 
philosophy can [continue to] be reconstructed”.70 Ronen Palan refers to this type of 
argument as “symbolic interactionism” and argues that although it aims to locate the 
‘self’ discursively by “reject[ing] the image of a passive structurally determined subject 
of structuralism and view[ing] people as constantly undergoing changes during 
interaction”, it does not ultimately disturb the notion of the ‘self’ as a foundational 
entity.71 
Yet it is precisely the authority of this foundational unity of modernity (the notion 
of a self-authorizing autonomous subject which opposes itself to the world) which is of 
concern to those theorists who seek to interrogate the notion of ‘sovereignty’ and the 
“synthetic oppositions (subject-object, self-other, inside-outside)” which this authorizes.72 
I have suggested (in chapter one) that modern subjectivity can be rethought through the 
work of Julia Kristeva as someone who engages with a distinctly non-modern theory of 
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the self based on the work of Sigmund Freud. The manner in which Kristeva has 
retheorized the conception of a unified modern subject in favour of a subject-in-process is 
by introducing the Freudian register of psychic representation on top of the level of 
conscious representation. As mentioned above, Freud’s discovery of the unconscious was 
an integral moment in de-centring the Cartesian subject. It undermined the previous 
privilege granted to consciousness and the need to think the subject always in reference to 
presence. His work left behind an understanding of subjectivity which was not dominated 
by consciousness but which recognized consciousness as an aspect of the 
unconsciousness. As Freud himself explained, according to this new understanding “[t]he 
unconsciousness is the larger sphere, which includes within it the smaller sphere of the 
consciousness” and not the other way around.73 In reversal of the Cartesian subject which 
is based upon consciousness and the notion of presence and wholeness, Freud’s 
understanding of the subject is based upon the notion of absence and lack. The subject at 
the core of this line of thinking is one which is not only de-centred therefore but which 
needs to be understood as that which has also become “the impossible subject”.74  
Within the field of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan has most notably further 
developed the Freudian concept of a subject as marked by a lack.75 Lacan’s work has 
been very influential in Kristeva’s own thinking and the shift in her work from exploring 
subjectivity through a purely linguistic or semiotic focus to exploring it through a more 
psychologically orientated focus.76 As noted by Edkins and Pin-Fat, Lacan’s work 
develops the notion of the impossible subject which brings sovereignty (the idea of core 
or essential subjectivity) into question by emphasizing how the self is always 
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retrospectively produced through its surrounding social or symbolic order. This social or 
symbolic order is posited in advance by assuming it already exists (at which point we are 
constituted as subjects) and therefore subjectivity itself “only ever will have been”.77 
Edkins and Pin-Fat point out that 
from a Lacanian perspective, the human subject is condemned to endlessly searching for 
an imaginary wholeness or unity that it will never attain. This search can be traced to the 
imaginary relationship between the individual and its surroundings, which is inaugurated 
in the mirror stage when the (mis)recognition of the self as autonomous agent occurs.78 
 
The impossibility of the subject here refers to the ego’s (the organized part of the 
psyche) illusionary mastery of its environment and the unorganized elements of the 
unconscious (the id).79 The result is an understanding of the basis of human subjectivity 
as an endless search for foundations (the idea that the subject is alienated in its very 
being) rather than as a discovery of foundations (the idea that the subject is eventually 
alienated from something else or from itself).80 Lacan’s work opened up an important line 
of inquiry for distinguishing our understanding of ‘the subject’ from that of a phase of 
subjectivity which is the formation of the self as ‘I’ (ego) through the mirror stage. And, 
for exploring the subsequent process – which began with the imaginary relationship 
between the subject and its surroundings inaugurated at the mirror state – through which 
the subject is later endowed with coherency as autonomous agent                                   
(albeit one which is based on a similar process of misrecognition) within the social or 
symbolic order.81 Here, the subject is constituted by becoming that which occupies a 
certain place as citizen, as intellectual, as consumer etc. in the social order through the 
process of interpellation or hailing: “What is crucial…here is that subjectivity and the 
social order are constituted together, the social order being the frame within which 
subjectivities are placed”.82  
I will now discuss how a Foucauldian conception of power has been integral in 
allowing us to move in this manner beyond simply problematizing the ‘self’ as having to 
conform to a particular type of sovereign presence (as ‘national born’ or ‘non-national 
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born’) ‘in’ discourse (the symbolic order), to that of actually rethinking the sovereign 
presence of self (the coherent I) as a discursive effect. I will then come back to the 
manner in which Julia Kristeva’s work has built on this idea of the impossible subject 
which is created through discourse, in the final section of this chapter.   
 
An Alternative Concept of Power 
Foucault saw sovereign power as an expression of the association of the king “as the 
centre of the entire juridical edifice” which defines right “in terms of a legitimacy which 
has to be established” from above (by the sovereign).83 He argued that “in our 
society…[the] relationship among power, right, and truth is organized in a very particular 
way” whereby the multiple relations of power which “traverse, characterize and 
constitute the social body [are]…indissociable from a discourse of truth”.84 For Foucault 
the importance of this truth/power axis is paramount as it emphasizes how in Western 
societies from the Middle Ages onwards, the theory of right (the need to replace the 
element of domination in power) is organized around the problem of sovereignty (the 
legitimate rights of the sovereign and the legal obligation to obey) in order to be true.85 
For Foucault, this theory of power as sovereign and thus of power as repressive cannot, 
however, take account of new forms of power which were introduced in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Pointing out that the new types of power relations which he 
explores (namely, disciplinary, and bio power) are incompatible with sovereign power, he 
insists nonetheless that they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, that they work at 
different levels in society with sovereign power. He explains that on one hand you have 
“a legislation, a discourse, and an organization of public right articulated around the 
principle of the sovereignty of the social body and the delegation of individual 
sovereignty to the state”, on the other “a tight grid of disciplinary coercions that actually 
guarantees the cohesion of that social body”,86 and finally the regularization of “the 
population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a 
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biological problem and as power’s problem”.87 The problem with using the principle of 
sovereignty to understand these latter newer forms of power according to Foucault is that 
a theory of power as sovereign always tries to establish “the subject-to-subject cycle” and 
in doing so assumes the notion of individuality in subjectivity rather than interrogating 
it.88 It assumes that power in the ‘political’ sense can only function through a centralizing 
force (a “unity of power”) in the face of a monarch or the form of state; or at minimum 
that of an individual.89 A theory of sovereignty always already privileges a centre from 
whence political power must be established in order to function before finally locating 
the legitimacy of this power in law, thus ignoring how new forms of power work through 
decentralized means.  
What Foucault’s work indicates here is the need to think in terms of how power 
works other than simply as top-down but also as bottom-up and sideways, as well as in 
many other directions. Foucault refers to this as “the multiplicity of power relations”.90 
Yet, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum and the dominant trends in critical citizenship scholarship which 
they echo, the emphasis remains in the last instance on institutions which are assumed to 
be holders of power, namely ‘the state’ and/or sub or supra statist institutions. Power 
continues to be presented as top-down in these accounts; conceived of “as an imaginary 
entity or force that has an independent but intangible being, [which]… can be collected, 
gathered and harnessed to the will of a preexisting institution or collectivity”.91 Because 
the questions being asked by existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
relate to the significance of institutions (most notably, the Irish state and the EU) in their 
ability to ‘include’ and ‘exclude’ groups from society, this places an emphasis on 
defining citizenship in terms of an understanding of power which is centralized and 
imposed upon individuals, with very little appreciation of how power also operates 
through the manner in which “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
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desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” or groups thereof.92 To 
quote Nalini Persram, there has been “little fundamental questioning of…the means by 
which the semblance of sovereignty is made persuasive”.93 Existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum leaves us with an understanding of sovereignty associated 
with ‘the state’ on one hand, or with ‘individuals’ on the other. These are our starting 
points. There is no question of how we have come to presume that these are distinct 
entities from which power emanates in the first place, or of the potential need to rethink 
this truth.  
As Judith Butler has demonstrated, although there has to be a subject for power to 
act, this does not automatically make the subject the origin of power.94 What is therefore 
missing in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is an exploration of 
the question as to how ‘they’ (individuals and groups of individuals) have already been 
constructed and sustained in the last instance as a coherent unified entity which can be 
pointed to or counted. Following the Foucauldian conception of power, this is to think of 
power in a decentralized fashion. It is to shift attention away from institutions and 
embodiment and the patterns of exclusion which can be necessarily traced through these, 
towards focusing on “the prior question of the forms of power relation” which give rise to 
and sustain particular institutions and specific subjectivities in the first place.95 It is to 
consider how “[t]he individual…is not the vis-à-vis of power…[but] one of its prime 
effects.”96  
According to this line of reasoning, the ‘individual’ and the knowledge that may 
be gained of him or her are no longer presumed to be separate from his or her 
surroundings as power is no longer in need of a centralized sovereign source which is 
located presence. Instead, through this decentralized power matrix everything becomes 
part of how meaning is produced as ‘discourse’. Discourse becomes the medium through 
which ‘reality’ is conceptualized in terms of material effects, as opposed to that which 
merely gives (existing) material presence (such as individuality) meaning in a reality 
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which exists separate from its conceptualization. The next section of this chapter 
discusses in detail how this thesis attempts to rethink the ‘self’ as a discursive effect in 
the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. What is emphasized 
here is the need to rethink citizenship, not as something that exists ‘out there’, 
independent of thinking which is then constructed through discourse, but to consider how 
it presents itself in the form of a particular problem to which ‘we’ seek solutions. It is in 
seeking these solutions that we construct ourselves and other ‘subjects of knowledge’ as 
discursive effects.97  
For David Campbell, problematizing can be understood as a deconstructive 
method which provides a basis for “putting ‘out of joint’ the authority of the ‘is’”.98 It 
does so by demonstrating how “different solutions to a problem have been constructed 
and made possible by the way the problem is posed in the first place” and not by virtue of 
particular individual’s actions.99  Instead of an understanding of the world in terms of an 
independent realm of ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ which ‘we’ (as individuals) encounter, 
the point is that we begin to see how our understanding of ourselves as individuals who 
respond to problems, is implicated in the process by which we problematize ourselves 
into being as sovereign autonomous selves who can respond to problems in the first 
place. This focus on the problematic of subjectivity as a discursive effect is contrasted in 
the next section with the reliance in existing analysis of 2004 Citizenship Referendum on 
an understanding of the non-discursive (or extra-discursive) historical and social practice 
of self as presence.  
 
 
Discourse Scholarship Beyond Sovereign Politics 
Subjects of a discourse should not be confused with individuals. An individual may have 
multiple subjectivities. Similarly, there may be multiple physical individuals that 
constitute a single subject. Roxanne Lynn Doty100  
 
                                                 
97
 Campbell,  National Deconstruction, pp.ix-xi 
98
 Derrida, J. (1995) ‘The Time is Out of Joint’ In: Deconstruction is/in America (New York: New York 
University Press) p.25 quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, p.21  
99
 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p.x 
100
 Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction,’ pp.309-310 
 92 
Inquiring into the constitution of subjectivity has resulted, as I have discussed, in the 
dissolution of the traditional distinction between what one says (language) and what one 
does (culture). This distinction is instead collapsed within the notion of ‘discourse’ or, 
more accurately ‘discursive practices’. There are various uses of the concept of 
‘discourse’ within the social sciences, however. It is therefore necessary to explore how 
the style of thinking looked at in this chapter differs from the existing available 
constructivist approach presented in the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. What is 
emphasized is the difference between ‘discourse theory’ as pursued in this thesis and that 
of ‘discourse analysis’ or ‘critical discourse analysis’ pursued in existing analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum.101  
What the previous section of this chapter explored was the importance of 
recognising how power is envisaged following Foucault as that which need not always be 
centralized in a sovereign presence (such as a state or individual) in order to exist but can 
work outside of the notion of presence itself. As Judith Butler explains in her own 
attempts to rethink gender outside of presence: “[t]hinking the body as constructed” from 
this perspective “demands a rethinking of the meaning of construction itself.”102 This is 
because it is not only a question of asking what are the constraints on how intelligible 
bodies are produced – as ‘nationals’ (citizens) and as ‘non-nationals’ (non-citizens) – but 
it involves also asking what the constraints are on a domain of unthinkable unintelligible 
bodies “that haunt the former domain as the spectre of its own impossibility, the very 
limit to intelligibility, its constitutive outside”.103 This is not to oppose limits and 
possibilities, or the intelligible and the unintelligible. For as Butler herself points out 
here, all oppositions are themselves part of the domain of intelligibility. Rather, what is 
emphasized is the need from this perspective to consider how presence as the 
embodiment of centralized power relation defines both our possibilities (what makes us 
intellible) as well as the limits of our possibilities (the points at which we are no longer 
intelligible), as (citizen)subjects.   
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Locating the Self Discursively  
Louise Phillips and Marianne W. Jørgensen point out that discourse scholarship spans a 
large range of techniques for exploring discursive formations. It ranges from that which 
emphasizes a very narrow understanding of the concept of ‘text’ as primarily the 
written/spoken word (speeches, interviews, media reports etc.), thus maintaining a strong 
emphasis on distinguishing the material nature of the non-textual world. To, on the other 
hand, scholarship which emphasizes a very broad understanding of the concept of ‘text’, 
thus highlighting the need to understand the interdependence of the discursive and the 
material.104 This is often following Derrida’s assertion “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” 
(literally, ‘there is no outside to the text’).105 In the latter understanding, discourse itself is 
material. What this indicates is that discourse scholarship can go beyond merely 
problematizing the self (sovereign presence) ‘in’ discourse – for example, problematizing 
the idea that individuals need to be recognized as having an essential identity as 
‘national’ or ‘non-national’ etc – to that of also attempting to rethink the ‘self’ (a 
coherent I) in its entirety as a discursive effect. In doing so, it questions the notion of 
individuality and the idea of presence and sovereign voice more generally. The point, 
however, is that not all discourse scholarship does this.   
This is confirmed by Roxanne Lynn Doty who points out that not all discourse 
scholarship by any means “fundamentally challenges the concept of a unitary, pre-given 
subject”.106 This is despite the fact that most discourse scholarship does employ an 
understanding of language as productive, thus emphasizing more critically self-aware 
‘how-possible’ questions which ask how certain practices become socially constructed, 
rather than ‘why’ questions which presuppose a range of possible or plausible option 
which have already been constructed. Doty points out that this reluctance to challenge the 
concept of a unitary, pre-given subject has “important implications for the way that 
language enters into analysis” insofar as instead of examining what linguistic practices 
do, the focus remains that of seeking “to reveal what linguistic practices tell us about the 
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beliefs and understandings of decision makers.”107 Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum, for example, emphasizes the importance of looking at how the 
roles of ‘migrant mother’ and ‘non-national born’ can be traced to processes of exclusion. 
This line of inquiry is a recognized area of focus in international critical citizenship 
scholarship.108 It is highly reflective and appreciative of the importance of the productive 
power of language. However echoing Doty, as Maguire and Cassidy point out, it also 
reduces the role of critical theory to that of ‘unmasking’ migration policy as different 
types of statist and/or nationally circumscribed forms of racism or prejudice.109  
What this indicates is the need to consider the varying degrees of assumption 
about what exists ‘out there’ prior to or outside of structures of meaning within and 
across the broader field of discourse scholarship. It is the assumptions regarding 
subjectivity that are being explored in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum in this thesis. This is in order to ask what they tell us about the 
limitations of how being ‘citizen’ in the context of migration is conceptualized. For 
example, within existing theorizations of citizenship there have been many attempts to 
interrogate the notion that ‘Irishness’ acts as a stable identity upon which to base a 
meaning-giving transcendental subject position such as citizenship in terms of ethnicity 
or gender.110 These in turn have been drawn on in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum to interrogate the notion of the coherent ‘Irish’ citizen and to 
emphasize how certain people (namely migrant women and their children but also ethnic 
minorities more generally) fall outside of this. The focus here is on how individuals 
experience processes of classification. This is captured by Bryan Fanning who argues “In 
Ireland, both citizen and non-citizen black and ethnic minorities live outside the dominant 
imagined community.”111 This statement reflects the importance which Yuval-Davis et al 
place on identity (“the ways in which people define themselves and each other”) in 
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constructing contemporary politics of belonging.112 This is still, however, to understand 
subjectivity as clearly delineated presence in time and space – this is in terms of a self 
which can be classified in terms of lines and boundaries between national and 
international, them and us, identity and difference. The point is not to deny the 
sophistication of such theorizations nor their contribution to knowledge in this area, but 
to point out that they are based on a theory of power which is sovereign in the last 
instance insofar as it takes for granted that a sovereign centre is essential for questions of 
subjectivity. Such theories work on the basis that the notion of a coherent self is the 
necessarily ‘natural’, distinctive and unquestioned lowest unit of analysis.  
What this demonstrates is that existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum and the critical citizenship scholarship which it draws upon positively 
affirms an understanding of non-discursive (or extra-discursive) historical and social 
practices of self. This is a notion of power as productive yet also as ‘produced’.113 In 
comparison to the discourse theory approach advocated in this thesis, the philosophical 
foundations of the critical discursive approach which they apply are based on 
acknowledging the performative nature of power only to the extent that it is presumed 
(pre-given) subjects are objectified by it. This is to retain the idea of a certain core which 
transcends the social spectrum. It could be argued that a style of thinking has developed 
here which does not reject Foucault’s view of power as productive but nor does it reject 
the old sovereign theory of power as repressive either. Rather both are incorporated 
together.  
 Phillips and Jørgensen argue that an understanding of language as that which 
simultaneously enslaves and empowers people has led studies of critical discourse 
analysis to attach great importance to patterns of dominance, whereby one group is 
subordinated to another.114 The emphasis of these studies is defined in terms of the 
‘material’ implications (objectifications) – for example, lack of resources or access to 
resources such as rights – which manifest themselves as ‘experience’ in relation to 
different types of social subjectification. Critical discourse analysis and other theories 
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like it portray power (not unproblematically, but nonetheless) as antithetical to freedom, 
subjectivity and resistance by presenting the idea that discourse can serve “to expose the 
way language and meaning are used by the powerful to deceive or oppress the 
dominated”.115 This invokes a sovereign theory of power to the extent that it takes for 
granted that power is localized in terms of one group or another. While the notion of a 
sovereign subject as foundational in itself (as the central source of power) is ‘deferred’ 
here, it is not ultimately ‘displaced’ as certain assumptions reinscribe it in the last 
instance.  Foucault called this the “the re-apprehension through the manifest meaning of 
discourse of another meaning at once secondary and primary, that is, more hidden but 
also fundamental”.116 More recently Stuart Hall has similarly highlighted the need for 
vigilance in understanding how some forms of critical inquiry can unwittingly mirror the 
non-critical arguments which they oppose when they do not ultimately undermine but 
instead confirm the need to always search for a politics with foundations (a sovereign 
politics).117  
 The point is that the notion of a (stable) ‘self’ which is central to Western 
Enlightenment thought has not been uniformly challenged. It has, on the contrary, been 
challenged to varying degrees: from those who have simply questioned the notion of ‘the 
subject’ as the authentic source of action of meaning, to those who have actually 
reconceptualized ‘the subject’ by thinking of it in a new displaced or de-centred 
position.118 This is arguably because despite all the talk of postmodern subjectivity, the 
idea of a de-centred subject is not an easy one to conceptualize, nor an easy one to work 
with. We can each see the physical space and historical continuity which we occupy as 
individuals. Such individuality is ‘the truth’ through which we have come to know 
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ourselves. Indeed, some people fear that a coherent self is a requirement for the notion of 
subjectivity itself. However, as Sara Mills explains, seeking to destabilize the self is not 
the same as dispensing with the notion of the subject. Instead, theorists such as Judith 
Butler and Stuart Hall have been quick to point out that a de-centred self is still a subject. 
Destabilizing the self, Mills points out, is rather to problematize the notion of the self as 
foundational and explore how it can be understood as the result of “a fragmented and 
unstable amalgam of the unconscious and the conscious” which is produced through 
discourse.119 With this in mind I will now discuss how the notion of ‘orders of 
problematization’ can help us to shift from the existing focus in the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum on the domestic relations of pre-given subjects which engage 
‘in’ discourse(s), to that of the problematic of subjectivity itself.120 
 
Problematization as a Guiding Method of Inquiry 
In focusing on how the body has been acted upon in the spread and localization of power, 
Foucault has turned the self into “a terrain of political action”.121 This has meant that the 
notion of “acting upon the self” is no longer simply explainable as a quest for self 
discovery. It becomes instead, as Barbara Cruikshank shrewdly notes, “a manner of 
acting politically” which involves choosing between infinite interpretations.122 According 
to this line of reasoning, the idea of the subject as individual becomes “an 
accomplishment regulated and produced in advance”.123 Individuality can therefore no 
longer be merely assumed to make sense but must be explained in and of itself.  
In her book entitled The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other 
Subjects, Cruikshank interrogates the assumption that the citizen/subject dualism posits a 
self-evident state of subjection against autonomous agency. She explains:  
[w]hen we say today that someone is subject, acquiescent, independent or apathetic, we 
are measuring that person against a normative ideal of citizenship. As a result the 
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discourses of democratic citizenship tend to foreclose the ways in which it is possible to 
be a citizen.124  
 
She therefore considers how democracy might be conceived of differently: something 
which requires “a new kind of subject rather than a form of government that liberates the 
subject from under the sovereign”.125 Following Foucault’s call “not [to] look for the 
headquarters that presides over its [power’s] rationality” Cruikshank refrains from asking 
‘who has the power?’ in relation to citizenship and looking at the typical questions 
regarding the types of people we understand as being empowered and those we 
understand as being disempowered.126 Instead, she attempts to understand what Foucault 
meant when he spoke of “the material agency of subjugation”127 by considering how 
power simultaneously “subjects and makes subject to”.128 She puts the notion of 
‘democratic citizenship’ itself, as that which is supposed by definition to equate with 
various degrees of freedom from power by ‘individuals’, under scrutiny.  
             What Cruikshank essentially does is to show how different solutions to 
citizenship have been constituted and made possible by the way in which the ‘problem’ 
of democracy itself has been posed in the first place – that is to say, in terms of the need 
for freedom. Doing so, she rethinks the ontological presumptions surrounding the history 
of citizenship and the object of inquiry – ‘the citizen’ – by emphasizing the 
representational processes of these claims to ‘being’ in the first place. The result is that 
she reestablishes the ‘politics’ of the initial idea itself of citizenship as (inevitably) 
democratic by exploring the games of truth through which the notion of ‘the citizen’ as 
empowered began to make sense in and of itself. This is Cruikshank’s ‘order of 
problematization’. Cruikshank is able in this manner to consider how it is that power is 
exercised through a series of aims and objectives without necessarily locating this power 
in the choice or decision of an individual subject (located presence). What Cruikshank 
shows is that the notion of problematization makes it possible to think of how power 
relations operate in terms of problems and solutions rather than by way of pre-given 
subjects. This ties Cruikshank’s work to that of Ashley, Walker, Campbell, Doty, Edkins 
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and Pin-Fat given how subjectivity itself (as opposed merely to identity) is theorized here 
as the effect of, rather than the cause of, how these problems and solutions are articulated.  
             The analysis offered in this thesis proceeds upon a similar premise that 
problematizations occur along and through a continuum of political spaces “through 
which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought”.129 It acknowledges, as David 
Campbell points out, that some problematizations are more powerfully and deeply 
entrenched than others, but starts from the premise nonetheless that “no one escapes the 
discursive realm of a problematization to find themselves in an extra-discursive realm of 
pregiven problems and ready-made solutions”.130 This represents an alternative way of 
looking at the 2004 Citizenship Referendum to how it has thus far been presented. This is 
because instead of concentrating on ‘who’ was included and ‘who’ was excluded from 
legal definitions and social understandings of citizenship, it emphasizes a particular order 
by which ‘a truth’ emerged in the first place about what it means to ‘be’ citizen in this 
instance as that which could be articulated and pointed to in terms of presence and thus 
vis-à-vis sovereignty. As outlined in chapter one, this is essentially a truth which focuses 
on the role of the state in regulating citizenship and the need to define whether this is a 
legitimate role (a product of the right and duty of states to regulate their borders) or an 
illegitimate role (an abuse of power by states and an attempt to discriminate by excluding 
certain people from the statist political community). What is being looked at is how 
citizenship has been constructed as a problem of and/or for state sovereignty in the 
discussions surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum.  
Approaching the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as an order of 
problematization can be understood as an attempt not so much to resolve the question of 
citizenship in order to put an end to it. Instead it is an attempt to try to understand how a 
particular understanding of ‘politics’ dictated how ‘citizen’ came to be indentified in the 
context of migration in the Republic of Ireland in 2004, as well as the links between this 
referendum and more general understandings regarding the meaning of what it is to ‘be’ a 
citizen-subject. This is to explore, challenge and question rather than merely assume the 
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solutions (commonsense or racism) which came to be assigned to the particular ‘problem’ 
of migration in the context of citizenship in Ireland and further afield.  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum frames the issue in terms of 
two debates: one dominant, the other dominated. Couched in terms of being concerned 
with trying to catalogue and specify the ‘real’ reasons for the referendum, we are told by 
this analysis that we must negotiate between two supposedly opposing arguments.131 On 
the one hand, the argument that the referendum was racially motivated as it involved a 
move from territorial to ethnic citizenship. And, on the other hand, the argument that the 
referendum involved a mere technical change needed to return power to the Executive in 
the area of Citizenship after it had mistakenly been taken away under the Good Friday 
Agreement. Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum treats these 
arguments as two different strategies which oppose each other. If, however, we are to 
think about experience as “the correlation of a domain of knowledge…a type of 
normativity and a mode of relation to the self”132, the notion of orders of 
problematization provides a way of imagining how a collection of ‘discursive elements’ 
which appear to oppose each other might also be shown to share a common way of 
knowing and acting in relation to a ‘truth’. In other words, we can begin to consider how 
two supposedly opposing debates might be shown to share a common strategy (by way of 
a common truth) about ‘citizenship’, forming one general citizenship debate. This is 
because instead of the notion of a discourse of power on one side and opposite it a 
discourse that runs counter to it, we begin “to reconceive of discourses as tactical 
elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations”.133 To consider by way of the 
notion of problematization, how the 2004 Citizenship Referendum might be conceived of 
as a discourse in its own right, is an attempt at putting it back within a general economy 
of discourses on citizenship so as to highlight how a particular “order of representation” 
was enabled because it elevated a certain type of understandings to that of the ‘legitimate’ 
medium for debating citizenship issues.134 It is to consider “the very historicity of forms 
of experience” as citizen-subject in this instance and the question of how these came to 
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situate themselves in thought vis-à-vis the notion of ‘individuality’, as opposed to by 
virtue of this fact.135 
  
 
Re-establishing the Politics of Subjectivity  
It is not enough to say that the subject is invariably engaged in a political field; that 
phenomenological phrasing misses the point that the subject is an accomplishment 
regulated and produced in advance. And as such is fully political; indeed perhaps most 
political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself. Judith Butler136  
  
Instead of simply presuming that the politics of citizenship in 2004 must be located in 
respect of questions regarding an individual’s access to the sovereign state, what has been 
suggested in this chapter following Walker and others is that the invocation of the notion 
of a sovereign present subject which exists vis-à-vis the state is also an important political 
aspect in its own right. What I want to consider in this final section is how an 
interrogation of subjectivity as sovereign presence in respect of citizenship in this regard 
allows for a reassessment of what currently counts as politics and political possibility in 
the context of migration.  
 
From Sovereign Politics to ‘The Political’   
R.B.J. Walker argues that the appearance of separation in modern liberal democratic 
traditions between claims about state sovereignty and the production of modern 
subjectivities within or outside states “merely effaces the conditions under which the 
world of modern sovereignties and subjectivities, of liberties, securities, developments 
and authorities/authorizations has been a world of mutual production.”137 Given that this 
separation between political community and subjectivity (and the manner in which this is 
constantly renegotiated) forms the basis of what is understood as politics in Western 
society, this has resulted in a call for the moment of ‘the political’ (the moment of 
contestation regarding what gets to count as ‘politics’) to be brought “back in”.138 The 
distinction which is drawn here between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ is one which 
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attempts to capture how our understanding of what counts as politics is both narrow and 
broad in focus. It is narrow in focus because on the one hand it invokes a clearly defined 
sphere of social life (politics) which involves all state related activities at a national level 
(elections, parliamentary debates, political activism, day-to-day activities of elected and 
government officials etc.) as well as at an international level (participation in the United 
Nations, diplomacy and war etc.). It is also broad in focus, however, insofar as it refers 
moreover to the processes of contestation (the political) by which all these things are 
constituted as ‘politics’ in the first place.  
This emphasis on the contested and thus ‘the political’ nature of what gets to 
count as ‘politics’ is often attributed to the success of feminism during the 1970s and 
1980s in its insistence that “the personal is political”.139 This slogan emphasized the 
importance of the notion of politics to understanding how relations of power result in 
certain activities – the feminization of domestic labour for example – being taken for 
granted. It highlighted the importance of the process itself by which activities and 
identities do or do not get to be included in ‘politics’ in the first place. Following this line 
of analysis what we can begin to see is a shift in the focus from questions of politics 
which are defined in terms of an already designated area of legitimate identities and 
subjectivities who engage ‘in’ politics, to questions of ‘the political’ which is the question 
of how we have come to understand the relationship between subjectivity and politics as 
one which is based on inclusion and exclusion in the first place. The political is no longer 
limited here simply to “grand moments of openness or decidability that arise in between 
established social systems”.140 Rather, what we are presented with is an explosion in the 
idea itself of a unique space of the political via a dissolution of the distinction between 
the public and the private in general, as well as more specifically in relation to the 
question of ‘being’.141 Our understanding of ‘the political’ has been relocated, in other 
words, in “the very soul of subjectivity”.142  
 In the case of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum we see that the emphasis in 
existing analysis is on how citizenship provides a space for some children (whose parents 
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are ‘Irish nationals’) while excluding others (whose parents are ‘non-Irish nationals’). 
The assumption is that everyone can become a ‘citizen’ but that only some are sanctioned 
to do so on the basis of how they have been culturally circumscribed as one or the other. 
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum emphasizes that certain 
children are prioritized over others and then draws moral implications from these 
experiences. In one respect this type of analysis is important insofar as it is predicated on 
making visible certain experiences of inclusion (as universalism) and exclusion (as 
particularism) in order to expose the existence of repressive mechanisms through which 
the boundaries of political community are conceptualized. It fails in an equally important 
respect however, given that it does not historicize the notion of a coherent present self 
which has become articulated in terms of an inclusion/exclusion framework in the first 
place. In other words, despite highlighting the power relations embedded in dominant 
conceptions of citizenship, it ignores the conditions of possibility for the particular 
representations of power upon which a certain type of (autonomous and self-authorizing) 
subject is legitimized in the first place.143 Instead, it presumes that the basis of all 
political possibility must be based on a decisive distinction in the last instance between 
identity (inside) and difference (outside). Doing so, it specifically ignores, however, how 
the question of citizenship in respect of migration is an area in which the idea itself of 
distinguishing between inside and outside, identity and difference, domestic and external 
spheres of organization is increasingly difficult, if not almost impossible, to maintain. 
Having established that the question of what gets to count as political subjectivity 
(the political) in respect of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum in the context of 
migration has been hitherto subordinated to prior assumptions about the nature of 
‘politics’ as that which must always be based on the secure foundations of coherent 
presence, what is being argued is that there is a need to re-establish the political (the 
moment of contestation) in respect of our understanding of citizen-subjectivity in this 
context. The manner in which it is suggested that this be done in this thesis is by 
revisiting the question of how we have come to know the self as ‘subject’ via a particular 
understandings of time and space associated with the notion of the state as the basis of 
political organization. This is to ask how it became meaningful to begin with to think of 
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‘being’ as inclusionable or exclusionable from politics and political community in the 
context of citizenship in 2004 by attending to “the historical processes that, through 
discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences” in terms of the idea of a 
coherent I as divisible in space and continuous in time.144 It is to ask specifically how the 
notion of presence itself functions as a foundation in respect of citizenship upon which 
subsequent ontological settlements are then based. Instead of taking for granted that 
being or not being citizen simply makes sense in terms of spaces of self and selves which 
are clearly delineated from spaces of (antagonistic or neutralized) other and others which 
are underwritten by historical narratives of here and now, us and them, what is focused 
upon is the question of the spatial and temporal conditions of possibility through which a 
specific understanding of ‘being’ has come to be understood in the dominant political 
imagination. This is so as to lay the foundations for exploring the types of alternative 
spatio-temporal conditions of possibility which have become unintelligible in respect of 
the question of citizen-subjectivity – most notably the ambiguous subjectivity of citizen-
children born to migrant parents which will be explored in chapters four and five of this 
thesis – and how these indicate new political possibilities beyond what is currently 
envisaged in terms of sovereignty.  
 
Repoliticising Subjectivity  
In chapter one I argued that Julia Kristeva’s work could help us consider how we might 
begin to engage with normally unintelligible spatio-temporal understandings of ‘being’. 
This is on the basis that her work presents an alternative way of understanding human 
being which is no longer a metaphysics of presence vis-à-vis the state (sovereignty) but a 
metaphysics of process: ‘being’ that is a production of displacement and dispersal rather 
than substance. As has been noted, Freudian inspired psychoanalytical explorations of the 
various levels of the subject (of which the self as coherent I is only one) have been 
integral to the notion of the ‘impossible subject’ as a subject based around a lack. This 
idea of the subject which eschews foundations is central in turn to the attempts 
considered in this chapter to interrogate sovereignty and the notion of core or essential 
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subjectivity which is foundational in itself. Kristeva’s work brings an interesting twist to 
this idea and to the field of psychoanalysis more generally. This is one which is 
particularly relevant in the context of migration, given that running through her work is 
an emphasis on how subjectivity is constructed by virtue of exile, separation and 
foreignness as that which is always already within the subject, as opposed to against it, as 
that which is its constitutive outside.  
Building on the work of Lacan, Julia Kristeva’s work can be seen to have further 
collapsed the distinction between public (self inside) and private (other outside) as 
understood in modern society. This is done by her asking who the stranger to the self is. 
This stranger is conceived of in various ways in her work: as migrant, as inner child, or as 
the effects of meaning which are not reducible to language and communication (the 
semiotic).145 In all cases, the effect is to problematize the normal association of ‘politics’ 
with the public and the assumption that this is separable from the self which is private.146 
She shows how the external, the public and the institutional domain should not be 
conceived of as separate from the ‘intimate’ but as that which emerges “in the field of the 
‘intimate’”.147 In respect more specifically of questions of community, Kristeva shows 
this by considering how foreignness defines the very possibility for the distinction 
between ‘Man’ (or ‘woman’) and ‘citizen’ at the same time as it is juxtaposed to both.148 
The result is an alternative notion of ‘self’ as a discursive effect which is based around a 
lack of secure foundations in either ‘Wo/Man’ or ‘citizen’, as opposed to that which is 
based around the sovereign presence of both ‘Wo/Man’ and ‘citizen’ which already exists 
in discourse. 
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Kristeva’s work not only engages with the notion of the ‘impossible subject’ 
therefore. Her work also provides a way of theorizing this impossible subject through the 
notion of the ‘intimate’ itself as the basis of politics, despite that fact that politics is 
normally differentiated from the private and notions of intimacy.149 This is very important 
in respect of this thesis given that its focus is on how understandings about citizenship 
intersect with those of migration through the intimate act of motherhood and giving birth. 
Where other theorists do similarly explore the intimate, they tend to equate this with an 
inferior position. In contrast to this, in her work when emphasizing her belief in the idea 
“of the woman as irrecuperable foreigner”, Kristeva has sought to argue that “permanent 
marginality….is the motor of change”.150 She does so however uniquely without 
emphasizing the notion of ‘woman’: “Because in the present state of things, I am afraid 
that if we insist on the fact that the feminine differentiates the individual, we may arrive 
at a new form of homogeneity”.151 Instead, Kristeva emphasizes the irreducibility of the 
subject in all respects including in the last instance to that of (even gendered) 
embodiment. As Sean Homer so aptly points out “[f]or Kristeva, one cannot be a woman 
because ‘woman’ is a social construct. Kristeva defines ‘woman’ as that which is outside 
representation; that which cannot be spoken.”152    
 It is precisely this constant disorientation in respect of the notion of ‘subject’ in 
her writings that makes Kristeva’s work so relevant to the attempt to re-establish the 
political moment in respect of our understanding of citizen-subjectivity in the context of 
migration. This is because the notion here of constant disorientation and displacement is 
precisely contrary to how the subject has been conceived of via sovereignty as the 
‘individual’ who is included in or excluded from politics in existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum and elsewhere in critical citizenship scholarship. Kristeva’s 
work as based on the impossible dislocated subject instead emphasizes the idea of 
inconsistent times and spaces of subjectivity which demand our attention and permit us to 
consider how we might retheorize political possibility in respect of the question of 
citizenship. It presents an image contrary to the understanding of self which mirrors the 
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spatio-temporal architecture of the sovereign state as that which is grounded both in 
absolute space and in a historical concept of time. Doing so, it provides us with a way of 
engaging with the interruptions to linear timeframes and absolute spatial imaginary which 
migration (as exile) poses to claims to sovereignty.   
 
 
Conclusion 
At the intersection of migration and citizenship some of the most important realities of 
modern political life come into focus. These realities manifest as a series of absolute 
spaces of ‘politics’ and the associated rights which are accorded to those who reside 
permanently within these borders and have become part of their historical narratives. 
These in turn, are opposed to absolute spaces devoid of politics in which certain other 
people are left to languish; constructed as being ‘in’ but not ‘of’ the aforementioned 
political spaces. In existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum the focus 
is on the people who are perceived as unfairly being prevented from ever fully belonging 
in the spaces and times of politics to which they contribute on a daily basis. In subjecting 
these ‘realities’ to an in-depth theoretical investigation, the aim of this chapter has not 
been to ignore them and/or their urgency but rather to distinguish between the problems 
themselves and that of the existing solutions and conclusions which have been derived 
from these problems; in particular that of sovereign autonomy and the idea that political 
possibility must be based on appeals to a guarantee of the self as located presence in the 
last instance.  
What has been emphasized in this chapter is the manner in which the sovereign 
state and the modern subject have together become “as the apogee of all modern desires 
and possibilities”.153 Sovereign power, as that which has come to dominate our 
understanding of rule, has also therefore arguably come “to limit our imagination in 
relation to the possibility and to the promise of politics.”154 What has been considered is 
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the need instead to recognise the appeal to sovereign autonomy as a particular solution to 
the problem of politics as posed in early modern Europe. This is one which encourages 
certain understandings regarding subjectivity while excluding others, and as such, is 
something which needs to be explored as a political aspect in its own right.  
This chapter has suggested that an alternative perspective on the construction of 
citizen-subjectivity might be drawn from a series of theorists (whose work is otherwise 
diverse) who problematize the notion of sovereignty – the supposed overarching reality 
of presence – as a particular way of knowing and being. These are people for whom 
political theory is no longer “a site at which one…[can] more or less ignore the 
problematic status of modern political judgement and assume that sovereignty simply 
is”.155 This is due to the manner in which modern accounts of sovereignty are 
increasingly unable to respond persuasively to understandings about how discrimination 
and authorization are being renegotiated outside of the idea of traditional political 
‘possibility’.  
Instead of trying to fit the newly configuring categories of space and time which 
as a result of migration are contracting, twisting, expanding and fracturing all around us 
(back) into existing statist dominated political horizons which reaffirm the need for 
foundations and our ability to always resolve the dilemma of particularism and 
universalism within the notion of a sovereign autonomous self, the work of these theorists 
has been used to consider the manner in which the ‘politics’ of citizenship need not 
always be answered in this manner. Instead, through their work what has been 
emphasized is the ability to consider how migration implicates “new ways of 
experiencing life, a new attitude to time and space, a new sense of history and identity” 
which require answers and horizons beyond the notion of ‘individual’ and the idea of a 
subject as that which exists vis-à-vis the state as autonomous and sovereign in the last 
instance.156 The danger in ignoring the need for these new horizons and instead 
continuing to resolve the dilemma of particularism and universalism vis-à-vis the state 
and thus within the notion of a sovereign autonomous self, will be explored in the next 
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chapter. What will be argued is that the result is to merely reframe the existing terms of 
the citizenship debate rather than to interrogate the taken-for-granted (sovereign) time 
and space of how we understand the political possibility of citizen-subjectivity.  
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Chapter 3 
Maintaining the Citizenship Debate: 
Reframing as opposed to challenging its existing terms 
    
 
For the entire life of this State, we have held to a person’s 
fundamental right to the country of his or her birth. In this regard 
we have always been closer to Boston than to Berlin…Fortress 
Europe has little to teach us in this regard. It has long held to the 
old tired principle of the rights of blood (known as jus sanguine) 
over those of soil (jus soli)…We are now being asked to choose 
between these two new worlds and to choose the old world 
model. Mary Raferty1  
 
     
Introduction  
The 2004 Citizenship Referendum brought to the fore questions of, and understandings 
regarding immigration, integration and social change in the Republic of Ireland in terms 
of the dualisms of inclusion and exclusion, particularism and universalism, nationalism 
and postnationalism. As indicated in the above quotation, these distinctions have been 
conceptualized primarily through a comparison between a European inspired qualified 
model of birthright (jus sanguine), versus that of a North American model of universal 
birthright citizenship (jus soli). Existing analysis of the referendum argues these are two 
alternative understandings regarding how political community and identity should be 
organized: one which reproduces the existing boundaries of the nation-state and can be 
associated with a particularly narrow republican conception of citizenship, the other 
which allows for a rewriting of these boundaries through more inclusive appeals to a 
common humanity. This chapter explores, however, how claims to humanity and the idea 
of a universal citizenship are not entirely contradictory to claims about particularism and 
the idea of bounded citizenship. It considers instead how each works on some level 
“within a broader discourse [about our collective futures] that requires both for its 
coherence and legitimacy.”2 The result is a much more complex and intricate image of 
the various (overlapping) arguments put forward in the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum to that which is normally offered.  
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This chapter argues that the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum can be retheorized 
as one single debate made up of two sides: one which accepts a dominant framework of 
statehood and community rather unproblematically, and the other which attempts to resist 
this framing but which nonetheless accepts the notion that the state is determinative in the 
last instance of the limits to understandings about political possibility. The latter attempts 
to resist the dominant framing are important because they challenge the basis of the statist 
monopoly on existing understandings about political community and identity. However, 
it will be pointed out that these do not ultimately undermine the dominant conception of 
political subjectivity as that which is defined in terms of state sovereignty. Instead they 
reinforce the idea that political possibility must continue to be defined as that which is 
split between ‘Man’ (as universal identity) and ‘citizen’ (as particular identity); thus 
merely reframing as opposed to actually challenging the terms of the existing citizenship 
debate.  
 Chapters one and two set out how the 2004 Citizenship Referendum can be begun 
to be conceived of as a discourse in its own right by looking at how citizenship has been 
constructed as a problem of and for state sovereignty in discussions surrounding it. Both 
this and the next chapter draw on source material generated by the discussions 
surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum across academia, politics and civil society, 
in order to consider the terms of this discourse. The aim in doing so is to highlight how a 
particular 'order of representation' was enabled because it prioritized a certain type of 
understandings (a modern conception of subjectivity) as the legitimate basis for debating 
citizenship. What is emphasized is how both sides of the debate underline the need to 
consider how particularism and universalism can ultimately be reconciled in an 
understanding of subjectivity which is one and the same time multiple and universal, yet 
individual and specific. The point is to consider how, in the last instance, subjectivity is 
limited in these accounts according to the manner in which it is conceptualized through 
the principle of state sovereignty and the associated delineation of political possibility in 
time and space. This chapter does so by looking specifically at the importance of the 
state, and thus statist imaginary, in defining the possibilities for political community and 
identity in those arguments against, as well as those arguments in favour of the 2004 
proposal to abolish automatic entitlement to birthright citizenship in Ireland. Drawing on 
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the same source material, the next chapter will then consider more closely the 
implications and limitations of conceptualizing the subject as sovereign in this continued 
statist framing of the ‘politics’ of citizenship. 
 
 
The Citizenship Debate 
The aim of this first section is to begin to explore the mutually constitutive relationship 
between universal and particular conceptions of political community and identity which 
informed the possible responses to the question of Irish citizenship in 2004. It considers 
how to conceptualize the interdependence of models of citizenship which are normally 
presented as opposing each other in this respect. Following Maxim Silverman, and Piaras 
MacÉinrí it will be explained that this is to (re)orientate the dominant focus in citizenship 
studies away from emphasizing the dissimilarities between particular (exclusive) and 
universal (inclusive) models of citizenship, to that of exploring the interdependence of 
these understandings for a more general comprehension of the nature and location of 
‘politics’ in modern society. It will be argued that neither particular nor universal models 
of citizenship on their own provide the answers to what the politics of citizenship is and 
can be. Rather the politics of citizenship only makes sense in relation to both. Citizenship 
therefore needs to be understood in terms of how it is informed by the idea of belonging 
to a specific community (particularism) in conjunction with our sense of our being 
humans (universalism).3  
 
Universal and Particular Conceptions of Political Community as In(ter)dependent 
At the time of the proposed referendum in 2004, the clash between the principle of jus 
sanguine as a qualified model of birthright, and that of jus soli as an unrestricted model of 
birthright, was outlined broadly thus. On one side, those in favor of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum proposal argued that the decision to base citizenship on the 
principle of jus sanguine was about global compatibility:  
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It is about bringing Irish citizenship law into line with European Union citizenship law. 
In Australia, for instance, a child born to non-national parents has no claim to citizenship. 
The same applies in the United Kingdom, France and Germany.4  
 
The Government Chief Whip insisted that it came down to the question of contribution 
and the need to distinguish between those who contribute to society themselves or 
through their parents, as opposed to those who do not: 
I consider myself of be a citizen of Ireland as does everybody in the House, not just 
because I was born here. I am a citizen of Ireland because my parents and grandparents 
lived and worked here and contributed to society. I too continue to make a contribution to 
society. Citizenship does not imply any cultural or ethnic uniformity but it implies that 
contribution.5  
 
Those in favor of jus soli, on the other hand, questioned the merits of this European trend, 
arguing that “[t]he experience of the United States as a melting pot and a society which 
welcomed – with different levels of success, […] different cultures” has resulted in “a 
stronger country, particularly economically”.6 It was argued furthermore that it resulted in 
a fairer society: 
The argument that was persuasive in Canada and the United States was that the 
seemingly random ‘accident of birth’ rule was actually a fair, democratic and objective 
way to determine citizenship, not dependent on race, colour, wealth or the political clout 
of parents. North American countries have maintained a generous approach to citizenship 
and have thriving economies. Their approach to citizenship has served Irish people very 
well over the past two centuries. We are grateful for that and we should learn from it.7 
 
In keeping with this idea, former USA Congressman Bruce Morrison went so far as to 
suggest that jus soli was the only basis for a fair society, insisting that “[t]he alternative to 
birthright citizenship is citizenship based upon ethnicity with a set of technical rules that 
leave open the possibility that people born and brought up in Ireland are not citizens.”8  
According to Mancini and Finlay the eventual choice of the Irish Government to 
propose a break with the existing emphasis on jus soli in the Irish constitution – a 
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decision which was later endorsed by the Irish electorate at the polls on 11 June 2004 – 
“marked a sharp break from both this tradition and the universalism it entails.”9 
Elsewhere King-O’Riain has argued that the result has been “to create a racialised two-
tier system where jus sanguinis, or ancestry…becomes the basis and prime criterion for 
being an Irish citizen.”10 The understanding here is that by favouring the European trend 
the ideology of universalism (jus soli) was ‘replaced’ by the ideology of particularism 
(jus sanguine). Narrow exclusivist understandings of modern political community, 
defined in terms of possibilities and necessities of the nation-state, took precedence over 
broader understandings of modern political community which were defined in terms of 
possibilities and necessities beyond the nation-state. Mancini and Finlay argue that 
“a…neglect of the moral, cultural, and economic importance of jus soli threatens to 
impoverish contemporary debates surrounding immigration”.11 In raising the question of 
immigration in this manner, they posit the choice of models of political community as 
either jus soli (universalism) or, jus sanguine (particularism) and this understanding is 
reflected throughout existing analysis of the referendum itself. This analysis emphasizes 
that the referendum proposal “removed”, “eliminated” and “substituted” jus soli in favour 
of jus sanguine, tracing this decision back to a European convergence in this direction in 
the area of immigration.12 General references within Dáil discussions and the literature on 
the 2004 referendum are based on the understanding, as argued by Fanning and 
Mutwarasibo, that in the wake of the Maastricht treaty a degree of harmonization became 
inevitable in Europe13 and that “[T]he Government is playing with…a fear of the 
unknown, a fear of the foreigner that is shared throughout Europe.”14  
Yet, the usefulness of this juxtaposition between understandings of how political 
community is organized in Europe on one hand and in North America on the other, in 
terms of a supposed ‘trade off’ between prioritizing either jus soli or jus sanguine, 
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universalism or particularism, is problematic. When considering, for example, how 
Ireland might formulate a vision of political community in the twenty-first century as a 
country of immigration rather than that of emigration, Piaras MacÉinrí argues that 
existing responses to immigration within Europe and within individual states in Europe 
involve questions and understandings of ‘universal’ conceptions of political community 
as much as those understandings about political community ‘between’ Europe and 
elsewhere do.15 This is because most European countries operate a system of both jus 
sanguine and jus soli. In Ireland, for example, the general provision which stipulates that 
all those born in Ireland are Irish citizens themselves regardless of their parent’s place of 
birth, which has existed either constitutionally or in statute until 2004, is not the only 
provision governing citizenship. This exists in conjunction with legal provisions for 
obtaining Irish citizenship by descent through an Irish citizen parent or, through a 
grandparent (the so-called ‘grandfather clause’).16 This final provision, as provided for in 
Irish legislation, is a provision allowing second, third and fourth generation people whose 
parents are registered on the Foreign Births Register to avail of Irish citizenship by virtue 
of their ancestry. The point is that Irish legislation has always allowed for citizenship to 
be passed on by descent (jus sanguine) as well as by way of the provision of place of 
birth (jus soli).  
To some extent his fact is indirectly acknowledged by most people. However, this 
has not prevented the use of ‘jus soli’ and ‘jus sanguine’ as concepts to refer in shorthand 
to entirely conflicting models of citizenship and to argue that one is replacing/overturning 
etc. the other. Furthermore, even when this is acknowledged and the distinction between 
jus soli and jus sanguine is justified as that which refers to what is the ‘primary’ means 
(descent or birthplace) by which citizenship is acquired in a given state, the lack of 
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general consensus regarding the meaning of these terms in the first place is often ignored. 
For example, there was huge disagreement in 2004 as to whether jus soli can exist in 
conjunction with jus sanguine or not. The Irish Government insisted, on one hand, that it 
can and therefore argued that jus soli would not be ‘overturned’ or ‘eliminated’ as, 
following acceptance of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004 
the children of non-nationals who fulfilled the conditions of residency criteria would 
automatically acquire the right to Irish citizenship at birth. On the other hand, those 
against the proposed referendum argued that jus soli is an unconditional right which 
ceases to exist when qualifications are imposed on it. One Teachta Dála (TD), for 
example, referred to birthright citizenship as being a “sacred” feature, implying that it can 
not be altered in any way.17  
In contrast to this emphasis on opposing particular and universal models of 
political community, MacÉinrí considers how one of the main European models for the 
organization of political community – multiculturalism – is in fact neither particular on 
one hand, nor universal on the other, neither inclusive nor exclusive, but needs to be 
understood as a product of (and therefore as that which incorporates elements of) both 
Romantic particularism and Enlightenment universalist aspirations.18 This recent 
observation by MacÉinrí is reminiscent of a similar observation made by Maxim 
Silverman in his work undertaken in the early nineteen-nineties. In Deconstructing the 
Nation, Silverman sought to reappraise the framework of oppositional models through 
which citizenship had been primarily theorized up until that point.19 This was normally in 
terms of a republican universalism model associated with France, as against a Romantic 
particularism model associated with Germany. This typology can be seen in turn to have 
been taken as indicative of a juxtaposition between ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ models of 
political community within a European context and, between Europe and the rest of the 
world.20 Silverman argued, however, that “the contradictions in the formation of all 
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modern nation-states: contradictions which emerge within Enlightenment of the 
individual and the collectivity” needed to be considered also.21 Emphasizing the general 
problematic nature and ambivalence of the nation form which is highlighted when 
questions of immigration invoke responses regarding citizenship, Silverman specifically 
argued that “there is a need to problematize models which have become stereotyped as 
polar opposites” such as universalism and particularism; assimilation and difference; 
individualism and collectivism.22  
Silverman’s argument is that practice demonstrates that the concept of citizenship 
does not reflect mutually exclusive understandings of how political society should be 
organized in terms of inclusion and exclusion, or alternatively as some middle ground 
between these two options. The concept of citizenship is rather “situated at the 
intersection of diverse and often contradictory discourses” regarding who ‘we’ are and 
where ‘we’ belong.23 Instead of reflecting models which can be understood as either 
inclusive on one hand or, on the other hand, more exclusive organizations of political 
community and identity, Silverman argues that the concepts of universalism and 
particularism which underpin these citizenship models need to be conceptualized in terms 
of how they themselves “form part of a more complex whole: that of a tension within the 
fabric of western nations.”24 Furthermore, instead of looking at how the question of 
immigration ‘confirms’ how citizenship operates at a national level or within Europe, 
Silverman insists on the need to explore how immigration contradicts and destabilizes the 
models of universalism and particularism upon which understandings about citizenship 
and its relationship with the state are based in the first place. In this respect Silverman 
takes a different approach to someone like Roger Brubaker whose work has been 
particularly influential in the area of citizenship and who has concentrated on exploring 
the genesis and continuation of several distinctive traditions of political community 
formation across Europe: understood in terms of different traditions of universalism and 
particularism associated with Universal Enlightenment and Romantic Particularism 
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respectively.25 Brubaker’s discussions have undoubtedly facilitated very important 
understandings regarding the widely varied development of citizenship across European 
territory and the implications for immigrants as a result thereof. This notwithstanding, 
Silverman, however, points towards the need to explore how the question of immigration 
also problematizes the understanding of the historical relationship between citizenship 
and the modern sovereign territorial nation-state. He points out that thinking about 
particularism and universalism as two separate models of citizenship fails to address this 
question as it merely reproduces a statist framing of politics.  
In order to understand the role which the modern sovereign territorial state plays 
in defining citizenship, what is suggested in this chapter is that we begin to think of the 
state as a ‘limit-concept’. Peter Nyers argues that thinking in terms of limit concepts 
“forces us to confront the limits of modern forms of political identity, community and 
practice.”26 He argues that we need to think of ‘limits’, however, not only as that which 
act as restrictions “beyond which one can go no further” but as that which are 
“simultaneously foundational, as they serve as the condition of possibility for making 
distinctions such as inside/outside, self/other, friend/enemy.”27 This understanding of the 
state as limit concept will be taken as a starting point to begin to explore, within the 
deliberations and discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, the 
mutually constitutive relationship between particular (exclusive) and universal (inclusive) 
models of citizenship in defining the type of political subjectivity which we are told 
makes sense here.  
 
The State as a ‘Limit-Concept’ 
The second stage of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004 was 
debated in Dáil Eireann over a sixteen hour (two day) period. In the weeks leading up to 
this Bill, as well as in the remainder committee and final report stages, and in the Seanad 
where the bill was debated subsequently, various types of political society envisaged for 
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Ireland were passionately discussed in light of the all important question of 
‘immigration’. Yet insofar as there were two sides to the debate, neither of these can be 
said to have invoked completely different conceptions of the nature of citizenship. 
Rather, what is evident is that conceptions of universalism (jus soli) and those of 
particularism (jus sanguine) relied equally on the notion of a bounded political unit (state) 
to invoke the parameters of what was and what was not an accepted limitation on 
understandings of where citizenship should end. 
On one side there were those advocating a bounded concept of political 
community who justified this on the basis of a civic understanding of the importance of 
the relationship between duty and belonging. These people argued that the physical 
borders of the Irish state could be identified with the ‘acceptable’ limits of Irish 
citizenship. The argument here, as Ivor Calley, Minister of State at the Department of 
Health and Children points out, is that citizenship is understood as embodying a 
relationship between community, nationality and sovereignty. This is a relationship 
which is encompassed in Irish statehood itself. What is understood is that “[c]itizenship is 
an important issue which goes to the heart of the nature of our State, our nation and our 
sovereignty.”28 The presumption is that citizenship is synonymous with the national 
political community. The point at which the international community (the universal) 
begins is the point where national political community (the particular) ends. This is also 
the point at which citizenship in any meaningful sense of the term ends. In other words, 
the notion of the particular works here to define the ‘acceptable’ limits of how political 
community (citizenship) must be organized and beyond which it will not work. The 
implication is that the former should not be conflated with the latter as to do so would be 
to lose the essence (core) of citizenship. This framework allows for the clear delineation 
between what citizenship does and does not require by way of connections and duties or 
responsibilities. As articulated again by Ivor Calley at the time of the referendum in 2004, 
the belief here is that 
[i]t [citizenship] is more than just an entitlement to a passport. Citizens must show loyalty 
to the State and fidelity to the nation. Citizenship should not be available on foot of 
geographical circumstances of birth. There should be a greater connection with the 
country before an entitlement to citizenship.29 
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 Against this, those who objected to the notion of a bounded concept citizenship 
argued that a bounded concept of political community was based on an ethnic 
understanding of belonging. As an alternative, they advocated a concept of citizenship 
which emphasized the importance of humanity (the universal) over and above that of the 
national community (the particular). The argument made here is that the national 
community is indicative of the boundaries at which the ‘unacceptable’ limits of 
citizenship become most apparent. As Mr. Crowe, a SF TD points out, proposals about 
the need to align citizenship with the boundaries of the Irish state are interpreted from 
this perspective as dangerous: “Most fair-minded people would see that we are going in 
the direction of the politics of fear. We heard a great deal about the concept of fortress 
Europe, but are we not in fortress Ireland? Is that the sort of message that we are sending 
out?”30 In other words, although the particularity of the national community is understood 
here as coterminous with the boundaries of the Irish statist project, the claims of state 
sovereignty are not presumed to provide the only real answers to “all questions about 
who we are and who we might become as political subjects.”31 Rather, what is argued is 
that the claims of state sovereignty mark the point at which our possibilities as political 
subjects are often restricted. For example, Michael D. Higgins, TD, emphasized in 2004 
in respect of the question of citizenship that, “the tone is moving away from human rights 
and international law and towards a narrow interpretation of protecting the territory 
etc.”32 The problem with this, he indicates, is the manner in which contemporary 
understandings about rights and obligations and needs often exceed the Irish statist 
political project which gives these rights and responsibilities meaning. His comment 
emphasizes how this is ignored and refused when rights and responsibilities (articulated 
as ‘connections’) are (exclusively) interpreted according to state sovereignty. He and 
others therefore argued in 2004 that the realm beyond the national political community – 
the realm which enables our understanding of ourselves as ‘humans’ as opposed to 
merely as ‘citizens’ – needs to be considered in terms of how it too affords occasion for 
thinking about how political subjectivity is enabled.  
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Thinking about the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum in this manner allows us to consider how the relationship between the 
particular (national community) and the universal (humanity) as invoked here is a 
mutually constitutive relationship. It is one in which the claims of a prior understanding 
of the framing of universality enables the particularity of the state to become both 
problem and solution to this framing.33 This allows us to stop continuing to engage with 
this debate simply in terms of the merits of one side versus the other or the need for a 
middle ground between both. It allows us to consider instead how the notion of the 
modern territorial state acts as a defining concept in both sides of the debate: on one hand 
as that which defines the acceptable limits of citizenship (here the state is understood as a 
‘solution’ to the framing of universality), and on the other hand as that which defines the 
unacceptable limits of citizenship (where the state is understood as a ‘problem’ to the 
framing of universality).  
 
The state as defining the ‘acceptable’ limits of citizenship  
With the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2004, the Irish 
Government defended a conception of citizenship which they argued needed to be 
grounded in ‘connections’. This was articulated in terms of the idea that “to become an 
Irish citizen a person should have a much greater connection with this country than 
simply being born here.”34 These connections to the nation, to the state, and to Irish 
society more generally were seen here as embodying the most important elements of 
citizenship.  
Within the Irish political system, the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern had begun to 
indicate concerns in 2004 regarding growing alienation within Irish society. He did so by 
inviting well known author of Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam, to address the FF 
parliamentary party in September 2004. Speaking several years later at the Conference on 
the Future of the Community and Voluntary Sector, Ahern spoke of the significance of 
Putnam’s concept of ‘social capital’ and the need which Putman had identified for direct 
participation in society by individuals to ensure the health of society as a whole. He 
stressed the importance of both ideas in the development of the community sector in an 
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Irish context.35 Robert Putnam explains in Blowing Alone that social capital “refers to 
connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them”, going on to argue that social capital is “most 
powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations.”36 An 
accumulation of efforts by the FF Government to put this model into practice in Ireland 
in the early twenty-first century can be seen in the setting up ‘the Active Taskforce on 
Citizenship’ designed to encourage all citizens in Ireland to be(come) ‘active citizens’.  In 
the Government’s White Paper on Supporting Voluntary Activity, it defines active 
citizenship as  
the active role of people, communities and voluntary organisations in decision-making 
which directly affects them. This extends the concept of formal citizenship and 
democratic society from one of basic civil, political and social and economic rights to one 
of direct democratic participation and responsibility.37  
 
The Concept of Active Citizenship (publication by the Taskforce on Active Citizenship) 
defines active citizenship in relation both to the concept of civic republicanism and 
Putman’s work on social capital.38 The values which this particular model of social 
change stresses are encompassed in the Taoiseach’s emphasis on three factors in his 2006 
address to the Community and Voluntary Sector: the importance of “vibrant civic 
society”; the need “to support the values of solidarity and participation, rather than 
isolation and withdrawal”; and, the imperative of encouraging everyone to “take a step 
forward, become involved, and serve the community in a direct and active way”.39  
It is important to note, therefore, that when speaking in the Dáil about the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2004, Government Deputies 
discussed the issue of citizenship in relation specifically to the need for this type of 
‘involvement’ in Irish society. The Government Chief Whip in 2004, for example, when 
asked about her understanding of the issue of citizenship when coming to speak in the 
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discussions about the referendum proposal in 2004, explained that her understanding of 
the issue was “via the notion of ‘active belonging’”.40 This, she defined as the 
involvement in a particular community or in a particular cultural amenity such as sport.41 
“We weren’t always talking explicitly about ‘citizenship’ […] but about belonging and 
being proud of being involved in an Irish society. I think this notion of local belonging is 
quite particular to Ireland. In itself it is a definition of citizenship.”42 Similarly, another 
TD interviewed who had spoken in the Dáil discussions in 2004 in favour of basing 
citizenship on ‘connections’ rather than on “entry into this country a short time before the 
birth of a child”43, cited personal experience of exploring the issue of citizenship in terms 
of the problem of a disconnect between citizen and system. “My experience tells me that 
democracy is very remote for most people in society and this perception is perpetuated by 
the media. My conclusion is therefore that what is needed is to encourage participation 
and this is what I have concentrated on.”44  
What this demonstrates is that the concept of citizenship had been assigned a very 
particular meaning in the political arena in Ireland leading up to the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum. In an era where utilitarian individualist accounts of what liberal societies 
should look like were gaining predominance, an emphasis on social obligation and 
collective responsibility understandably resonated with many people.45 The importance of 
the idea of connection(s) via direct involvement in Irish community had taken on 
                                                 
40
 Interview with Mary Hanafin, TD and Government Chief Whip, 2002 – 2004 (Dublin, 12/08/2009) 
41
 Ibid. It should be noted that sport has had a particularly political emphasis in Ireland given the role which 
certain games (hurling and Gaelic football most notably) played in the construction of Irish nationalism 
after partition in 1922 in comparison to how other sports were designated as ‘foreign’. It was only in 2005, 
for example, that there was an eventual end to a century-old ban by the Irish Gaelic Athletics Association 
on the playing of ‘foreign sports’ (which included soccer and rugby) on any of its properties.  
42
 Interview with Mary Hanafin, TD and Government Chief Whip, 2002 – 2004 (Dublin, 12/08/2009) 
43
 Killeen, T. (FF) Oireachtas Debates, (22 April 2004) Twenty-Seventh Amendment, p.67 
44
 Interview with Tony Killeen, TD and Minister for Labour Affairs at the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment 2004 – 2007, (Dublin, 17/06/2009) 
45
 It is notable that critiques of active citizenship tend not to be based therefore on refuting the usefulness of 
such a concept but of the necessary understanding implied regarding a supposedly consistent meaning of 
the ‘active citizen’ and/or of ‘action in solidarity’. On the former see, for example, Cynthia Weber who 
looks at how the notion of an ‘active’ citizenship is being redesigned through projects such as ‘the casa 
segura project’ in the U.S. On the latter see, for example, Niamh Gaynor who interrogates what she argues 
is “a highly selective rendering of the interrelated concepts of citizenship, social capital, and community 
development”. Weber, C. (2010) ‘Introduction, Design and Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, Vol.14, 
Issue.1, p.8; Gaynor, N. (2009) ‘In-Active Citizenship and the Depoliticization of Community 
Development in Ireland’, Community Development Journal, Advance Access published 23 July, p.2 
 124 
enormous importance in political life for understandings of the role which citizenship 
should play in society.  
The notion that there are core assumptions attached to the concept of citizenship 
which place constraints on its use or application is one which has found acceptance 
within social science. Andrew Mason, for example, insists that citizenship has a core 
which is hard to reconcile with notions of a more global universal type citizenship which 
lies outside the boundaries of the nation-state or equivalent political institution.46 For 
Mason, a common respect for global ethics or global justice does not fulfil the condition 
of citizenship: “the mere existence of demanding moral obligations, or even obligations 
of justice that extend across state borders, is insufficient to engage the concept of 
citizenship.”47 David Miller also draws a similar distinction between obligations which 
human beings have to each other and what he calls ‘genuine citizenship’.48 For Miller, 
genuine citizenship is republican citizenship which remains true to its preconditions; “it 
cannot be conjured up ex nihilo”.49 He discusses four necessary preconditions: these are 
the enjoyment of a set of equal rights necessary to carry out private aims as well as a 
public role; a set of obligations; willingness to defend rights of others and protect 
common interests; and participation in both formal and informal politics.50  
The point is that ‘citizenship’ is distinguished here from (mere) relations between 
states. Aspirations of cosmopolitan democratic law, global civil society and multi-level 
territorial democratic citizenship are argued to take place by virtue of relations between 
states (e.g. via the European Court of Justice). Miller insists that they have nothing to do 
(or only minimal involvement) with citizenship itself. Without a determinate community 
with which one identifies politically, which is held together with communal ties, and 
others with whom one stands in relations of reciprocity, Miller argues that “this is not 
citizenship in any but the most empty and inflated sense”.51 It was arguably on such a 
basis that the Irish Government was able to comfortably respond to the Opposition’s 
objections to the narrow conditions for citizenship put forward in the referendum 
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proposal; explaining that to do otherwise would be to move away from citizenship as a 
useful term.  
Yet, just as in Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam does not endorse or encourage “a 
single-minded pursuit of social capital [that] might unacceptably infringe on freedom and 
justice”, nor, did the Irish Government claim to advocate such a policy regarding 
citizenship.52 Putnam differentiates between “bridging social capital” (out-group 
solidarity) and “bonding social capital” (in-group solidarity) and argues that a balance 
needs to be achieved between them. It was this idea of a need for a balance between 
bonding further together those already part of Irish society (particularism) and bridging 
between Irish society and inward migration (universalism) that was echoed by the Irish 
Government in 2004. In particular it was argued, in response to accusations that the 
proposed amendment was racist, that bringing the existing Irish and new immigrant 
communities closer together (bridging) in order to create social capital within new and 
old communities (bonding) depended on dealing with any manifest grievances within 
Irish society as a whole. The Minister of State at the Department of Justice sought to 
clarify this at the time in the Dáil, explaining:   
It is important for us to recognise that it is the duty of Government to regulate and control 
immigration. Failure to do so would lead to racial tension […]. Rather than raising the 
issue of racism inadvertently, as the Opposition may be doing, the Minister, by dealing 
with this issue in terms of immigration laws, has objectively, sensibly and sensitively 
raised and introduced this referendum, and the legislation that will follow, to ensure that 
the charge of racism being levelled by the Opposition will not arise.53  
 
When interviewed, another TD from FF justified the referendum in 2004 and the 
subsequent change in citizenship legislation as a form of prevention against what he 
called “toxic type reaction or incipient racism to the volume of asylum-seekers coming 
into the country.”54  He further elaborated:  
It couldn’t be left as it was – if abuse wasn’t curtailed bigger problems would follow. 
Racism was what we wanted to avoid. Not on a control platform but we wanted to avoid 
the problem which the British had already had by being seen to supervise immigration 
and limit abuses. The referendum needed to be done early to avoid implications of 
rampant abuses.55 
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The Taoiseach made a very similar argument when asked about the significance of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. He explained that from 2002 onwards  
it was very clear that exploitation involving babies via entitlement to citizenship [was 
taking place]. There was factual information on the ground regarding citizenship tourism. 
We did not want racism to take over. There would have been rampant abuse if left go 
on.56 
 
 
The state as defining the ‘unacceptable’ limits of citizenship  
In comparison, those who opposed the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal can be 
seen to have questioned the civic principle(s) of bounded citizenship which they were 
presented with by the Irish Government. This was done in the first instance by 
questioning the relatively unproblematic notion of the autonomy of the Irish state referred 
to in arguments about the sovereign ‘duty’ of the state to regulate and manage entry into 
and within its boundaries in order to control immigration and prevent racism. The history 
of emigration with which Ireland is associated was emphasized here instead to show the 
very real interdependent links between Ireland and the global system of states in which it 
exists. Similarly, the assumption regarding the homogeneity of Irish society until the 
1990s, expressed by Government Deputies via comments such as: “[u]ntil recent years 
the people of this country have not been exposed to any great extent to people of African 
or oriental origin”57, was actively problematized. An FG TD, for example, refuted this, 
responding that  
Deputy Killeen said we are not used to having people of other races in our communities 
but many generations of Irish people have been exposed to people of other races over 
many centuries. This did not take place in Ireland, but in those places throughout the 
world to which Irish people travelled.58 
 
Finally, the notion of a dividing line between ‘established’ and ‘new’ (read: temporary) 
communities in Ireland which underwrote arguments regarding the need to distinguish 
between those with a ‘genuine’ connection to Ireland and the idea of passport tourists, 
was put under scrutiny. This was done by explaining that “[m]ost who come here do not 
see themselves as guest workers or temporary visitors. They fundamentally wish to stay 
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and Ireland needs to face up to this and start to integrate these potential new citizens from 
the start.”59  
As an alternative, therefore, to looking only to the necessities and possibilities of 
modern political community ‘within’ the sovereign state and understandings of political 
subjectivity defined in terms of state particularism, those opposed to the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum tried to draw on understandings of the necessities and 
possibilities of modern political community and understandings of political subjectivity 
outside of the modern sovereign state. In other words, they emphasized the sense of being 
humans and being part of a universal human race as well as of ‘being’ in relation to a 
particular community. The imaginary of this interdependency of Ireland as a state within 
a larger states system was invoked here in order to break down the supposedly clear lines 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’, between those living within the Irish state and, those living 
outside of it. For example, it was pointed out by TD Mr O’Dowd in Dáil Éireann during 
discussions on the referendum proposal that “[t]he Irish people who emigrated sent back 
the money to send Pat and Mary to school. They used it to look after their sick parents 
and grandparents. What are the immigrants in Ireland doing today? They are doing 
exactly the same.”60  
This counter argument echoes an alternative strand within social science to the 
one invoked by the Irish Government in 2004. This is one which instead considers the 
need to radically expand the core concept of citizenship as normally understood in terms 
of the legal and political structure of the sovereign state. This is in order to take account 
of the many different types of membership of society which exist, both nationally and 
internationally. Michael Lister, for example, points out that “citizenship has become, or is 
in the process of becoming, decoupled from nationality.”61 In moving away from 
nationality and the statist project as a core element of citizenship, Lister explains that this 
reality is reflected in considerations of how it is that Europeanization and migration can 
be seen to challenge the so-called core values of citizenship which are normally 
associated with national statist understandings of the organization of political community. 
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Instead of agreeing that citizenship is meaningless without its core values, he suggests 
that the evidence increasingly points to the fact that globalization, Europeanization and 
migration re-define the core values themselves in terms of internationalism.62 It is on the 
basis of such understandings that the counter arguments surrounding the referendum have 
been able to interrogate the unquestionable assumption that state particularism defines the 
‘acceptable’ limits of citizenship. This assumption has been revealed as highly 
problematic. On the contrary, state particularism is shown to present the misconceived 
‘unacceptable’ limits of citizenship. Abstract universalism is put forward here as 
providing answers to more complex understandings of political possibility which state 
particularism fails to provide.  
Looking at universal and particular conceptions of citizenship via the idea of the 
state as ‘limit concept’ in this way points to the mutually constitutive nature of 
understandings regarding how political community should be organized. It provides 
tangible examples of how conceptions of abstract universalism (humanity) work 
interdependently with conceptions of precise particularism (national community) to 
define a more general horizon of political possibility and necessity which are (only) then 
debated. In this first section, universal and particular models of citizenship have been 
shown to form part of a more complex whole therefore than is presented in existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. What is brought into focus is not 
opposition, but the constant transgression  
of the (imagined) frontiers between universalism, particularism, assimilation and 
difference, individuals and communities, distance and proximity, the citizen and the 
subject, the private and the public, the administrative and the legal, the economic and the 
social and so on.63 
 
 
Theorizing Citizenship as a Battlefield: Two Sides, One Debate  
Having considered the debate on citizenship as manifested in the Republic of Ireland in 
2004 in terms of two interdependent (as opposed to mutually exclusive) conceptions of 
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political community and identity, this second section will consider further how existing 
analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum defines citizenship by way of the combined 
necessities and possibilities within and outside of the Irish sovereign state. It will do so 
by considering how this division between the national community (inside) and humanity 
(outside) has been further mapped onto the national statist project itself. This has been 
done by dividing it up into an ‘inclusionary’ core political realm (of which only certain 
people are members) on one hand, and an ‘exclusionary’ abstract humanitarian realm (of 
people who are not considered part of the dominant group) on the other.  
What is argued is that the main difference between the two sides, as presented in 
the discussions surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, can be refocused away 
from the idea of an opposition. It can be refocused instead on how one side accepts 
certain understandings regarding the division between statehood and the international 
realm, between citizenship and humanity and between inside and outside as secure 
foundations, while the other side demonstrates an awareness of the insecurity of these 
foundations by questioning outright the supposed distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
‘citizen’ and ‘human’. The importance of the challenge which is posed to the statist 
monopoly on understandings of political community here by the latter side is not denied. 
What is argued, however, is that it does not include an overall questioning of the 
universal (Man) versus particular (citizen) foundations themselves as the basis upon 
which questions about the politics of citizenship should be based. The question of 
political identity and community continues rather to be circumscribed in discussions 
surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum by conceptions of the supposed 
necessity of autonomy and (state) sovereignty underlying these categories which are in 
turn assumed to be foundational in themselves.  
 
Citizenship as a Process of Drawing Boundaries  
Many counter-arguments surrounding the question of Irish citizenship in 2004 emphasize 
the precariousness of the foundations upon which the notions of ‘Irish community’ and 
‘Irish statehood’ as used by the Irish Government, are based. In doing so, they highlight – 
both explicitly and implicitly – the importance of the role which citizenship plays in 
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nation construction: discussed most notably in the work of Floya Anthias and Nira 
Yuval-Davis.  
In Racialized Boundaries, Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis consider the 
significance of exclusive understandings of political community and identity in terms of 
particular types of nationalist projects.64 Their argument is that the right for national self-
determination has assumed an ideal type understanding of nation-state according to 
which certain people are included (the dominant national collectivity) and certain others 
are excluded (minorities). They argue nonetheless that immigration is a concept which 
permits interrogation of the notion of ‘community’ understood here as being based on 
fixed boundaries. With this in mind, Yuval-Davis suggests that “for an adequate theory of 
citizenship, the examination of the differential access of different categories of citizens is 
of central importance”.65 Anthias and Yuval-Davis insist that citizenship be 
conceptualized as a battleground because they argue that the focus is primarily on 
securing “the right to enter, or, once having entered, the right to remain in a specific 
country.”66 They identify the issue of citizenship therefore as that of the question of 
‘where’ boundaries are drawn, not only between the state and the international 
community but within the state itself by pointing out how the lines between inside 
(national) and outside (international) can be seen to be reproduced here. These 
boundaries, they argue, “relate to different sorts of racialized exclusions in the 
construction of the national collectivity.”67  
Notwithstanding disagreement by people such as Robin Cohen regarding whether 
or not these boundaries are accurately described as ‘racialized’68, the emphasis here and 
elsewhere by Yuval-Davis and Anthias on how the boundaries of national community 
and sovereign statehood need to be de-naturalized, has become a extremely powerful way 
of thinking about political community in critical citizenship studies. Its influences can be 
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seen with regard to how many of the counter-arguments surrounding the referendum were 
articulated in reference to this idea. Essentially, the focus of this work is on the manner in 
which understandings of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘minority’ and ‘majority’, ‘citizen’ and 
‘immigrant’ are drawn and redrawn according to complex interrelationships between 
inclusion and exclusion, inside and outside. What is highlighted in all such explorations 
is the social constructedness of the more entrenched boundaries which are taken for 
granted in so much of everyday life; in particular, the tenuousness of the foundations 
upon which dominant understandings of ‘community’ and ‘statehood’ rely. 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias argue that citizenship is one of four elements through 
which the nationalist statist project is racialized (the others are culture, religion and 
origin).69 Citizenship is conceptualized here, in other words, as a mechanism (which is 
mutually constituted by, as well as constitutive of, assumptions regarding place of birth, 
descent and/or cultural and religious affiliation) by which boundaries are drawn between 
people according to understandings about perceived status as ‘belonging’ or, as ‘not 
belonging’. With citizenship conceptualized as a battleground in which lines are 
constantly (re)drawn between people in an effort to differentiate ‘insiders’ from 
‘outsiders’, citizenship is broken down into a proliferation of (often contradictory) legal, 
social and political discourses via the question of immigration – for example, by looking 
at how the legal status of ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’ can be very different from their social 
status where understandings about the former (who can belong) conflict with 
understandings about the latter (who does actually hold citizenship).70 The implication is 
that be(com)ing a citizen is an extremely complex, and most importantly, a contradictory 
process. Because understandings about community and statehood themselves rely on 
conceptions of citizenship to secure understandings regarding the nature of belonging, 
and Yuval-Davis and Anthias have shown the contradictory nature of ‘citizenship’ itself, 
what is achieved here is to undermine considerably the supposedly secure foundations 
upon which these concepts are based.  
Similar to the questions raised by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, the counter-
arguments surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum highlight the manner in which 
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the Irish Government, in emphasizing the notion of ‘genuine’ connections as a pre-
requisite for ‘Irish’ citizenship, sought to draw lines between those who belong and those 
who do not belong; the difference between those who are ‘Irish’ and those who are 
supposedly ‘guests’ of the nation.71 This is not to say that this literature is in agreement in 
relation to what is the best theoretical framework for understanding how and why these 
lines were drawn. Indeed, there is a substantial divergence in this literature regarding 
whether a racist-state understanding (after David Theo Goldberg72) adequately theorizes 
the construction of these boundaries or whether alternatively, this theoretical framework 
needs to be considered in conjunction with theories on nationalism, to fully understand 
the implications of, and basis for the maintenance of these boundaries.73 This 
disagreement notwithstanding however, the overall focus of the counter-arguments in the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has been on seeking to undermine the idea that the 
reference by the Irish Government to genuine connections is based on the notion of a 
community (Irish or otherwise) with fixed boundaries.   
The point which is made by these counter arguments is to the effect that no 
society is strictly homogenous, although the imagined community upon which statehood 
is secured can be based on narratives of homogeneity. In particular it was (and continues 
to be) pointed out that Ireland has always been a multi-ethnic society, made up most 
notably of Travellers, Black Irish and Jewish Irish as well as settled, white, Catholics.74 
The problem, as Fanning explains, is that “small minorities […] find themselves written 
out of history, swallowed up like corner-shops in the face of the big brand names.”75 It is 
an appreciation of this fluid nature of boundaries between conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
which prompted much objection to the proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the 
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Constitution Bill 2004. The argument being that basing citizenship primarily on descent 
(jus sanguine) as opposed to place of birth (jus soli) would ignore the history of diversity 
on which Irish society was built, as it would continue to maintain the illusion of 
homogeneity and further prevent ‘new’ ethnic and racial groups from gaining access to 
the nation.76 Attempts by the Government to point out instances of abuse of Irish 
citizenship have been conceived of as endeavours to draw lines between people on the 
basis of their origin; to distinguish between ‘Irish’ and ‘Immigrants’ in a discriminatory 
fashion. The imposition of qualifications on birthright citizenship have been similarly 
associated with these attempts at categorizing people. Categorizing people in terms of 
their relationship to Ireland, or lack thereof (the extent of their ‘connections’) was 
deemed disingenuous in 2004, and continues to be so on the basis that it excludes certain 
people arbitrarily from Irish citizenship and the benefits associated with this status.  
The importance of these arguments notwithstanding, I would like to point out that 
they focus once again on the limit of particular (statist) as against more abstract universal 
(humanitarian) understandings of belonging. This is merely (re)articulated here as the 
difference between ‘exclusive’ conceptions of national versus ‘inclusive’ conceptions of 
global society. This takes for granted the need to theorize the specificity of political 
identity first and foremost in relation to state(hood), as that which is then challenged by a 
universalizing claim to humanity.77 The problem with this, as I will shortly discuss, is 
that it does not explore directly the idea itself of having to theorize political identity in 
terms of the relationship between citizenship and the modern sovereign territorial state. 
This is to point out that the idea itself of the sovereign binary framework (understood in 
terms of statist/humanitarian, inclusive/exclusive, universal/particular) as the very basis 
for theorizing citizenship, is not interrogated here. The line of questioning opened up by 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias which is pursued in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum in other words does not ask what assumptions regarding political 
subjectivity are required here in order for this relationship to ‘make sense’. Nor does it 
ask how the assumption of a historical relationship between citizenship and the modern 
sovereign territorial state is itself reliant on an understanding of political subjectivity 
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which is at one and the same time particular (citizen) and universal (human). It assumes 
rather that the future lies primarily with either one or the other: the state (citizenship) or 
humanity (Man). There is no consideration of how the limits of this particular 
understanding of political identity might be undertaken by resituating and politicizing 
both.78  
 
Problematizing the Notion of Belonging in Ireland 
Problematizing the boundaries according to which understandings of an ‘Irish’ 
community have been conceptualized is not an easy task. As Bryan Fanning points out in 
‘The Rules of Belonging’, the diversity of humanity aside, “[i]dentity imposes 
orthodoxies slaved to ideals of belonging.”79 His point is that human beings live their 
lives in rule-bound social settings where difference is subordinated to ideals of 
homogeneity. Here, an ideal type ‘national’ or ‘citizen’ prevails. In an Irish context, the 
key to engaging with these embedded concepts, according to Fanning, is to separate civic 
republican conceptions of equal citizenship (universalism) from the ethnic nationalist 
republican past (particularism) upon which they are based.80 This emphasis here by 
Fanning on the need to specifically deconstruct the particular ethnic foundations upon 
which Irishness has been constructed when considering the possibilities for Irish 
citizenship, is not uncommon. It echoes and is echoed elsewhere in the work of those 
who have attempted to explore the exclusive basis of Irishness encoded and re-encoded in 
the 1937 Constitution.81 Unlike certain other people, however, Fanning is insistent that 
the concept of ‘ethnic nepotism’ is preferential to that of ‘race’ for exploring responses to 
immigration and social change in the twenty-first century.82 This is insofar as it 
encapsulates essentialist understandings of national identity but does not reduce these to 
purely exclusionist aims. This divergence reflects an already noted bifurcation in the 
literature between those who concentrate specifically on ‘racism’ and, those who look for 
alternative concepts (such as nationalism) when theorizing social change. Having noted 
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this divergence the next subsection concentrates nonetheless on the general focus which 
exists regarding the need to deconstruct so-called ‘common sense’ assumptions about 
who is and who is not entitled to be(come) an Irish national or Irish citizen.  
 
Deconstructing ‘commonsense citizenship’  
In May 2004 the largest party in Government (FF) launched their campaign for a Yes 
vote in the June 2004 referendum with campaign posters that read “Vote Yes to Common 
Sense Citizenship”.83 This campaign saw several FF Teachta Dálas (most notably the 
Government Chief whip, Mary Hanafin; Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 
Mary Coughlan; and Junior Minister with Responsibility for children, Brian Lenihan) 
travel around the country defending the need to impose controls in the area of citizenship 
due to the loophole which they argued had arisen by virtue of the unqualified 
constitutional entitlement to citizenship at birth which was (mistakenly) enshrined in 
1999.84 They refused the accusation that the referendum was tampering with the Good 
Friday Agreement. The Taoiseach later argued that “When it comes to the citizenship 
referendum…it was not about ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’ [as it had been under the Good 
Friday Agreement] but about people who just arrived in the country.”85 On a discussion 
on RTÉ Primetime, Government Chief Whip Mary Hanafin explained that Irish 
citizenship was nonetheless being devalued by virtue of the loophole that had resulted 
from the Good Friday Agreement and that the referendum was proposed as a way of 
dealing with this: “It’s about protecting our Irish citizenship. It’s about forming a link 
between our citizenship and a connection to the country, participation in the country, or 
indeed making some contribution to it.”86  
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This need to think ‘sensibly’ about citizenship was driven home elsewhere during 
this campaign by references to the case of baby Catherine Chen which had been ruled on 
by the Advocate General in May 2004. The Government argued that the practice of 
giving birth in Ireland in order to secure citizenship for a child and residency rights for 
the parents on the back of this (in either Ireland or elsewhere in Europe) was a type of 
‘citizenship tourism’ and that this was “undermining the value of Irish citizenship at 
home and abroad”.87 Voting in favor of qualifying birthright citizenship in Ireland would 
not therefore be racist or discriminatory, it was argued. It was simply a reasonable 
response to a problem posed by abuse in this area which would do no more than bring 
Ireland’s citizenship legislation in line with the rest of Europe. Echoing the Government 
campaign sentiment which called for ‘common sense citizenship’, one of the TDs who 
was involved in this campaign later explained when interviewed: “Our argument was 
driven by sense. We were merely aligning our citizenship rules with those of the rest of 
Europe. Our citizenship policy in Ireland was still the most liberal in Europe even after 
this referendum.”88    
In ‘“Vote Yes for Commonsense Citizenship”’: The Paradoxes at the Heart of 
Ireland’s “Céad Míle Fáilte”’ Crowley et al suggest, however, that there are assumptions 
underlying this notion itself of ‘commonsense citizenship’ which need to be explored.89 
In the first instance they consider how moves in the EU and North America as well as 
elsewhere to protect a given economy and culture in such a way as to benefit existing 
citizens of a state, are becoming increasingly referred to as ‘common sense’ measures. 
They point out that the implication is that it somehow makes obvious sense to think about 
protecting citizenship from abuse by people who are not interested in participating in the 
particular culture and economy of the state in question. These people are conceptualized 
as ‘Outsiders’ who pose a threat to citizenship by devaluing it for those who are, on the 
contrary, interested in participating in a given culture and economy. Unlike the former, 
the latter are conceptualized as ‘genuine’ citizens.  
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It is the obviousness of this understanding with which Crowley et al find issue. 
Crowley et al argue that calls by the Government for Irish citizenship to be restricted to 
‘legitimate’ and ‘authentic’ parties need to be reconsidered rather in terms of how they 
also work to fix and essentialize Irish identity and Irish citizenship by drawing lines 
between ‘who’ is (non-nationals) and ‘who’ is not (Irish nationals) understood to be 
‘abusing’ it. They attempt to deconstruct these assumptions and the understandings upon 
which they are based – such as the understanding, for example, that to be Irish, one has to 
grow up in Ireland, be part of the Irish diaspora or have Irish citizen parents.90 They do so 
by highlighting a series of inconsistencies underlying dominant understandings about the 
nature of Irishness. These are dominant understanding which they argue ‘commonsense 
citizenship’ embodies. They explain that they emphasize these inconsistencies in the aim 
of undermining the supposed simplicity of the proposed amendment put to the electorate 
on 11 June 2004 and to open up new ways to rethink Irish citizenship more broadly. 
These new ways are identified by the authors as “possibilities, for other, more inclusive 
understandings of Irishness”.91  
This emphasis on trying to think about Irish citizenship in a more inclusive 
manner is reflected over and again in counter arguments to the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004. As outlined in chapter one, one of the main 
indicators referred to as evidence of abuse of Irish citizenship and of the need to deal with 
this by way of referendum was the existence of what was termed a “disproportionate” 
number of births to non-national mothers in Irish maternity hospitals over the preceding 
years.92 The Taoiseach later insisted that “[i]f the abuse had been only by a handful of 
people then there probably wouldn’t have been any change to constitution. However, 
abuse was rampant and it was this rampant abuse that forced the hand.”93 In the Seanad in 
April 2004 during second stage discussions of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution Bill, it was pointed out, for example, that the Rotunda hospital had recorded 
a substantial jump from less than four hundred births to non-nationals in 1998, to just 
under two thousand in 2003. 
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If there were only 350 in 1998 and 1,951 in 2003 there is something happening…Figures 
do not lie and [these figures] do appear to be highly disproportionate. People to whom I 
have spoken and who work in the area are absolutely convinced that it is the uniqueness 
of the facility that Irish citizenship brings in Europe that is causing this.94  
 
The response to this by those opposed to the referendum was to render highly 
problematic, however, the idea that a line could be automatically drawn between ‘non-
nationals’ on one hand, and ‘nationals’ on the other in order to differentiate between 
those who do have a genuine connection to Ireland and are entitled to give birth in 
Ireland, and those who do not have real connections with Ireland and are therefore 
‘abusing’ Irish citizenship by giving birth to their children in Irish maternity hospitals. 
What was most forcefully argued was that this way of thinking is based on a very narrow 
and therefore exclusive understanding of the composition of Irish society in the twenty-
first century. This is an understanding which a report by the Children’s Rights Alliance 
argued specifically ignores the impact of migration into Ireland and the changing 
composition of Irish society as a direct result of this.95 It should be noted that to some 
extent this ignores indications within the health sector that the distinction between 
‘national’ and ‘non-national’ was not always taken for granted in such a manner. For 
example, Dr. Declan Keane (Master of Holles Street National Maternity Hospital) 
explained that there was an understanding that the category ‘non-Irish’ could be further 
broken down into “those working in Ireland and those arriving late in pregnancy to avail 
of loophole from the Good Friday Agreement.” He goes on to explain that  
Despite not stating specifically that their reason for wanting to give birth in Ireland was 
citizenship, the reason we suspected that these people were here to avail of this loophole 
is that they weren’t showing up for their six week health check after the birth. The 
implication of this was that they were no longer in the country and getting medical care 
elsewhere.96 
 
Nonetheless, the concerns raised here by these counter arguments were articulated 
in terms of a fear that certain specific immigrant groups were being made scapegoats by 
the Government in this respect. Some of these concerns are addressed in the Labour Party 
pamphlet entitled Facts? No!, Figures? No! Reasons?, No!: Vote No! issued shortly 
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before the referendum on 11 June 2004.97 This pamphlet argues for a reading of the 
referendum as a cynical ploy by the Irish Government. It points to the question marks 
surrounding the statistics provided by the Government regarding births of non-national 
mothers in Irish maternity hospitals. It furthermore argues that the Government’s 
subsequent emphasis on the importance of the ‘integrity’ of Irish citizenship regardless of 
actual figures is undermined by their lack of interest in re-assessing the ‘grandfather 
clause’ which relates to the provision in Irish legislation through which people from 
outside of Ireland who have never set foot in the country can attain Irish citizenship by 
virtue of their heritage. Raising this issue in the second stage of Dáil discussions on the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2004, Labour TD Joan Burton 
points to an example of 3,500 people in South Africa who, only the previous year in 2003 
got Irish passports for a fee by establishing a family link with Ireland. She suggests, 
however, that  
[t]he Minister [for Justice, Equality and Law Reform] and his Government are not 
worried about the people concerned because they are 99% white...The concern of the 
Minister is exclusively with a small, as yet unquantified number largely of black African 
origin who are slipping through whatever vetting procedure is in train.98 
 
The merits of these arguments notwithstanding, the emphasis here continues to be 
on the correct place to draw boundaries among people on the basis of what is considered 
the best resolution between universal identities as human beings and particular identities 
as citizens. As I will now discuss, this means that political subjectivity continues to be 
defined in terms of this dual understanding of what it is to ‘be’ a subject.  
 
 
Reframing Modern Subjectivity  
There is little doubt that the aforementioned critical attempts to explore Irish citizenship 
are based on asking hard questions about what it means to be ‘Irish’ by pointing out how 
fluid and essentially contested the boundaries between ‘Irishness’ and what supposedly 
lies outside of this, are. Unlike the Irish Government who rely on a belief in clearly 
defined lines between notions of passive as opposed to active citizenship, which they link 
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in turn to the difference between being born ‘of’ as opposed to being born ‘in’ the Irish 
community,99 those who oppose the 2004 Citizenship Referendum proposal refuse to 
ignore the problematic nature of these precarious distinctions which they point out have 
always been somewhat contested, and never so neatly defined as presented under the 
banner of ‘commonsense citizenship’. This work has highlighted how some people – 
most notably Travellers, Jews, Protestants and Unionists – have always historically fallen 
outside the dominant narrative of Irishness and its synonymy with Catholicism, whiteness 
and settled-ness.100 In doing so, the political nature of the Government’s emphasis in 
2004 on ‘genuine’ citizenship has been highlighted and the manner in which this works to 
exclude immigrants and ethnic minorities living in Ireland from understandings of 
Irishness has been brought to people’s attention. Where the Irish Government posits a 
clearly defined ‘outside’ against a clearly defined ‘inside’, the former distinguishing 
‘them’ from ‘us’, taking for granted that this opposition rests on secure foundations, this 
swath of critical opinion pushes at these foundations by highlighting their tenuous and 
deeply unstable nature.  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum specifically 
concentrates on the political possibilities which abstract universalism opens up in relation 
to the limitations imposed by state particularism. It does so, by advocating jus soli 
(citizenship based on place of birth) over that of jus sanguine (citizenship based on 
heritage) and in doing so, expands the boundaries of Irish-ness to include the ‘Other’ 
constructed outside and therefore excluded from the initial (Irish) statist project. It 
identifies the question of citizenship as a different kind of resolution (a more ‘inclusive’ 
one) between being part of a particular community and being part of humanity, to that 
which is proposed by the Irish Government. Yet, as has been discussed, it is increasingly 
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evident that conceptions of abstract universalism work in tandem with conceptions of 
precise particularism to define the horizons of political possibility and necessity. This 
begs the question as to the extent of the ‘challenge’ to dominant understandings of 
political community, which is posed here. This is because these critical explorations of 
Irish citizenship do not specifically dispute the existing basis of the understanding here of 
modern subjectivity as being divided between being ‘Man’ (a common humanity) and 
citizen (a particular sovereign identity), but reaffirm instead in the last instance the 
modern assumption that ‘politics’ must be a trade-off between these two options. In other 
words, the extent of the challenge posed here is questionable when we realize that it is 
based on assuming, rather than problematizing, the prior framing of the politics of 
citizenship as a relationship between individuals and the modern territorial state; a 
framing which was always already presumed to be in need of ‘resolution’. 
What is becoming increasingly clear is that although the hard questions continue 
to be asked here about the failure of state claims to provide answers to understandings of 
political subjectivity which transcend their boundaries, they are being asked in a manner 
which “reproduces the terms on which they have been posed since the early-modern 
era.”101 That is to say that although the statist monopoly on understandings of the nature 
and possibility of/for political community is interrogated in existing analysis of the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum, the modern statist political discourse itself, which dictates 
that ‘politics’ must be conceptualized in terms of a relationship between the state and 
autonomous persons or groups of autonomous persons, is not. Rather, by continuing to 
pose the question of Irish citizenship in terms of its relationship ‘to’ the modern 
sovereign territorial state, the terms of this analysis remain embedded in the 
understanding that the ground of modern politics must be located here and that political 
subjectivity must be (re)constructed in the last instance as autonomous and sovereign.102 
As Walker eloquently observes of other such attempts to counterpose state sovereignty 
and globalization, “[o]nly the sharpness of the boundary is put into question, not the 
spatial articulations of political life that place the boundaries where they are.”103 What is 
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not questioned is the modern conception of how we came to understand the self and state 
as separated from, yet also somehow linked to, other selves and other states. 
The point is that the concept itself of modern state sovereignty as a constitutive 
practice in its own right (as opposed to a state of being or a legal principle) with an 
equally constitutive subject (as opposed to beings that simply ‘are’) is not considered 
here. Citizenship embodies a problem which is its ability to draw lines between citizen 
and non-citizen, between belonging and not-belonging etc. It also provides a historically 
specific way of responding to this problem however, because it presents the alternative in 
the problem itself. ‘Man’ does not therefore necessarily oppose ‘citizen’ because both 
concepts form equal parts of the equation through which citizenship has been historically 
constructed as a problem of (state) sovereignty in the first place – i.e. citizenship has been 
posed in terms of the need to understand how humans also belong to specific 
communities. To speak in terms of this dualism of Man and citizen to try to understand 
citizenship is therefore simply to reproduce the dual nature of this understanding of 
subjectivity. As discussed in chapter one, the point is that this is not a timeless 
understanding of ‘being’. Rather, it is a particular understanding which can be traced 
back to a specific moment in history associated with Hobbes and Descartes when there 
was a paradigm shift “from theologically legitimated hierarchies to a modern world of 
self-legitimating subjects.”104  It can be traced back to a modern statist political discourse.  
 
The Modern Statist Political Discourse  
The emphasis of the critical opposition to the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
proposal focuses on how the dominance of a particular conception of Irish citizenship 
linked to the Irish statist project, excludes people arbitrarily. In doing so it underlines a 
continuing need to deconstruct the rules of belonging which are entrenched in 
understandings regarding the idea itself of an ‘Irish’ statist community. It concentrates 
primarily on the manner in which we currently draw boundaries vis-à-vis the state in 
terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ and the ways in which we could 
operationalize these differently. We are told, for example, that the focus must be on the 
question of how to apply the concept of citizenship most equitably. The principle of 
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(unqualified) birthright citizenship must not be removed because this is the fairest way to 
distribute the rights and benefits of citizenship in a world in which states regulate this; 
“the need for an ethical response to globalization demands it”.105 However, as Weber 
points out:  
[i]t is not possible to talk about the state as an ontological being – as a political identity – 
without engaging in the political practice of constituting the state. Put differently, to 
speak of the sovereign state at all requires one to engage in the political practice of 
stabilizing this concept’s meaning.106  
 
Weber here highlights the need to explain, as opposed to assuming, state 
sovereignty. She emphasizes the need to ask what the implications are of taking the state 
and citizenship’s relationship to this as a starting point; the need to ask how doing so 
involves reproducing the assumption to some extent that we must think citizenship in 
terms of the foundational oppositional categories us/them, inclusive/exclusive in the first 
place. How does this involve assuming that we must think about citizenship in terms of 
the manner in which we understand that the modern territorial state can limit or enable 
narrow (exclusive), as opposed to broaden (inclusive), conceptions of political 
community? Similarly, how does this involve assuming autonomous subjectivity – 
political identity as that which can be ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ – to make sense of this 
framework? This is to consider how citizenship is not something which simply ‘exists’ 
(vis-à-vis the state) but is “an expression of historically specific and historically variable 
relationships…among people and between peoples” which has come to make sense in 
relation to how it is posited vis-à-vis the state.107 Focusing on this compels us to regard 
citizenship as an expression which needs to be explored in terms of how it became tied up 
in a particular understanding of the meaning of political subjectivity itself. It demands 
that we consider how exactly citizenship came to be understood as referring to entities 
that are connected to, but ultimately separate from, the state. It demands that we ask how 
the ‘politics’ of citizenship has come to be understood as being based on the necessity of 
sovereign autonomous subjectivity in conceptualizations of the various competing 
models of political community which have been outlined in the citizenship debate. 
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The majority of those who oppose the 2004 Citizenship Referendum have 
specifically concentrated on the inability of modern territorial state sovereignty to 
account for appeals to political identity and community which exceed its boundaries. 
They concentrate on this in terms of the idea of an (ever widening) ‘gap’ between citizens 
and humanity. Yet, in advocating broader and broader communities of citizenship by way 
of conceptions such as that of the ‘new Irish’ it ignores how the universalizing categories 
themselves are always already part of the existing particularistic stance. For example, the 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern also emphasizes the importance of the category ‘new Irish’. He 
explains: “I like to call EU people ‘the new Irish’ and anyone who is living and working 
in Ireland who has settled here ‘new Irish’. The two categories now therefore for me are 
‘new Irish’ and ‘illegal’.”108 What this quotation by the Taoiseach demonstrates is the 
manner in which a universalizing category such as ‘new Irish’ does not stand opposed to 
the particularism of ‘Irish’ but is always already effortlessly (re)appropriated within a 
particularistic framework. Ignoring this, existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum presents an impression that the gap between ‘citizens’ and ‘humans’ can be 
erased in the future by replacing understandings of the modern statist monopoly on 
political community with a universalizing sense of common humanity. Of course, this is 
always resisted in the last instance with talk of the need to ‘balance’ priorities of diversity 
with that of equality. But the impression remains that the question of citizenship in 
Ireland can indeed be resolved in favor of one of the two competing models of political 
community: jus soli or jus sanguine. By concentrating on the idea of ‘crisis racism’ via 
scare stories in the health sector which can be traced back to ‘commonsense citizenship’ 
and ‘ethnic nepotism’109, the point is that the question of the ‘politics’ of citizenship is 
increasingly constructed in terms of how it revolves around the already (narrowly) 
identified options of either inclusive or exclusive possibilities and necessities of political 
community and identity. This in turn makes the realization of universal reason that is 
imminent in the modern project appear all the more reasonable.110  
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An example of this can be seen in ‘“Citizenship Matters”: Lessons from the Irish 
Citizenship Referendum’. Here, Mancini and Finlay specifically draw a distinction 
between “the question of how citizenship is regulated” and that of “the question of 
citizenship per se”.111 They argue that the latter is outside the scope of the lessons which 
can be taken from the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as this question involves 
discussions about the basis of national citizenship more generally, which they insist can 
only be resolved through its abolition. This allows them to justify their decision of 
continuing to pose the question of the politics of citizenship in terms of the relationship 
between citizenship and the modern territorial state as the most ‘reasonable’ one. In doing 
so, the overall range of options available in relation to the question of the politics of 
citizenship thus defined, is narrowed – the only options being jus sanguine or jus soli. 
Their option then becomes more (sometime the most) reasonable in light of the remaining 
possibilities. What is being specifically asked in this thesis, however, is whether there are 
possibilities of political subjectivity which further exceed the discursive space made 
available by this statist account of political necessity and which are ignored as a result of 
this approach. It asks whether the statist conditions of possibility – which have provided 
so many answers since early-modern Europe to how we understand who ‘we’ are and 
what politics can be – have become so dominant that they may ultimately mask the 
significance of other experiences of ‘being’ which are a result of the basic categories of 
time and space twisting, contracting, expanding and fracturing outside of the logic and 
codes of the sovereign territorial state.112  
The work of Ayelet Shachar indicates the importance of pursuing this line of 
inquiry. This is insofar as it indicates the need to think more carefully about the statist 
political discourse itself within which the notion of ‘citizenship’ operates, than has been 
done thus far in relation to the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. Shachar’s work, on 
the contrary, emphasizes that the question of how citizenship is regulated cannot be 
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separated from the question of citizenship more generally and the dominant 
understanding that this must be tied to statist imaginary.113 Unlike the existing citizenship 
literature, Shachar problematizes the notion of citizenship in general at the same time as 
she problematizes the question of how it is regulated. She does so by refusing to take as a 
starting point the idea that one type of (sovereign ordered) citizenship – either that based 
on the jus soli or jus sanguine principle – is ‘better’ than the other. Instead Shachar 
explores how both principles reproduce particular common sense assumptions about a 
certain territorial (spatial) understanding of what political membership can be. This is one 
which is associated with the principle of inherited property and therefore with an 
understanding of ‘being’ as defined in terms of a clearly delineated located presence. She 
notes the following:  
While jus soli and jus sanguinis are typically presented as antipodes, it is important to 
note that both rely upon, and sustain, a conception of bounded membership. They share 
the basic assumption of scarcity: only a limited pool of individuals can automatically 
acquire citizenship in a given polity. Once the idea of scarcity is introduced, we are faced 
with the dilemma of allocation, or boundary making…Both principles resolve this 
dilemma [where to draw the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion] in a similar fashion: 
by reliance on birthright transfer of entitlement. The distinction between them lies in the 
connecting factor used to demarcate a respective polity’s membership boundaries: jus soli 
relies on birthplace; jus sanguinis on parentage.114  
 
Shachar’s overall point is echoed by Sandro Mezzadra who elsewhere emphasizes how 
the concept of property has shaped conventional Western perspectives on the spatial 
organization of territory and of self. As he explains:  
We know the importance of the relationship between citizenship and property introduced 
by Locke. But it is important to underscore that the concept of property itself is in John 
Locke an ‘anthropological’ concept (that is, it is rooted within a determinate conception 
of ‘human nature’). It indicates first of all the property of the self, that is, the capacity of 
an individual to rationally dominate his passions and to discipline himself in order to be 
able to do that labor which constitutes in turn the foundation of every ‘material’ property. 
Only this individual is able to become a citizen115.  
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Shachar draws an analogy between citizenship and inherited property in order to 
interrogate what she calls the “‘naturalizing’ veil of birthright”.116 She asks how we can 
move beyond the manner in which both jus soli and jus sanguine principles of citizenship 
reproduce in their own ways (as if there was no alternative) the human-made distinctions 
between nations, countries and peoples. She emphasizes the increasing problems with 
tying citizenship as a category of identity to an absolute concept of space which is clearly 
definable somewhere given the reality of ever increasing global migration. Instead 
Shachar interrogates the notion of what Stuart Elden calls “thinking territorially”. 117  She 
does so by considering how political membership is not simply a legal category – “the 
standard accounts of political membership as a repository of legal status, rights and 
collective identity” – but a principle in its own right which can be traced back to the 
emergence of territory as a particular way of ordering the relation between political rule 
and space.118 
Unlike that of Mancini and Finlay as well as of existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum, the point is that Shachar’s work here focuses on the question of 
how boundaries themselves are understood as opposed to how they could or should be 
‘(re)negotiated’. Her suggestion is that a third basis for citizenship is needed (which she 
calls a ‘jus nexi’ principle). This would be based on tying citizenship to the “social fact of 
membership” at a local level by emphasizing functional and practical rather than formal 
ties.119 The new jus nexi principle for citizenship which Shachar proposes is not without 
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several issues.120 Similarly it is necessary to note that many other citizenship scholars 
have discussed and/or expressed their agreement with something similar (albeit normally 
based on domicile which reemphasizes territory and therefore political subjectivity as 
determined vis-à-vis the state once again). What is nonetheless particularly valuable 
about Shachar’s work is that it represents an attempt to think about citizenship by moving 
away from the state and understandings about political community as defined ‘through’, 
‘against’ or ‘beyond’ the modern territorial state; and away therefore from conceptions of 
political possibility in time and space as necessarily (re)defined here. She indicates, 
contrary to Mancini and Finlay’s insistence regarding its unfeasibility, how we might 
begin to rethink the question of the politics of citizenship other than in terms of the 
relationship between citizenship and the modern territorial state.  
This is done by thinking about ‘political’ participation beyond that which takes 
place simply through involvement in the labour force, business ownership or military 
service, to that of the considering the politics of relationships of friendship, family ties 
and association membership etc. developed within society. Doing so is to rethink the 
need to understand ‘being citizen’ as that which is always dictated by the notion a 
calculative understanding of the space of self.121 Although Shachar does mainly talk 
about the need to recognize those who are contributing permanently or long-term to a 
society, her discussions about jus nexi leaves open the idea that we can have different 
types of affiliation insofar as it problematizes, rather than taking for granted the idea that 
political identity can always be linked to a clearly delineated place. In interrupting 
furthermore the supposed natural basis of the ‘generational timeline’ (the manner in 
which citizenship is passed on through either jus soli or jus sanguine), her work also 
opens up the possibility of thinking about political subjectivity as something which is not 
necessarily based on the idea of a bounded community existing in the linear progressive 
time of the nation. Instead of the idea of community as pre-existing politics, the emphasis 
is on how political communities (identities and allegiances) are formed through 
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interaction with others in possible fragmented, multiple and ambiguous time. This 
presents a very different understanding for the possibility of ‘being in common’.122  
 
The Limits of Modern Subjectivity  
Towards the end of the first day of the second stage discussions regarding the Twenty-
seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004 Willy O’Dea, Minister of State at 
Department of Justice, put forward that  
Irish citizenship is about much more than entitlement to an Irish passport, it is a badge of 
identity, a statement to the world of who we are, the essence of our sovereignty as a 
nation. Is it not eminently reasonable, then, that to become an Irish citizen a person 
should have a much greater connection with this country than simply being born here?123 
 
Over the course of the next several weeks and months, both in the Oireachtas as well as 
outside it, his initial claim that Irish citizenship could be attributed to an easily 
identifiable, or at the very least a coherent ‘we’, was slowly but surely problematized. 
This was done via concerted critical explorations of the heterogeneous and infinitely fluid 
nature of identity on the island of Ireland. Where attempts to construct a ‘we’ as 
unproblematically homogenous existed, these were demonstrated to be based on 
discriminatory practices. The second half of Minister O’Dea’s statement – the reference 
to citizenship embodying “the essence of the sovereignty of a nation” – has, on the 
contrary, proved much harder to problematize.  
Try as they might to think differently, within existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum the question itself of the politics of (Irish) citizenship has kept 
coming back to its relationship with the modern territorial state and the extent to which 
different models of political community are facilitated or impeded by this relationship. It 
has, in other words, been very difficult to undermine the idea that citizenship is the 
essence of a group’s sovereignty as a national entity in general and as a nation-state in 
particular. Accusations, for example, about the extent of abuses of Irish citizenship by 
certain types of women have been undermined insofar as they have ultimately been 
proven to be exaggerated. This has been done by stressing that the question of the politics 
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of identity can be conceived of in either narrow or broad terms. Nonetheless, the notion 
itself persists that citizenship needs to be understood in terms of its relationship with the 
modern sovereign territorial state, as that which defines its limits in the last instance. The 
(only) difference here is that there is disagreement over the nature of the limits which the 
modern sovereign state is understood to impose on citizenship and whether these can or 
cannot (should or should not) be exceeded.    
This is not to ignore where attempts have been made in respect of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum to try to specifically undermine this statist understanding 
regarding the possibilities and necessities for political community and identity. Several 
attempts have been made, for example, to try to consider how the question of entitlement 
to birthright citizenship has already exceeded the nature of the existing relationship 
between citizenship and the modern sovereign territorial state by those who have asked 
how Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics might apply to the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum. What has been explored by these authors is how so-called ‘old’ forms of 
racism based on overt discrimination have been replaced with newer forms of more 
insidious racism expressed as ‘culture’ and incorporated into legal instruments.124 Others 
have further highlighted the need to consider the alternative form(s) of economic 
rationality which underlie and drive this new form of racism in the context of the 2004 
Referendum.125   
What is noted by these authors is that Michel Foucault uses the concept of 
biopolitics in Society Must be Defended and Security, Territory, Population to consider 
how a new form of racism has become inscribed in the state as a different mechanism of 
power to that of sovereign power. However, it is important to note that Foucault 
considers these ideas in light of a more general discussion regarding what it means to ‘be’ 
a subject and how this operates in this context through predominantly decentralized (as 
opposed to merely recentralized) power relations. Ignoring this, the concept of biopolitics 
as used in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has been taken to 
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mean that the state is now reducible to certain “biopolitical tasks…[which] are 
symbolically displayed in its founding documents…[and] codified in legislation and 
executive decrees.”126 This has meant that this analysis has been able to highlight the 
productive nature of certain types of coherent subjects (e.g. black, migrant, ethnic 
minority, refugee) which are marginalized through particular institutions and political 
economic frameworks by way of new non-sovereign forms of racism. However, this has 
taken place without much consideration about how subjectivity itself, as that which was 
articulated as coherent and non-ambiguous is also changing in respect of the question of 
racial and economic structures which are increasingly decentralized. It is now operating 
outside of the logic and codes of the sovereign territorial state and outside of the 
coherency associated with this.  
Because the presence of the state (as that which exists vis-à-vis subjectivity) is 
still ultimately taken as a starting point in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum, this is still being used to ‘explain’ as opposed to being explained in its own 
right. For example, there is little consideration in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum of how Foucault implies that the structures of the 
aforementioned novel biopolitics undermine in many important ways the need itself to 
always associate the possibilities and necessities for political community and identity 
(being citizen) with a requirement for coherency and resolution of ambiguity through 
appeals to a statist discourse. What is not considered here is how Foucault specifically 
points to inconsistent, multifarious and incoherent ways in which ‘being’ works beyond 
such a statist discourse. What is ignored, as such, is how the alternative to national 
sovereign state regulation explored by Foucault does not present itself as a larger version 
of this (i.e. as global regulation) with a similar emphasis on “lines…[as political 
boundaries] around the periphery, and by a concentration of coercive power at the 
centre”.127 But instead, operates through decidedly non sovereign forms of transition and 
inter-temporality, fluidity and contradiction; and therefore by way of overlapping, diverse 
and fragmented power relations which manifest at the margins as well as at the centre, 
thus undermining this distinction by resulting in growing webs of interdependencies 
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which are simultaneously cosmopolitan, local, regional, national and transnational.128 
There is no attempt in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum to 
challenge the idea that citizenship must be discussed vis-à-vis the notion of sovereign 
territoriality and national time. There is no attempt to rethink this in order to consider an 
alternative conception of political possibility – this time beyond appeals to sovereignty – 
in respect of the question of biopolitics itself, as advocated by Foucault in the first place. 
As Maguire and Cassidy point out, what is called for is a much closer reading of 
Foucault’s work than has hitherto been undertaken in respect of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum given that Foucault specifically focused on how power “worked 
on the individual and on the conduct of conduct in ways that did not involve the state”.129 
A closer reading is required, in other words, in order to consider the highly complex 
structures of power relations which Foucault emphasized and the contradiction between 
how these are immanent, but not ‘identical’ to the institutions themselves through which 
they operate.130 Deirdre Conlon has pointed out that one of the main reasons why there is 
so much focus on the state in respect of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is that 
there is a feeling that the tide has turned too far in the opposite direction and that there is 
a need to ‘bring the state back in’ to emphasize the continued importance of the role of 
the state in institutionalizing racism. For example, the need to take on board, as argued by 
Lentin and McVeigh, that “[h]owever we characterise the ‘postmodern form of racism’, it 
is not ‘stateless’.”131 However, Conlon equally notes that this argument misses the point 
that there is a difference between continuing to construct the state as an ontological being 
by taking its presence as given (which is done here) and that of actually examining the 
practices that ‘fix’ the state as the “mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities”, as discussed by Foucault.132  
Foucault argues that there is a specific “kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries” and urges us to consider how posing questions in 
terms of modern sovereign territory reinforces this particular understanding of what it 
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means to ‘be’ a subject.133 Foucault’s point appears to be that in looking to the state and 
the mechanisms of power inscribed therein there are certain assumptions about where 
political life ‘is’ which go hand-in-hand with this analytical category.134 These 
assumptions relate namely to the necessary relationship between sovereignty and 
subjectivity for ‘political’ possibility and need also to be thoroughly interrogated. Yet, 
there is little indication that the relationship which Foucault identifies here between 
sovereignty on one hand, and subjectivity on the other, is explored in its own right in 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum.135 Instead, biopower is 
conceptualized as a tool which is used by the state to control the internal population by 
defining, policing and excluding outgroups within and outside of its borders. A very clear 
understanding of the significance of the state and its ability to include and exclude is 
provided here. But, the question of the form of power relation and specific sovereign 
logic of exclusion which gives rise to and sustains a particular conception of identity as 
divided between inside and outside in the first place (what Edkins and Pin-Fat call “the 
prior question”) which can in turn can be compared to other logics of exclusion, is 
ignored.136  
The point is that the boundaries of inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion 
which exclusive conceptions of political community affirm and which inclusive 
conceptions of political community dispute, do not merely apply to understandings of 
state boundaries. They need more generally to be understood as reinforcing a particular 
understanding also of the nature of modern subjectivity as that which is simultaneously 
particular and universal, inclusionable and exclusionable. Existing critical accounts of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum have sought to explore and transform conceptions of 
sovereignty on one hand and those of subjectivity on the other. What it has not really 
done, however, is explored the manner in which “the relation between them remains at 
the core of modern political thought and practice.”137 While it can therefore be said that 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum successfully problematizes the 
                                                 
133
 Foucault, M. ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’, p.216 
134
 Foucault, M. (2007) ‘Truth and Power [1977]’ In: C. Calhoun, J. Gerteis, J. Moody, S. Pfaff and I. Virk, 
(eds) Contemporary Sociological Theory (Second Edition), (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford), p.205 
135
 For an example of where it has been explored see contributions to Edkins, Persram and Pin-Fat, 
Sovereignty and Subjectivity  
136
 Edkins and Pin-Fat, ‘Life, Power, Resistance’, p.3 
137
 Walker, ‘Foreword’, p.x 
 154 
statist monopoly on our understandings of modern political community, it is stressed in 
this thesis that this is different to problematizing a modern statist political discourse 
which tells us what ‘politics’ (including political subjectivity) should be in time and 
space. Without the latter, the possibilities that inform the responses to dominant 
understanding of political community and identity will continue to be circumscribed by 
understandings of the relationship between (state) sovereignty and subjectivity. This is an 
understanding which posits the ‘politics’ of citizenship as a binary (but which, as I have 
shown in this chapter following Walker, can also be read as a mutually constitutive) 
choice between the state or nation and its universal other. Here the need for a resolution 
between particularism and universalism (between being Man and being citizen) will 
continue to dictate what it means to ‘be’ a subject in relation to the question of citizenship 
until the relationship between citizenship and the modern territorial state is problematized 
in and of itself. 
 
  
Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to consider how the possibilities for citizenship that have 
informed both critical and non-critical responses to immigration in the Republic of 
Ireland in the context of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum can be shown to be 
inextricably linked to a particular understanding of the nature and location of political 
community and identity. This is an understanding where the sovereign territorial state is 
taken as the ground of modern politics. This was done by demonstrating that the so-called 
‘opposing’ particular jus sanguine and universal jus soli models of citizenship articulated 
in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum do not only 
indicate competing models of citizenship within the terms of how citizenship is normally 
debated. Rather, they need to be understood as two necessary components of the modern 
framing of politics. This modern framing of politics assumes that political subjectivity is 
both autonomous and sovereign insofar as it is conceptualized in terms of how it exists in 
conjunction with, but at the same time as separate from, the state.  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum posits two opposing 
debates in 2004 – one which promotes the notion of commonsense citizenship 
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unproblematically, the other which questions this idea and the supposed obviousness of 
the political community and identity which this endorses. The emphasis in critical 
scholarship here is currently on the need “to face up to the extent to which the whole 
business of Irishness has been such a bitterly contested one with the intellectual politics 
of the last generation.”138 However, as discussed in this chapter, this is to focus 
exclusively on the manner in which the statist project can and does include and exclude 
certain people from its general historical narrative. It takes this framework as its starting 
point to then make arguments about the need for more ‘universal’ as opposed to 
‘particular’ conceptions of political community without putting this framework itself 
under scrutiny. Mancini and Finlay point out that citizenship is regulated by the state and 
justify this approach in terms of “what is feasible”.139  Elsewhere Fanning defends it as 
being “a realistic conception of the limits of solidarity”, pointing out that the question of 
“who gets rights and on what terms very much depends on the actions of the nation-
states.”140 Be that as it may, this chapter has attempted to point out that this ignores how 
other forms of subjectivity which do not conform to statist imaginary (and the prevailing 
idea of political life as dictated through sovereign binaries) are denied a place in this 
‘politics’.  
This chapter is not claiming that the two sides of the debate presented in the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum do not challenge each other in any way. Rather it has 
sought to qualify the type of challenge which was provided by universal models of 
citizenship to particular models of citizenship. It has pointed out that these two options 
can be traced back to the manner in which citizenship has been posed as a problem of and 
for (state) sovereignty in the first place. As Silverman points out, the boundaries between 
universal and particular conceptions of how political community and identity are 
organized can no longer be taken for granted. Yet, the manner in which question of 
citizenship is posed in terms of the relationship between citizenship and the state, as is 
done in the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, presumes precisely this distinction given that 
the politics of citizenship is defined in terms of needing to reconcile the relationship 
between particularism (citizen) and universalism (Man). What has been argued in this 
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chapter is that this relationship as a starting point needs therefore to be reconsidered. 
Until this is done, the possibilities for responses to dominant conceptions of citizenship 
will simply continue to be restricted to the conception of subjectivity which makes sense 
within this particular framework.  Chapter four will now look at the example of citizen-
children born to migrant parents – as those neither ‘included in’ or ‘excluded from’ the 
state, but in-between both positions – as the type of complex subjectivity which has been 
denied a place in the ‘politics’ of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as defined in 
this manner.  
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Chapter 4 
Challenging the Citizenship Debate:  
(Re)thinking the sovereign time and space of citizenship  
 
 
Introduction 
There were several key elements to the Irish Government’s insistence in 2004 that the 
existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship should be amended. 
These included the supposed issue of late arrivals of pregnant non-national women at 
Dublin maternity hospitals, the Chen case and Ireland’s obligations as a member of the 
EU to other Member States, as well as the need to protect the integrity of Irish 
citizenship. Others have chosen to assume that these were separate arguments, 
emphasizing the Irish Government’s inconsistency in switching between them.1 What is 
explored in this chapter is the link between reproduction and residency which was central 
to all three arguments. This chapter focuses specifically on how the counter-arguments in 
the debates surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum which embody ‘critical’ 
interrogation of the proposal itself have responded to this central concept and how they 
have attempted to rethink citizenship anew. It argues that despite producing extremely 
sophisticated gendered as well as cosmopolitan/ human rights analyses, these counter 
arguments nonetheless find it very difficult to theorize the ambiguous role of Irish citizen 
children born to migrant parents in these discussions. This is given their reliance in the 
last instance on the principle of sovereignty in defining the limits to understandings about 
political possibility. The work of Julia Kristeva is taken as integral to exploring these 
limitations and to suggesting what an alternative understanding of subjectivity might look 
like. 
The first part of this chapter looks at how the counter-arguments in the 2004 
Citizenship Referendum discussions have converged around (although not necessarily 
falling neatly into) two types of analyses. On one hand, a gendered analysis which 
emphasizes the racialized nature of how the relationship between residency and 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Brennock, M. (2004), ‘McDowell changes argument on referendum’, The Irish Times, 
9/04/2004; In Seanad Éireann Ms Terry argues “It is clear the Minister has…clearly abandoned the 
contentious argument about the maternity hospitals for the altogether more abstract desire of protecting the 
integrity of citizenship.” Terry, S (FG) Oireachtas Debates (30 April 2004) Twenty-seventh Amendment, 
p.645 
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reproductive rights was constructed in 2004. On the other hand, a cosmopolitan/human 
rights analysis which emphasizes a more general exclusionary basis (although not 
denying outright the racialized component) of how this relationship has been constructed. 
What will be considered is how both forms of analysis emphasize above all the idea of a 
continuity in how certain people have come to represent the boundaries of what is not 
‘Irish’ through discussions about reproduction. As will be discussed, where these 
analyses differ is insofar as they suggest different responses to the question of how to 
negotiate the tension between state regulation (sovereignty) and the question of ‘who’ is 
excluded (subjectivity). The gendered analysis insists that it is migrant women who need 
to be focused on in respect of how solidarity is being redefined in Ireland. The 
cosmopolitan/human rights analysis insists that it is the migrant community as a whole 
which needs to be focused on. What will be argued is that neither, however, challenges 
the initial premise regarding the assumption of a sovereign subject (an originary located 
presence) that sits at the centre of claims to citizenship in the first place, as ‘excluded’ 
subject. The problem with this, it will be pointed out, is that the analyses produced by 
both ignores the subjectivity of Irish citizen children born to migrant parents who, unlike 
their migrant parents, are not simply marginalized subjects who have been positioned 
‘outside’ the dominant political community and are in need of ‘inclusion’, but people 
whose subjectivity is defined in the tension between inclusion and exclusion, 
particularism and universalism. This is a subjectivity which I will argue is experienced as 
an ambiguous (contingent) political effect rather than a sovereign one.  
The second section of the chapter will consider the work of Julia Kristeva as an 
attempt to move away from always defining the question of citizenship vis-à-vis how it is 
regulated by the state. This section considers how Kristeva’s work emphasizes that the 
particularity of reproduction can be shown to make impossible the automatic assumption 
of the coherent ‘I’ (as ‘woman’, ‘child’, or ‘migrant’) as the sovereign presence which 
can define claims to solidarity and sits at the centre of rights as the marginalized subject. 
It will be argued that her work provides a way of thinking about the subject as that which 
is instead produced through the articulation of a specific (as opposed to an inevitable) 
relationship between identity (people), place (territory) and history (linear narrative). This 
is one which is reinscribed but also rewritten through discussions about reproduction and 
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its representations. What will be discussed is how this allows us to consider the more 
ambiguous subjectivity of Irish citizen children in its own right as it specifically provides 
for the possibility of thinking how political subjectivity is being experienced outside the 
question of state sovereignty, and thus on less stable and fixed foundations than that of a 
coherent self. Chapter five will then explore the main implications of opening up the 
conceptual space in which citizenship is currently thought in this manner  
 
 
(Re)confirming Modern Subjectivity through Debates about Residency and 
Reproduction   
As has been already been outlined, the Irish Government in 2004 discussed the need to 
amend via constitutional referendum the automatic entitlement to birthright citizenship in 
the Republic of Ireland in a series of official documents, public press releases and 
television interviews. What is important for the basis of this particular chapter is how a 
specific link was emphasized in these arguments between the reproductive process 
through which birthright citizenship is acquired on one hand, and residency rights or lack 
thereof, on the other. This was done by pointing continually to the increase in migration 
into the country over the previous decade and an increase in births during this time to 
migrant mothers. It was within this specific context that the Irish Government made the 
case that the referendum proposal to abolish automatic citizenship at birth was a “simple” 
and “sensible” response to the need to ensure that those who acquired Irish citizenship at 
birth had sufficient connections to the country.2  
The counter arguments in response to the Irish Government’s insistence that 
certain people were ‘abusing’ Irish citizenship in this respect have also been outlined. 
These all focused specifically on the exclusionary nature through which the link between 
residency and reproduction rights was constructed by the Irish Government in 2004. They 
also fall loosely into two forms of analyses. The first of these is a gendered analysis 
which focuses on the racialized nature of the discourse surrounding the act of 
childbearing by so-called non-national women (in particular asylum seekers) in the 
Republic of Ireland. This analysis focuses on the manner in which the link which was 
                                                 
2
 Progressive Democrats Press Room, ‘McDowell Address at Launch’  
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drawn between giving birth (reproduction) and the desire for residency in respect of 
certain groups in Irish society was (and still is) constructed as a deliberate act which 
contravenes the common good.3 The second form of analysis around which the counter 
arguments converge is a cosmopolitan/human rights analysis. This analysis focuses on 
the manner in which this link was constructed by appealing to narrow, exclusive ethnic 
and economic nationalist fears and how it can be redrawn more inclusively through 
cosmopolitan and humanitarian concerns. This first section looks at each form of analysis 
in turn. What is pointed out is that both emphasize the need to continue to conceptualize 
the politics of citizenship in terms of a sovereign marginalized subject that sits at the 
centre of claims to citizenship. In doing so I argue that they ignore other important 
experiences of political subjectivity in the context of migration that do not remain tied to 
this particularly modern conception of time and space. 
 
A Gendered Analysis  
The referendum campaign was conducted using gendered, racialized discourses of blame 
against migrant women who were allegedly having babies solely to gain Irish citizenship 
for their children… Ronit Lentin and Eithne Luibhéid4  
 
One of the main oppositions to the Government’s arguments in 2004 in favour of 
amending the entitlement to automatic citizenship at birth is a gendered critique of the 
perceived threat which it claimed certain people were posing to the integrity of Irish and 
European citizenship law in the early twenty-first century. This critique has specifically 
sought, on the contrary, to show how the arrival of certain mothers and their ‘Irish-born 
children’5 as immigrants into a country which perceived itself to be largely mono-cultural 
needs to be understood in terms of how it worked “to subvert traditional understandings 
of citizenship and ‘the nation’, dragging Irish modernity kicking and screaming into the 
chaos of the postmodern.”6 This analysis sets out to radically retheorize the traditional 
notion of an ‘Irish’ citizenship by examining how Ireland’s experience in the twenty-first 
                                                 
3
 See on this, in particular Luibhéid, ‘Childbearing against the State?’ 
4
 Lentin, R. and Luibhéid, E. (eds) (2004) ‘Representing Migrant Women in Ireland and the EU’, Special 
Issue of Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol.27, Issue.4, p.294 
5
 The term ‘Irish born children’ is a term which is understood from this perspective as being predominantly 
used to differentiate children born to migrant parents from children born to Irish citizen parents. Lentin, for 
example, argues that “the euphemism ‘Irish-born children’ racially differentiates the children of ‘non-
nationals’ from all other children born in Ireland.” Lentin, ‘Pregnant Silence’, p.310 
6
 Lentin, ‘Pregnant Silence’, p.301 
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century of migration undermines established understandings of citizenship which are 
defined according to dominant ideals and practices of solidarity located solely in the 
national community. Ultimately it argues that so-called ‘common sense’ responses are in 
fact racialized attempts to control “not only in-migration but also the self-definition of 
existing collectivities within.”7 As Steve Garner explains, what is argued here is that 
“[u]nderlying all justifications for changing the Citizenship Act is the [mistaken] 
assumption that entitlement to Irishness is primarily an essence that can be transmitted 
genetically.”8 This gendered analysis insists that this assumption must be subverted by 
beginning instead to (re)imagine the possibility of political community outside and 
beyond the clearly delineated boundaries of the nation-state so as to facilitate an 
interrogation of how Irish solidarity can be other than predominantly based on being 
white, catholic and settled.9 Those writing from this perspective have focused specifically 
on the need to recognize how ‘race’ and ‘nation’ are increasingly defined in terms of each 
other in the modern state. Some people writing from this perspective have gone so far as 
to argue that the Irish state can be theorized not only as a racial, but also as a ‘racist’ 
state, due to the manner in which it can be shown to actively (re)construct itself as 
unproblematically homogenous despite the heterogeneities of postmodernity which it is 
faced with on a daily basis.10 However, the more general aim of this analysis has been 
defined as the need to begin to understand how understandings of belonging have been 
dictated by the exclusionary (understood as racialized rather than as ‘racist’) boundaries 
of the Irish statist project.11  
Focusing on the connection which was made between reproductive and residency 
rights in several key court cases involving the state and migrant families between 1990 
and 2003, this gendered critique highlights the centrality of the role of migrant women 
and their Irish citizen children in the disagreements over citizenship rights in 2004. The 
two court cases which are seen as integral are Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice (1990) and 
Lobe and Osayande vs. Minister for Justice (2003), the details of which were discussed in 
                                                 
7
 Lentin, ‘From Racial State to Racist State’, p.6 
8
 Garner, ‘Babies, Bodies and Entitlement’, p.443 
9
 Lentin, ‘From Racial State to Racist State’, p.6 
10
 On this see, Christie, ‘From Racial to Racist State’; Lentin, ‘From Racial State to Racist State’; Lentin 
and Lentin, ‘Introduction: Speaking of Racism’; Lentin and McVeigh, After Optimism? 
11
 See, for example, Garner, ‘Babies, Bodies and Entitlement’; Luibhéid, ‘Childbearing against the State?’ 
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chapter one of this thesis.  What is considered here is how the constitutional entitlement 
to birthright citizenship (inserted as Article 2 in 1998 under the Good Friday Agreement) 
and itself a founding principle of the Irish statist project was eventually constructed by 
virtue of these cases as “a ‘constitutional quirk’ or a ‘constitutional loophole’” which was 
supposedly resulting in the abuse of Irish citizenship.12 As discussed in chapter one, it is 
the ‘fact’ of a direct correlation between the constitutional entitlement to birthright 
citizenship and of the actions of migrant parents, in particular migrant mothers, which is 
disputed. This has led to questions as to why it was specifically migrant women who had 
been singled out in this regard. Lentin, for example, most notably argues that there is a 
need to understand how and why exactly it is specifically “migrant women in Ireland 
[that] have been signified as ‘other’ and stereotyped as sexually active child-makers, 
deliberately subverting Irish norms of citizenship and nationality.”13  
 
Women, childbearing and the nation-state  
In order to explore this question, what has been considered is a larger historical tradition, 
far beyond 2004, by which “Irish women have been forced to become very familiar with 
the connections among childbearing, race and the nation-state.”14 Echoing the arguments 
made in the work of Yuval-Davis and Anthias which explore how women act as the 
reproducers of future generations,15 what has been emphasized here is the manner in 
which women in the Republic of Ireland have traditionally been defined in terms of their 
childrearing and “their childbearing role within the making of the nation – a 
subordination that was reflected in the 1937 Constitution and is still being struggled 
over.”16 Laura Oaks has emphasized how, for example, in Ireland women’s reproduction 
                                                 
12
 Lentin, ‘From Racial State to Racist State’, p.4; Sheahan, F. (2004) ‘Revealed: proof of citizenship 
tourism’; See also reference to quotation by FF Teachta Dála Noel O’Flynn which refers to the provision 
for unqualified birthright citizenship (Article 2 of the Constitution) as “the maternity-residency clause in 
the constitution.” Cited in Luibhéid, ‘Childbearing against the State?’, p.339 
13
 Lentin, ‘Strangers and Strollers’, p.305   
14
 Luibhéid, ‘Childbearing against the State?’, p.342 
15
 See Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, Woman-Nation-State 
16
 Luibhéid, ‘Childbearing against the State?’, p.344. What is highlighted here is the fact that within the 
Irish Constitution women are primarily conceived of as mothers. Article 41 of Bunreacht na hÉireann 
recognizes the family “as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society”, subsequently stating 
that “the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without 
which the common good cannot be achieved.” According to Article 41.2.2, “The State shall ... endeavour to 
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is best understood as “a medium through which competing national origin stories that 
focus on Irish national identity and cultural self-determination, indeed versions of 
'Irishness' itself, are imagined and expressed.”17 What has been suggested is that 
discourses surrounding childbearing and reproduction by migrant women – in particular 
those in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum – might 
similarly be understood as integral to attempts to (re)produce dominant conceptions of 
nationhood by encouraging particular understandings (and excluding others) of the 
meaning of the ‘Irish’ family and ‘Irishness’. This line of inquiry has been seen as an 
attempt to understand how “the stigmatization of pregnant asylum seeker women (many, 
if not most, of whom are of color) is an extension of the feminization of Ireland that has a 
long history.”18  
The case of ‘Baby O’ has been considered of particular importance with regard to 
this question of how migrant mothers and their offspring have been positioned vis-à-vis 
dominant conceptions of the national ‘Irish’ community. Baby O and anor v. Minister for 
Justice Equality and Law Reform is a case which involved a seven month pregnant 
Nigerian national who was issued with a deportation order following a failed asylum 
application in the Republic of Ireland.19 This Nigerian national mother sought to 
challenge her deportation order on several grounds including on behalf of the baby she 
was carrying by appealing to the protection, enshrined in Article 40.3.3 of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann, of the right to life of the unborn. Article 40.3.3 of the Bunreacht na hÉireann is 
the clause (inserted in 1983) that enshrined abortion as illegal in the Republic of Ireland. 
It states that “[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and so far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”20 This mother argued that it 
                                                                                                                                                 
ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their 
duties in the home.” Bunreacht na hÉireann: Constitution of Ireland  
17
 Oaks, L. (1998) ‘Irishness, Eurocitizens, and Reproductive Rights’ In: S. Franklin and H. Ragone (eds) 
Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power and Technological Innovation (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press), p.133 
18
 Smith, A. (2008) ‘The Irish Citizenship Referendum (2004): Motherhood and Belonging’ In: Ireland’, In: 
D. Reed-Danahay, and C.B. Brettell (eds) Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants 
in Europe and the United States (NJ: Rutgers University Press), p.76 (emphasis added)  
19
 Baby O and anor v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and ors, [2002]  IESC 44 (2002), 
Unreported Supreme Court Judgment, [2002], pp.1-12 
20
 Bunreacht na hÉireann: Constitution of Ireland   
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was the Irish state’s duty to defend Baby O’s right to life by preventing her from being 
deported to Nigeria where the mortality rate was much higher (at ninety per thousand 
births) than in Ireland (where it was seven per thousand births) and where the standard of 
living was considerably lower. She also contested the deportation order arguing that her 
unborn child was legally a person and as such should have been issued with its own 
deportation order (which it was not).21 Acting on behalf of the Minister for Justice, the 
Attorney General appealed directly in this case to the common good and to the Minister’s 
right to deport failed asylum seekers regardless of their being pregnant or not.22 Those 
acting on behalf of the State pointed out further that the state was not denying that the 
unborn had rights but that “in the context of these proceedings the rights of the unborn 
are not distinguishable [from those of the pregnant mother]”.23 The Supreme Court  
eventually concluded that the state’s duty to ‘defend and vindicate the right to life of the 
unborn’ as appealed to by the applicant, did not extend to needing to ensure safe delivery 
and the health and well-being of Baby O. Rather, it intended to prevent only the 
legalization of abortion in all cases apart from those where there was a danger to the 
health of the mother. With this in mind, it indicated its satisfaction that in this case no 
party involved was seeking to terminate the pregnancy of Baby O and therefore affirmed 
the order of the High Court to proceed with the deportation.24  
Those writing from the gendered analysis perspective have drawn a comparison 
between the case of ‘Baby O’ and that of two previous high profile cases on abortion in 
the Republic of Ireland – the X case (1992) and the C case (1997). The ‘X case’ (Attorney 
General vs. X and Others) and the ‘C case’ (A and B vs. Eastern Health Board, District 
Judge Mary Fahy and C) were cases involving a fourteen and a thirteen year old 
respectively who became pregnant as a result of being raped and who were initially 
prevented by the Irish state from travelling to the UK (abortion services being illegal and 
therefore unavailable in Ireland) in order to terminate their pregnancies.25 The state did so 
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 Carolan, M. ‘Court appeal against deportation fails’, The Irish Times, 15/02/2002 
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 Mullally (2005) ‘Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.27, Issue.1, 
pp.78-104 
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 Coulter, C. (2002) ‘State fails to argue foetus is not a person’, The Irish Times, 10/01/2004 
24
 Baby O and anor v. Minister for Justice,  p.10  
25
 Attorney General v. X and others. (1992). IESC 1; [1992] 1 IR 1 (5 March, 1992); A. and B. v. Eastern 
Health Board, District Judge Mary Fahy and C. (1997). IEHC 176; [1998] 1 IR 464; [1998] 1 ILRM 460 
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on these occasions on the basis of what it argued were its duties as set out in Article 
40.3.3. to protect the right of the unborn (the same clause which the mother of Baby O 
appealed to).26 Putting aside accusations of internal racialization of Irish citizen mothers 
momentarily – for example, one of the issues which has since been raised is the 
difference between how ‘X’ (as a white middle-class mother) as opposed to ‘C’ (a 
Traveller mother)27 were portrayed by the judgments passed down and by the media.28  
Fletcher and others have nonetheless contrasted the state’s response in both the X and C 
cases and its understanding at the time of the fetus as a distinct legal entity in the context 
of abortion law with its refusal to make a similar distinction in the case of Baby O. In 
doing so Fletcher points to the difference in twenty-first century Ireland between the 
treatment of the rights of some unborns (whose mothers are Irish citizens) against those 
of other unborns (whose mothers are not Irish citizens). In the case of Baby O she argues 
that “it is clear that the rights of the ‘unborn’ are being outweighed here because they are 
the rights of Nigerian ‘unborns’…the ‘born’ are represented by the citizenry on whose 
behalf the state is apparently acting.”29   
Fletcher is insistent, however, that ‘Irishness’ and nationalism has been 
constructed through the racialization of reproduction ever since 1983 when the right to 
life of the unborn was enshrined in the Irish Constitution. Others, looking similarly at the 
contrast between the ‘Baby O’ case and other cases date this illegality back further – even 
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as far as 1861 in some cases and the passing of the Offences Against the Person Act.30 
The point, therefore, is that the case of ‘Baby O’ has been used to point here to a 
continuing (albeit different) form of exclusionary renationalization taking place in the 
Republic of Ireland in relation to discussions about citizenship. It has been taken as 
indicating another hierarchy among women in Ireland which is the result of intersecting 
(older) sexual regimes and (newer) migration controls. What has changed Fletcher 
argues, is the concept of race. Previously based on nationality (Irishness defined against 
‘Britishness’) it is now based on skin colour (Irishness defined against the ‘migrant 
other’).31 This argument is echoed by Eithne Luibhéid who emphasizes the growing need 
to consider how state migration control regimes in a world of growing 
transnationalization are increasingly central to the question of how women’s sexualized 
bodies continue to play a part in constituting the nation-state.32 Luibhéid argues that 
existing national boundaries must be recognized as constantly being reproduced through 
ever “new strategies of sexualized racial governance.”33  
Luibhéid also specifically explores the history by which state sexual regimes have 
intersected with migration controls in the Republic of Ireland by contrasting the ‘X’ and 
‘Baby O’ cases. Arguing that “[m]igration controls, as much as sexual regimes, 
significantly construct the ideological and material boundaries of the nation-state”,34 she 
insists that there is a need to consider how immigration controls can be contextualized in 
terms of their underlying continuity with the long history of state sexual regimes in the 
Republic of Ireland which define the horizons of the nation-state in exclusionary terms. 
She points specifically to the narrow terms through which migrants were defined by the 
Irish state as either an asylum seeker, refugee or economic migrant. Because “birthing a 
child on Irish soil” emerged as one of the only a means “to challenge the state’s 
exclusionary regimes”35 Luibhéid argues that “pregnancy itself… [became the] site 
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 See, for example, Luibhéid, E (2006) ‘Sexual Regimes and Migration Controls: Reproducing the Irish 
Nation-State in Transnational Contexts’, Feminist Review, Vol.83, p.63 
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through which the ‘genuine’/’bogus’ distinction” came to be adjudicated once more by 
the state.36  
In respect of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, what is argued as such is that 
racialized female migrants have come to embody the new boundaries of ‘Irish’ society by 
virtue of their role as reproducers of future generations of (non)Irish offspring. The 
suggestion is that the 2004 Citizenship Referendum represents the culmination of 
attempts by the Irish state to privilege increasingly narrow concepts of ‘Irishness’.37 What 
has been concentrated on is the challenge which twenty-first century migration patterns 
pose to traditional (common sense) assumptions regarding the threat which certain 
women are understood to pose to the integrity of Irish and European citizenship law in 
the early twenty-first century. Doing so, this gendered analysis highlights the simplistic 
nature of dominant understandings of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland in the 
arguments in favour of abolishing automatic entitlement to birthright citizenship in 2004. 
It is on this basis that subsequent attempts have been made to begin to try to theorize how 
a new postmodern politics of citizenship might be envisaged. Unfortunately, as I will 
now discuss, attempts to try to theorize another politics of citizenship in this regard have 
been limited by the manner in which it is presumed that citizenship, and thus subjectivity, 
must continue to be theorized in the last instance via state sovereignty and thus via the 
idea of a separate, sovereign subject who sits at the centre of claims to citizenship in the 
first place.  
 
 Rethinking citizenship: migrant women challenging the boundaries of ‘Irishness’  
In an attempt to pull away or, move beyond an understanding of belonging in Irish 
society as defined in terms of the clean clear lines imposed by the Irish state in 2004 
between ‘migrant’ and ‘Irish’ mothers and, between their ‘Irish’ and ‘non-Irish’ 
offspring, Lentin considers how Irishness and Irish citizenship might be (re)theorized as 
“‘soft’, porous and permeable to migratory movements”.38 In order to do so she 
concentrates specifically on how migrant mothers can be theorized as more than mere 
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“objects of controlling impetus of the racial state”, focusing instead on how they can be 
conceptualized “as independent agents” who not only are excluded from existing spaces, 
but also create alternative spaces through which citizenship and Irishness can be 
renegotiated.39 This emphasis is echoed by Luibhéid who similarly argues that “control of 
women’s sexuality and childbearing remains key to establishing and maintaining – but 
also potentially contesting and reworking – racial boundaries and racialized social 
orders.”40 Lentin points out that Dublin has three main maternity hospitals and is 
therefore somewhere where migrant women, through giving birth, have been able to 
acquire residency. It is also, she is quick to point out however, where many asylum-
seeker women live in hostels without room for a cot for their babies, forced to share toilet 
facilities while they recover (often bleeding for weeks afterwards) from childbirth. It is 
this contrast which, for Lentin, provides the opportunity to consider how Dublin city 
space might be (re)theorized as “a series of acts of resistance and survival rather than of 
mere strangerhood.”41 Several examples of possible acts of resistance are given. These 
include the presence of visual images which capture everyday encounters “between 
migrant mothers and Dublin city life” as something which disturbs “the certitudes of Irish 
late modernity”,42 as well as specific attempts by migrant mothers to 
“increasingly…speak for themselves” and have their own specific experiences of racism 
recorded and acknowledged.43 This understanding of the ability of migrant women to 
challenge existing dominant conceptions of ‘Irishness’ is echoed in the structure of 
organizations such as ‘AkiDwA: The Migrant Women’s Network’ that has been set up to 
emphasize the importance of migrant women’s ability to promote “an equal society, free 
of racism, discrimination and stereotyping.”44                 
             As pointed out by Lentin and Luibhéid, this type of analysis provides for the 
opportunity to “negotiate hierarchies of privilege and exclusion that dissolve any 
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simplistic notion of ‘migrant women’.”45 That said, these acts of resistance also limit the 
question of what subjectivity can be in this regard, insofar as they are defined in terms of 
how they specifically subvert racial ‘statist’ and thus sovereign orderings of political life. 
The most significant implication of this is the absence of an ability in these writings to 
conceptualize a role in its own right for the subjectivity of Irish citizen children born to 
migrant mothers, despite the fact that this critique highlights the centrality of the role of 
both migrant women and that of their Irish citizen children in the dispute over citizenship 
rights in 2004 in the first place. When it comes to the question of what it means to resist 
or subvert dominant conceptions of ‘Irishness’, all such possibilities are rather 
conceptualized exclusively in terms of the presence of migrant mothers. Irish citizen 
children are only mentioned here in terms of their mothers’ ability to subvert modern 
orders of the Irish state through giving birth to them.   
The problem is that subjectivity has been and continues to be theorized in these 
accounts in terms (always) of an ability to resist against the boundaries of (because 
‘being’ is always already defined as inclusionable or exclusionable in) the state. This 
reinforces a particular assumption about what and where political life can be. It is to 
locate it either in the exercise of sovereignty under state law or, in the interruption of the 
exercise of sovereignty under state law.46 As indicated by Angela Smith, the presumption 
from this perspective is that “[i]t is the mother’s status that thus creates a second class of 
Irish-born but not Irish citizen children. It is the mother who is burdened with this 
marginalization. She and her children do not belong.”47 Yet, this is precisely to ignore 
how Irish citizen children born to migrant mothers do not, unlike their migrant mothers, 
necessarily experience citizenship as either the exercise of, nor the suspension of 
sovereignty under state law but often as a contradiction of both. For example, the 
children who are being given birth to in hostels in Dublin by asylum-seeking migrant 
women as discussed by Lentin were, until December 2004, Irish citizen children who had 
an unqualified right to Irish citizenship. Their right to live in Ireland was merely 
suspended temporarily (as opposed to revoked per se): first by the need to secure the 
‘care and company’ of their parents and later, post 2003, by the need to prove that this 
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did not contravene ‘the common good’.48 These children are therefore neither entirely 
‘inside’ the Irish state as their citizenship is (only) deferred, but nor are they ‘outside’ of 
the Irish state either as they remain Irish citizens. Furthermore, instead of moving from 
outside where they are non-citizens and progressing to inside where they become citizens, 
these Irish citizen children instead move backwards and forward between the historical-
spatial periodizations of outside/future and inside/present depending on the particular 
situation in question. For example, whether the question is their entitlement to education, 
which as citizens they are guaranteed (and thus are recognized as being ‘inside’ and part 
of the present membership of the state) or, if it is the question of where they can live 
which, regardless of their citizenship, is dependent on their parent’s status in the country 
(thus positing them ‘outside’ the state and therefore only a future possible member).49 All 
this emphasizes the need to think about how these children live in very unique temporal 
spaces unlike those normally associated with statist imaginary. It means that, despite 
Smith’s argument, their experiences of belonging/not belonging can not entirely be 
equated with that of their mothers. Rather, as Yau points out elsewhere, the so-called 
‘second generation’ need to be understood in terms of how they are not migrants, but 
rather the product of migration.50 This is to consider how these children as Irish citizens 
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are persons who, unlike their migrant parents, can not be conceived of as definite, but 
only ‘potential’ abusers of Irish citizenship.  
This gendered analysis ignores the ambivalent nature of this subjectivity which, as 
Sajed points out, should be seen through “the prism of a generation of rupture and 
of…discontinuity”51 rather than coherency and continuity. It instead focuses on the 
ability of migrant mothers – as persons more clearly positioned outside the state – to 
destabilize or subvert “Irish understandings of ‘the nation’, ‘the family’ and ‘the 
citizenry’.”52 This analysis highlights how conceptions of Irish citizenship can be 
challenged vis-à-vis the Irish statist project. This forces it to assume rather than question, 
however, how the (only) form of subjectivity which does ‘make sense’ is that which is 
defined in terms first and foremost of a sovereign (as opposed to ambiguous) subjectivity. 
Doing so, it fails essentially to imagine how other types of subjectivity – those which 
cannot be defined in terms of understandings of time and space associated with state 
sovereignty – might also be theorized. A submission in 2003 by AkiDwA to a Joint 
Committee of the Oireachtas regarding the decision in the Lobe and Osayande case 
illustrates this narrow focus.53 Although it is explained here that the submission is guided 
primarily by an understanding that the 2003 Supreme Court Judgement has implications 
not only for non-national parents of Irish-born children but also for Irish-born children 
themselves, these all-important implications continue to be primarily defined in terms of 
the status of migrant parents and (only) their possible options in the case of deportation: 
parents having the option to bring their children with them, leave them in Ireland or, to 
give them to relatives with leave to remain in Ireland to care for. There is little or no 
mention of the status of the child themselves as an Irish citizen. This is not to ignore that 
the children in question who are Irish citizens are also minors and as such dependant on 
the decisions of their parents which are dictated by their particular status as (mostly 
undocumented) migrants. What I would point out, however, is that it is possible to 
acknowledge this while also considering how Irish citizen children born to migrant 
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parents are not entirely defined according to their parent’s status. Instead, this is 
something which this submission only implies indirectly through references to the ability 
of Irish citizen children to remain in Ireland with relatives after their parents have been 
deported. The point is that despite specifically lamenting, as for example Garner does, 
that one of the results of the constitutional amendment to birthright citizenship in 2004 is 
that “the child of non-national, non-residentially qualified parents (the ex-future 
national?) becomes indivisible from his/her mother’s body”, those writing from this 
gendered analysis perspective have time and again failed to engage with this debate on 
any other terms.54 
Having established certain limitations in respect to how the subject which sits at 
the centre of claims to solidarity and belonging is conceptualized in existing gendered 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, the next section considers the 
cosmopolitan/human rights response which has been offered as an alternative to this.  
 
A Cosmopolitan/Human Rights Analysis 
The effect of the 2004 Referendum on Citizenship was to narrow the empirical definition 
of what it meant to be Irish, inventing the conundrum of the Irish-born non-Irish child as 
a perverse twenty-first century civics lesson…The challenge is to come up with ways of 
binding the Irish to their diverse nation-state as well as integrating the new guests of the 
nation. Bryan Fanning55  
 
A second response to the perceived ‘commonsense’ threat which certain people were 
seen to pose to Irish citizenship through practices of reproduction in 2004 is clustered 
loosely around what has been articulated as a cosmopolitan and/or human rights 
perspective. This perspective has been constructed in some places as a direct alternative 
to the overriding emphasis on the notion of a racial or racist state which formed the basis 
of the aforementioned gendered critique.56 Although not contradicting the gendered 
racialized critique outright, it has sought to emphasize that support for so-called 
commonsense restrictions on citizenship in the Republic of Ireland in the twenty-first 
century on the basis of an understanding that migrant women’s reproductive practices are 
problematic, can not only be explained in terms of racism and/or exclusivist 
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understandings of nation-state building. It argues that the overwhelming endorsement for 
a change in the basis of birthright citizenship in 2004 needs rather to be explored vis-à-
vis the manner in which the populist distinction between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ 
which crystallized in the 2004 Citizenship Referendum was institutionalized by way of a 
combination of distributional anxiety shaped by past economic fatalism (economic 
Othering), as well as that of a racialized concept of citizenship “anchored in past 
exclusionary monocultural nation-building ideologues of Irishness” (cultural Othering).57 
The focus in this response has therefore been on the manner in which the Irish national 
project which came to be based on an exclusionary sense of cultural belonging and an 
exclusionary economic sense of entitlement linked to the past was not inevitable. Rather 
than classifying either economic or cultural Othering as necessarily ‘racial’, what is 
argued is that they can be shown to have formed the basis for avoidable hostility towards 
certain people in support of the Referendum.58  
Similar to the gendered response, the outcome of the 2004 Citizenship 
Referendum is attributed in this analysis to the rapid social change brought about by 
migration into the country over the previous decade. Unlike the gendered response, 
however, which emphasizes the need to conceptualize a post-racial statist model of 
citizenship, what is proposed to deal with the challenge which immigration poses to 
dominant ideals and practices of solidarity in the Republic of Ireland (the dominant 
imagined community) is a post-national model of citizenship which advocates ‘a 
universal perspective’. This is a model based on the notion of “binding trans-national 
human rights”.59 This analysis picks up on discussions in the Oireachtas by the 
Opposition immediately prior to and during the period in which the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill was discussed. These similarly called for a 
refocusing of the discussions on the question of human rights: it having been argued that 
the Government’s referendum proposal had “zeroed in on a very narrow aspect of the 
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citizenship debate” away from human rights concerns and towards protecting territory.60 
Indeed, opposition to the referendum proposal was based for many on this perceived lack 
in the first place of a more cosmopolitan and/or human rights focus underpinning its 
motivation and the motivation of immigration law more generally in the Republic of 
Ireland. Echoing concerns of the Human Rights Commission regarding the future 
implications of the referendum proposal in respect of the new distinction which it was to 
impose between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ children,61 SF member Aengus Ó Snodaigh 
explained it thus: 
Sinn Féin is opposing this proposal because it is irresponsible. Instead, we want 
comprehensive immigration law reform to establish a positive, compassionate, human-
rights-compliant and anti-racist immigration law that will pave the way for Ireland’s 
transition to a truly multicultural, equitable society.62 
 
 
The inclusionary/exclusionary nature of nation-building and local identity politics 
In ‘Nationals/Non-nationals: Immigration, Citizenship and Politics in the Republic of 
Ireland’, Bryan Fanning and Fidèle Mutwarasibo specifically problematize the notion of 
there being a straightforward link between nationalism and racism in the Republic of 
Ireland. They do so by focusing on how a distinction can be drawn in the disputes 
surrounding the 2004 Citizenship Referendum between those discussions which simply 
reinforced the assumption of a difference between nationals and non-nationals, and those 
which actually employed racialized hostility towards certain parents and their Irish 
citizen children. The underlying message here is that understandings about citizenship in 
the Republic of Ireland are intimately connected to nation-building and the nationalist 
project more generally – which Fanning elsewhere associates with local identity politics 
and therefore distinguishes from racism per se.63 They therefore need to be understood as 
bound up with processes of exclusion and inclusion, rather than simply with processes of 
exclusion as concentrated on by the aforementioned gendered analysis. 
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 Where the question of race does come into this critique, therefore, is not as in the 
gendered analysis in terms of the idea of the modern Irish state as an all encompassing or 
predominantly racialized institution. It is rather, by focusing on the manner in which the 
formulation of Irish identity which was central to the 2004 Referendum discussions 
specifically mobilized “past nationalist ethnocentrisms.”64 What Fanning and 
Mutwarasibo effectively argue is that previous racialization of the Irish statist project was 
mobilized during the referendum via references to immigrants as ‘non-nationals’ which 
in turn have been “projected on to the Irish born children of all immigrants.”65 Their 
contention is that the specific racialization of citizenship in 2004 was but one response to 
accelerated social change on the island of Ireland in the twenty-first century and not the 
only possible one. It is one, however, which Fanning and Mutwarasibo are quick to point 
out, was enabled (and to a large extent encouraged) by Government policies which, 
although promoting an understanding of the economic importance of immigration, also 
stressed the need to marginalize immigrants due to the economic threat they posed. This 
was done, for example, by emphasizing as the Minister for Social and Family Affairs did, 
the need “to safeguard the social welfare system from abuse by…people from other 
countries who have little or no connection with Ireland.”66 That said, Fanning and 
Mutwarasibo argue that these types of references need to be understood in terms of how 
they tapped into previous distributional conflicts in the Irish psyche – the scars of decades 
of emigration which was driven by lack of resources and fears about its reoccurrence 
even in times of prosperity – as opposed to latent racism.   
This second analysis does not shy away therefore from looking at how, over the 
previous century an understanding of Irishness associated with ethnic homogeneity did 
become central to the process of building an ‘Irish’ national project and exploring how 
this was mobilized in 2004 to encourage narrow racialized conceptions of ‘Irish’ 
solidarity. Nonetheless, what is primarily emphasized in this second analysis, unlike in 
the first gendered one, is the potential which exists for conceptualizing complementary 
conceptions of solidarity in the Republic of Ireland in the twenty-first century (referred to 
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variously as human rights based and/or cosmopolitan conceptions) which infuse the 
nation-state model with more inclusive ideals. Instead of two separate communities – 
comprising of Irish nationals on one hand and, non-Irish nationals, on the other hand – 
what is discussed is the need to conceptualize one larger community with a broader range 
of identifications which can encompass and bring together both ‘old’ and ‘new’ guests of 
the Irish nation in keeping with understandings of broader post-national cosmopolitan 
ideology. This is discussed in most detail in Bryan Fanning’s collection New Guests of 
the Irish Nation.67 This response does share some similarity with the gendered analysis 
insofar as it too concentrates to a large extent on how disputes about birthright citizenship 
in Ireland have “placed migrant women’s roles in reproduction at the centre of legal and 
political discourse on immigration.”68 Furthermore, it too has drawn a link from the 
general recognition of the construction of the Irish state as “a moment of exclusion” for 
women to that of focusing on the manner in which more recently it is specifically migrant 
families that have been constructed as a threat to how the Irish nation and state defines its 
welfare.69 However, the point is that a notable difference can be seen in the type of 
measures which are discussed as constituting a response to this by the cosmopolitan/ 
human rights analysis in contrast to the gendered analysis.  
 Most notably, what has been focused on in the cosmopolitan/human right analysis 
is the manner in which the narrative of the nation in the case of ‘Baby O’ and the 2004 
Irish Citizenship Referendum, although proving exclusionary, was not inevitably so.70 
Instead of focusing on the need to think of how ‘Irishness’ must be conceived ‘outside’ or 
‘beyond’ the notion of a ‘racist state’, what is discussed here is the need to 
reconceptualize the Irish republican statist project and the manner in which it has become 
associated with “a narrowly constructed monocultural religious (Catholic) ethnic 
conception of nation.”71 Mullally, for example – looking specifically at the ‘C’ and ‘Baby 
O’ cases – distinguishes between how rights can be conceptualized as either particular 
claims (defined in terms of national identity) or, alternatively as universal claims (defined 
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beyond nationality, invoking instead the notion of humanity). In so doing she argues for a 
recovery of the “recognition of the universal legitimacy of…human rights claims” in 
respect of discussions about the ‘fit’ between nation-building and concepts of belonging – 
in particular those of children.72 The emphasis turns in this second analysis therefore to 
the need to rethink the question of belonging vis-à-vis a broader community-centred 
focus and more inclusive concepts of Irishness. What is emphasized is the need to ‘bring 
in’ those who have been left outside of the dominant imagined community by broadening 
the focus in the discussions about citizenship and belonging to consider how a wider 
ranger of interests and rights are at stake than originally envisaged. Unlike the gendered 
analysis, this has resulted in a specific focus on the role of Irish citizen children (and not 
only that of their migrant parents) in challenging the boundaries of ‘Irishness’.  
As I will now discuss, however, the emphasis here specifically on the idea of how 
a cosmopolitan/human rights model of solidarity works to build bonds in society between 
‘new’ guests and the host population ignores the question of the existing bonds of these 
Irish citizens. It ignores most notably how Irish citizen children born to non-Irish national 
parents are people who are already tied in many ways to Irish society; albeit in ways 
which are often not so easy to fit into traditional notions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ as 
they do not correspond to dominant understandings of separate, sovereign and 
autonomous spaces (spaces which have fluid boundaries but nonetheless edges which can 
be filled) and linear historical time (the time of beginnings, middles and ends) which are 
reproduced in the image of the sovereign state.  
The ‘Irish Born Child (IBC)/05’ scheme under which certain Irish citizen children 
are entitled to live in Ireland with their parents but not necessarily with their siblings, is a 
case in point. The ‘Irish Born Child (IBC)/05’ scheme is a temporary scheme which was 
set up in the wake of the Lobe and Osayande Ruling in 2003 – which had removed the 
existing so-called ‘Irish-born child route’ for those wishing to apply for residency in 
Ireland. It facilitated undocumented parents of Irish citizen children born before 1 
January 2005 to apply through a different (once-off) route for permission to remain living 
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in Ireland due to them having an Irish citizen child.73 Under this scheme, migrant parents 
who were undocumented at the time and faced deportation were required to sign a 
statutory declaration which stated that they understood that should they be granted 
residency this would not give them or their Irish citizen child any entitlement to 
reunification with other family members residing outside the country.74 These Irish 
citizen children are in an unusual situation, therefore, insofar as unlike other Irish citizen 
children they are not necessarily entitled to expect to grow up in the same country as their 
siblings or, sometimes their second parent.75 This situation was furthermore only 
introduced retrospectively as a result of the 2003 Lobe and Osayande ruling. In other 
words, it applied to the Irish citizen children of undocumented parents who had had a 
right (by precedent) to the entitlement to the care and company of their parents, but 
whose right was subsequently removed (due to the abolition of this administrative path 
by the Government following the Lobe and Osayande ruling) before their cases came to 
court. The Irish citizen children involved therefore were predominantly children whose 
rights as citizens were suspended in hindsight. This directly contradicts the T.H. Marshall 
inspired idea of citizenship as the gradual accumulation of social, economic and political 
rights in time vis-à-vis the nation which still remains the basis for how citizenship is 
conceptualized today (despite other issues which have been identified with this model).76  
What is obvious once again is that while the various conditions surrounding the 
IBC/05 scheme mean that these children are not strictly ‘included’ in traditional 
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understandings of what Irish citizenship entails, nor does it necessarily follow either that 
they are therefore ‘excluded’ from Irish citizenship either. These are children who, for 
example, like all other Irish citizen children are entitled to all normal social welfare 
benefits. Equally they have no restrictions on where they can work in the future, nor 
where they can live within the country. The point is that these Irish citizen children 
experience citizenship in a very unique temporal and spatial framework: this is one which 
is temporally interrupted and spatially dislocated rather than temporally progressive and 
spatially coherent. Yet, focusing on the question specifically of how to ‘build’ bonds in 
society on a universal notion of human rights between these children and other Irish 
citizens does not acknowledge this issue. It simply presumes that they need to be 
‘bonded’ to other citizens and ignores how they already are, albeit in unusual 
understandings of time and space which are very hard to reconcile with how we normally 
conceive vis-à-vis the state of political community and identity as guaranteed in time and 
across absolute space.  
 When Siobhan Mullally insists therefore that we must consider how birthright 
citizenship forces us to answer the question ‘who belongs?’,77 I argue that Irish citizen 
children born to (in particular undocumented) migrant parents often experience 
citizenship in such diverse and contradictory ways that the notion itself of a coherent 
‘who’ which does or does not ‘belong’ and who therefore can or cannot be ‘bonded’ to 
Irish society, makes little sense. Rather, it is only by presuming a sovereign presence that 
this question constitutes a starting point that can be taken for granted in such inquiries. 
This sovereign presence is assumed, for example, by mapping the more coherent 
presence of the migrant parents as outsiders vis-à-vis the state due to their non-Irish 
citizenship – insofar as it conforms to dominant understandings of ‘being’ in time and 
across space – onto that of their Irish citizen child. Similarly, although I would agree that 
Siobhán Mullally is correct to point out from this perspective the importance of 
recognizing the child (as well as that of ‘woman’ and ‘migrant’ more generally) as barer 
of rights,78 there is a need to inquire into whether the place of ‘child’ (as subject) is a 
coherent one (i.e. is defined in terms of presence) which can be taken as an analytical 
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category in its own right here. This is to specifically point out that there is a need to 
question the sovereignty inherent here in the notion itself of a ‘subject’ who is entitled to 
rights to citizenship in the same way that the sovereignty of the nation and in particular of 
‘the people’ has been specifically problematized by these same authors in discussions 
surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum.  
  
 Rethinking citizenship: a child-centred focus 
Siobhan Mullally has argued that the 2004 Citizenship Referendum should be understood 
in terms of how “the perspective of the child was strikingly absent”; this having been 
subordinated to “an overriding concern with parental status and immigration control.”79  
In doing so she has emphasized the need to ‘bring in’ the experiences of Irish citizen 
children into discussions about citizenship, constitutional change and questions about 
belonging. However, although the essence of politics is no longer associated exclusively 
with the state here (realigning this instead with notions of cosmopolitanism and 
humanity), what can be seen is a presumption that solidarity must continue to be 
conceptualized in terms of coherent subjectivities, as opposed to engaging with it on its 
own (non sovereign) terms.  
Mullally’s concern is specifically with the decision in the Lobe and Osayande 
case as that which led up to the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, which she insists was a 
“de facto postponement of citizenship for many children” denying them the right to 
become part of the Irish nation in their own right.80 Comparing this with similar cases 
around Europe, Mullally concludes that a pattern can be seen in terms of how time and 
again in cases pertaining to migrant families and questions of residency, decisions are 
being made about children entirely dependant on their parents’ status and former actions 
rather than in the best interests of the child themselves: “there is little discussion in the 
case of the impact of the State’s actions on the citizen children involved.”81 Instead of 
automatically assuming that children’s rights can be subordinated to their parents’ status, 
Mullally calls for a “a child-centred perspective” in relation to questions about belonging 
which deportation orders and subsequent challenges against deportation, raise. She insists 
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that “the recognition of the child as bearer of rights in such cases would…transform the 
terms of the debate.”82 Unfortunately Mullally herself goes on subsequently to define the 
role of the Irish citizen child as a discussion about “the terms on which migrant families 
would be allowed to remain in Ireland.”83 In doing so she reduces the question of 
citizenship (of the Irish citizen child) to the question of the immigration status of parents 
more generally.  
Yet, as Ayelet Shachar points out, there is an important distinction between 
considering the question of ‘who belongs’ primarily in the context of immigration versus 
considering it primarily in the context of citizenship.84 In the former, it makes sense to 
speak of a subject which exists vis-à-vis the state insofar as migrants (in this case, 
migrant parents) are defined in terms of their status as ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the state. In 
the latter however, the ‘subject’ (in this case the Irish citizen child) cannot be defined in 
terms of their ability to transgress the boundaries of the state insofar as they are neither 
inside (included in) nor outside (excluded from) the state but located in the tension 
between these two positions and thus in-between ‘citizenship’ and ‘humanity’. 
Advocating a more child-centred focus in respect of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum 
requires specifically exploring the difference therefore between questions of 
‘immigration’ as they relate primarily to migrant parents and those of ‘citizenship’ as 
these relate to Irish-born children, not a conflation of the two.  
Yet, this lack of distinction can be seen in calls elsewhere by civil society groups 
working with migrants in the Republic of Ireland for a more child-centred focus in 
relation to questions regarding citizenship rights.  In 2006, for example, a report written 
by the Children’s Rights Alliance and Commissioned by CADIC, called for a child 
impact assessment for children to be built into all decisions by the state with regard to the 
question of deportation and the granting of leave to remain in Ireland under the IBC/05 
scheme.85 This is in keeping with its objection at the time of the 2004 Citizenship 
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Referendum where it expressed that it was “deeply concerned about the referendum's 
implications for children”.86 This 2006 Children’s Rights Alliance report explains that the 
notion of a child impact assessment “is based on the premise that children have needs and 
rights that are separate and different to adults and that these must be given due 
consideration.”87 However, as a second report commissioned by CADIC a year later 
shows, the experiences of Irish citizen children have still not been successfully theorized 
in their own right.88 Rather what has been theorized is again the notion of Irish citizen 
child families. The emphasis therefore continues to be on the question of belonging in the 
context primarily of immigration as opposed to citizenship. Here, the status of the child 
and the question of how that status affects the whole family is indeed considered. Yet, it 
is the migrant parents of Irish citizen children who are interviewed and whose 
experiences are recorded; the family as a whole being defined as ‘immigrant’.89 As a 
result, it is the migrant parents and their experience of non-citizenship in a national 
historical conception of time which is focused on here. For example, entitled ‘Looking 
Forward, Looking Back’ the 2007 CADIC report specifically focuses on the idea of the 
“African family…looking back to their country of origin [and] look[ing] forward to a 
better future in this country”.90 However, Irish citizen children born to migrant parents 
arguably do not unproblematically look ‘back’ to Africa and ‘forward’ to Ireland. Instead 
they live in a world in which both Africa and Ireland define them in the present moment. 
Despite therefore successfully according the status of the Irish citizen child such 
prominence in respect of the question itself of belonging and rights to citizenship, a 
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problem persists nonetheless where this emphasis on the notion of ‘families’ as the unit 
of analysis in the last instance ignores how Irish citizen children are different from their 
parents with regard to how they experience citizenship itself. What is ignored, apart from 
fleeting acknowledgements of the fact, is that these are families which comprise both 
migrant parents who are excluded from the statist imagined communities (having been 
born elsewhere and thus who can be conceptualized in terms of the notion of state 
sovereignty, albeit not unproblematically so) as well as Irish citizen children who are 
neither excluded from nor included in the state and whose subjectivity makes less sense 
in relation to the question of a sovereign subject that sits at the centre of claims to 
citizenship. Rather, what needs to be understood is how their subjectivity undermines any 
semblance of the seemingly stable and fixed foundations which is required to take this as 
a starting point.  
Instead of continuing to conceptualize what it is to ‘be(come)’ a citizen 
exclusively in terms of how we might ‘challenge’ or ‘bring together’, conceptions of  
identity ‘in here’ (Irish) and difference ‘out there’ (immigrant), the next section of this 
chapter will attempt to consider how Irish citizen children born to non-Irish nationals (as 
those who are neither just migrants nor alternatively just citizens) need to be theorized in 
their own right and not subsumed as part of the notion of a migrant family or theorized 
through their mother’s status as second-class citizen. In order to do so, an alternative 
approach in the work of Julia Kristeva will be presented which does not pose the question 
of political subjectivity vis-à-vis the state and therefore presume the notion of a sovereign 
autonomous subject of citizenship. As will be discussed, instead of continuing to define 
the question of the politics of citizenship in terms of how citizenship is first and foremost 
regulated by the state, this involves looking at the more general question of how the 
concept of citizenship has been fixed through the articulation of a specific (yet not 
inevitable) relationship between identity and spatio-temporal understandings, and thus 
between the question itself of subjectivity and its possible relation to state sovereignty. 
The aim here is to begin to consider the conceptual space which this latter analysis, 
unlike the former one, gives us to imagine the subjectivity of Irish citizen children in its 
own right.  
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Reproduction, Birth and Maternity: Rethinking ‘Political’ Subjectivity and the 
Question of Belonging outside Sovereignty   
The previous section looked at how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum offers two different solutions for negotiating processes of state regulation 
and the question of ‘who’ sits at the centre of claims: either by contesting (as argued by 
the gendered analysis) or by broadening (as argued by the cosmopolitan/human rights 
analysis) understandings of solidarity and national belonging. It sought to emphasize, 
however, that these different solutions are ultimately based upon similar philosophical 
assumptions regarding what it means to conceptualize political subjectivity in this 
situation as that which is defined in terms of (national/state) sovereignty and thus in 
exclusively modern conceptions of time and space. This second section will now look at 
how Kristeva’s work helps us try to problematize these assumptions themselves by 
emphasizing how political subjectivity is rewritten (as much as it is reinscribed) through 
discussions about reproduction and its representations.  
 
Rethinking the Space and Time of Modern Subjectivity 
Julia Kristeva’s work is significant as it does not merely emphasize the manner in which 
women ‘reproduce’ the nation through giving birth to successive generations. Instead it 
considers the manner in which the mode of reproduction and representations thereof 
associated with women and children can be understood to also (and perhaps more 
importantly) always already interrupt “[t]he nation….[and] its essence: economic 
homogeneity, historical tradition and linguistic unity” and the corresponding sovereign 
autonomous subject associated with this understanding.91 They do so, she explains, by 
representing an alternative temporal dimension to the linear (political and historical) time 
of nationality. This alternative is maternal time (motherhood). Unlike linear time which is 
time conceived of as project, teleology, departure, progression and arrival, “in other 
words, the time of history”, Kristeva has emphasized how maternal time is also linked 
both to cyclical time (repetition) given its association with menstruation and pregnancy, 
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as well as monumental time (eternity) given its association with reproduction and the 
genetic chain.92 In doing so, Kristeva implies here that theorizations about female 
subjectivity, and in particular the transcendental subject associated with this (‘woman’), 
cannot ignore how pregnancy itself – which she argues is “experienced as the radical 
ordeal of the splitting of the subject: redoubling up of the body, separation and 
coexistence of the self and of an other, of nature and consciousness, of physiology and 
speech” 93 – first and foremost challenges the identification of, and narrative involving, a 
sovereign self which has a beginning and an end in time and space. Drawing on her own 
experiences of motherhood and pregnancy, Kristeva discusses how pregnancy 
undermines the dominant view that the self and the other can be separated. She looks 
instead at how pregnancy results in a relationship to the other which is not wholly ‘other’ 
nor entirely oneself: “for such an other can come out of myself, which is yet not myself 
but a flow of unending germinations, an eternal cosmos.”94  
It is in this vein that Kristeva’s work has specifically explored how ‘woman’ has 
never simply existed in an essential sovereign form as a coherent ‘I’ which can be 
‘included’ or ‘excluded’ in national imaginary but needs to be understood as “presence in 
subversive form”95 which challenges the existing basis for “the synchronicity of the 
imagined community.”96 Her work has similarly emphasized how ‘child’ can be 
understood as presence which acts in subversive form as the stranger within, 
“remain[ing] active in the shadow of an adult’s consciousness”.97 Having highlighted the 
lack of permanent structure of the ‘subject’ which sits at the centre of claims to ‘identity’, 
Kristeva’s work urges us to embrace “contemporary individualism’s subversion, 
beginning with the moment when the citizen-individual ceases to consider himself as 
unitary and glorious but discovers his incoherencies and abysses”.98 It is this which 
distinguishes her work from that of so many others, insofar as she controversially implies 
that uncertainty and ambiguity associated with strangeness or otherness need not only be 
understood as a source of hopelessness or confusion but can be a positive force which 
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presents opportunities to reconsider “our own potential, the potential of those around us, 
and the ‘foreignness’ inherent in each of us”.99 Kristeva cautions however, that this 
embracing of uncertainty and its recognition as the basis of an alternative (but a 
nonetheless valid) type of political subjectivity, requires a new way of thinking. She 
points out that it requires a move towards “a different way of reading”100 the elusive 
nature itself of ‘being’, and away from the construction of theories which insist on trying 
to ‘make sense’ of this elusiveness according to existing political horizons.  
As Piaras MacÉinrí’s notes, the search for ‘home’ and discussions about 
belonging are part of attempts to locate the ‘self’ in both time and place.101 Yet, this 
search is increasingly futile as “[f]or many of us there is no possibility of staying at home 
in the conventional sense – that is, the world has changed to the point that those domestic, 
national or marked spaces no longer exist.”102 As Caitríona Ní Laoire points out, what is 
interrupted by migration is “the linear or circular narrative of home-leaving followed by 
homecoming”.103 Instead, both are collapsed together into the experience of migration. 
Noting the use of the concept of ‘home’ by recently returned Irish citizens to describe 
Ireland (as the country they grew up in) as well as their country of emigration, Ní Laoire 
considers how the result is “the fragmentation of self…associated with the contradictions 
of the migrant situation.”104 The point, as such, is not that realizing a ‘home’ and a ‘self’ 
is no longer possible. Rather that the realization of a sovereign home and self – that is a 
‘home’ and ‘self’ located in a clearly delineated territory (bounded space) and linear 
historical narrative (time based on a continuum of past, present and future) – has become 
increasingly impossible as the basis of (even if only in the last instance), and the starting 
point for, questions about citizenship. It is this particular conception of home and self 
which is based on a relationship between citizenship and the modern territorial state that 
is being problematized. Kristeva is calling for a new way of thinking through this 
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impossibility; that is the impossibility for many people of ‘home’ and ‘self’ as making 
sense according to the normal statist understanding of political community and identity in 
terms of sovereignty and autonomy. 
Highly influenced by Julia Kristeva’s work and in an attempt to think it through 
further, Homi Bhabha differentiates between continuing to conceptualize the national 
community and subjectivity in light of cultural difference as “the one” and “the-many-as-
one”, versus that of conceptualizing how national community and subjectivity is instead 
disturbed by cultural difference and is recast from the perspective of margins and 
minorities as “the less-than-one that intervenes with a metonymic, iterative 
temporality.”105 He has explored this in terms of the idea that adding ‘to’ need not 
necessarily ‘add up’ but can work instead to disturb the existing calculation. In this case 
the existing calculation is the idea that subjectivity must be defined in terms of wholes 
(individuality) rather than fractions thereof.106 Bhabha insists that this ‘space of doubling’ 
which he explores is different to the notion of plurality as it does not simply provide an 
alternative way of articulating existing conditions (of sovereign ‘being’) but results rather 
in a change in the position of enunciation itself; that is to say that it challenges the idea of 
how we have been told we must ‘be’ as sovereign presence.107 It is, he argues, better 
envisaged therefore as a ‘supplementary’ space which, having disturbed the calculation of 
power and knowledge, “produc[es] other spaces of subaltern signification” and thereby 
different understandings itself of ‘space’ and of the necessity of linear time (comprising 
of a succession of moments from past to future) within space.108  
What this demonstrates is that Kristeva’s work offers a form of analysis which 
incorporates a recognition of the need to understand how to problematize the assumption 
itself that a particular marginalized ‘who’ can be taken as a starting point in respect of 
analysis of the intersection of citizenship and migration. It does so by moving away from 
the question of how the state regulates individual citizens to that of allowing us to 
reconsider more generally how citizenship has been conceptualized vis-à-vis its 
relationship with the state and the notion of ‘individuals’ – a form of ‘being’ 
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conceptualized in terms of being connected to but ultimately separate from political 
community. As a result of emphasizing the need to question (as opposed to taking for 
granted as the natural starting point) the sovereign time and space of the marginalized 
subject, Kristeva’s work propels us towards those who start with the notion of ambiguity 
in order to consider how to invoke an alternative to the automatic assumption of a 
coherent marginalized ‘I’.  
 
Subject-in-potential as opposed to ‘marginalized subject’  
In respect of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, Kristeva propels us towards work 
such as that of geographers Allen White and Mary Gilmartin. In ‘Critical Geographies of 
Citizenship’ White and Gilmartin explore similar concerns to that of the aforementioned 
gendered and human rights/cosmopolitan analyses with regard to the relationship which 
has been established between reproductive and mobility rights prior to the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum.109 In their study of this, however, White and Gilmartin 
emphasize the fact that no less than five constitutional referenda proposals were debated 
over a twenty year period regarding the concept of ‘the right to life of the unborn’ as 
enshrined in Article 40.3.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. Doing so, they highlight the 
manner in which these referenda belie any coherency or stability underlying conceptions 
of child or woman as ‘citizen’ in the context of disputes about pregnancy in the Republic 
of Ireland which result in unambiguous continuities and intersections between previous 
and current state sexual regimes and (re)productions of hierarchies among women in the 
Republic of Ireland. Rather, they imply that these referenda reflect the manner in which 
the space of ‘woman’ and ‘child’ have more generally become in themselves “sites of 
conflict over the broader meanings of family, state and the law.”110  
From the perspective of Kristeva’s writings, this work by White and Gilmartin 
stands in contrast to the aforementioned critiques which form the basis of existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. These emphasize primarily how the 
relationship which was established between reproductive and residency rights in an Irish 
context – via the Fajujonu case in 1990 and the Lobe and Osayande case in 2003 – (only) 
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reinforce existing exclusionary legal discourses regarding reproductive rights; positing 
once again the ‘woman’ and/or ‘child’ as the (renewed) sovereign marginalized subject. 
White and Gilmartin’s work instead indicates that this relationship and the question of 
how this led to an understanding of the (il)legitimate presence of non-national women in 
the capital’s main maternity hospitals in 2004, can also be explored in terms of 
geographies of belonging and exclusion which traverse and destabilize existing 
exclusionary legal discourses regarding reproductive rights. They destabilize them insofar 
as they reveal the ambiguous nature of the supposedly coherent ‘subject’ which sits at the 
centre of such claims.  
In ‘Critical Geographies of Citizenship’ White and Gilmartin focus among other 
things upon the manner in which the judges in the high profile X and C cases described 
the subject at the centre of the claims variously as “young girl”, “girl”, “mother” and 
“girl/mother”.111 In doing so they draw attention, not to the manner in which the treatment 
of these ‘women’ must be understood in terms of a continuity with a long history of state 
sexual regimes in the Republic, but rather to how the idea of a sovereign autonomous 
subject itself (the notion of ‘woman’) at the centre of the claim to rights, makes little 
sense in relation to these cases. Their work can be read as pointing out that it is not 
possible here to think in terms of the progression of a sovereign autonomous ‘subject’ 
(individual) from the space of childhood on one hand to that of the space of motherhood 
on the other. Rather, it can be read as emphasizing that the boundaries themselves are 
collapsed here between the already born and yet unborn ‘child’ and therefore between 
‘child’ as foetus and ‘mother’ as woman. The result is the image of a disjointed subject of 
(as opposed to ‘in’) multiple time-space coordinates; each resulting from the different 
configurations of how the relationship between state, family and unborn child is 
articulated.112  
This is to introduce an important analytical temporal and spatial dimension to our 
understanding of the relationship between reproductive practices and rights of the child 
which has not yet been considered in the existing gendered analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum. This might now be read into an example such as that of the 
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‘Baby O’ case. This is insofar as it is possible to recognize how the foetus in question is 
neither an Irish citizen with rights nor non-citizen, but is potentially both until it is 
subsequently defined as one or the other – i.e. either as a subject who never had rights or 
a citizen-subject who always had rights. In other words, what the work of White and 
Gilmartin introduces is the idea that the citizen-subject in the ‘Baby O’ case is defined 
after the fact: it is defined outside of both the spatial order (as the normal parameters 
between inside and outside, self and other, child and mother) and the temporal order (the 
progression from past, to present and on to future) which is normally associated with our 
understanding of the way in which subjects are defined as political vis-à-vis the nation. It 
is defined outside of the understanding that subjects are either already part of an existing 
national community or only become part of that national community in the future.  
This focus on the ambiguity of the subject at the centre of discussions about 
reproduction in the Republic of Ireland is echoed in the work of Dianna J. Shandy. 
Shandy explores this ambiguity in a piece in which she considers the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum in the context of a how the process of birth is conceptualized 
differently in African and Irish societies.113 Shandy quotes Oyeronke Oyewumi who 
observes that in African societies “at the moment of birth, two entities are born – a baby 
and a mother”; however, she stresses that these are not distinct entities.114 Instead, she 
points out that, unlike in Irish society where birth itself is what predominantly marks the 
beginning of social (and often legal) status, “[i]n many African societies, social 
personhood does not necessarily coincide with biological birth”.115 With this in mind, the 
role of the ‘child’ in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
is conceptualized by Shandy, not as the voice of a sovereign subject who needs to be 
‘brought into’ the debate about belonging but as “the pre-verbal cries of a babe in arms” 
whose role is far more complex and ambiguous than simple ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ 
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implies.116 Shandy is at pains as such to emphasize the intricacy of the lives of the so-
called ‘individuals’ focused on in the 2004 Citizenship Referendum sub-debates. She 
does so by stressing the transnational nature of their experiences. Shandy focuses on the 
multiple, complex and shifting nature of the motivations of women who came to Ireland 
in the first place – something she points out which, as a result of changing over time, end 
up pushing and pulling them in many different directions. Doing so, she draws out the 
importance of considering how the ‘mother/child’ subject(s) that eventually become the 
focus in discussions about reproduction are always already connected to both ‘Irishness’ 
and/or ‘Africanness’ in such a way as to undermine the notion that it is possible to mark 
the end of one (which is associated with the past) and the beginning of another (which 
can be associated with the future) in order to identify an excluded subject as presence. 
Her point is that their subjectivity exists in ways which are very difficult to capture in 
existing legal-institutional concept of rights and/or policy-based-discourses. These 
assume that ‘political’ subjectivity must lie in claims to a coherent identity via the notion 
of bounded (either single or multiple) nationalities and the linear narrative (comprising a 
beginning, middle and end) of nationhood.  
Taken from the perspective of Julia Kristeva’s work, what the inquiries by White 
and Gilmartin and Shandy indicate is the need to try to reconceptualize belonging as a 
notion which is not always dictated by the image of an excluded citizen who is positioned 
‘outside’ the dominant political community and who can either transgress this or be 
brought ‘inside’. Instead it is often experienced as a series of interruptions into existing 
temporal and spatial understandings, resulting in a fragmented conception of self as 
citizen and of ‘citizen’ as self. This work furthermore confirms how these contradictions 
are already being approached as that which require, in and of themselves, new ways of 
conceptualizing subjectivity and what it is to ‘be’ political rather than trying to made 
sense of this according to existing understandings of political subjectivity as necessarily 
sovereign and autonomous. This is insofar as they can be shown to have considered how 
certain experiences displace (as oppose to reinforce) the relationship between ‘people’ 
(identity) and ‘place’ (the individual); a relationship which appeals to state sovereignty 
rely upon and, in doing so, subsequently reproduce. 
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Instead of conceptualizing subjectivity as that which exists vis-à-vis the state (as 
absolute space), subjectivity can be seen to have been recast by these authors in terms of 
“interconnected spaces”. These are sites and practices that “are crucial to understanding 
the ways in which citizenship laws are enacted, enforced and challenged.”117 The 
relationship between reproductiveness and residency can be seen to have been reset here 
through this work, in other words, in terms of an appreciation of interwoven (mostly 
contradictory) identity-spaces around which political and legal claims have been 
organized to date, not all of which can be understood as sovereign spaces. These authors 
focus on the range of different places where the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum was 
played out – White and Gilmartin focusing on the home, the private sphere, maternity 
wards in Irish hospitals, UK abortion clinics, the courtroom and legislature, as well as 
academic legal texts. Shandy considers how this includes different spatio-temporal 
discourses surrounding birth itself in both Ireland and in Africa. Doing so, I read them as 
asking us to re-imagine how we think about citizenship as spatially and/or temporally 
situated. They ask us to re-imagine this as other than necessarily playing out in a linear 
timeframe and somewhere that can be (unproblematically) located as bounded space; 
whether this is a jurisdiction, a homeland, a community, and/or a coherent excluded 
‘self’.  
 
Beyond Modern Subjectivity: Beyond ‘The-One’ and ‘The Many-As-One’ 
In their study entitled ‘Tell me about Yourself’, Ní Laoire et al touch specifically on the 
multifaceted (and often indeterminate) nature through which migrant children experience 
citizenship.118 This study, which was conducted between 2006 and 2009, explores the 
immigration and integration experiences of migrant children and youth in Irish society, 
many (although not all) of whom are Irish citizens either through having been born in 
Ireland or having acquired it through their Irish citizen parents. It focuses on migration 
from three geographical areas (Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America) as 
well as the general phenomenon of ‘return’ migration which involves Irish citizen parents 
who moved away from Ireland and began families abroad eventually moving back with 
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their (also Irish citizen) children. What is significant about this study is that while it does 
not ignore that “[c]hildren’s experiences are profoundly shaped…by their parents’ rights 
and status as migrants” and/or outsider status, very unusually it also emphasizes that the 
children of migrant families negotiate belonging and construct their own identities across 
a much more complex range of spatial and social as well as temporal contexts.119  
The study focuses on how the category of ‘migrant children’ itself (which here 
includes Irish citizens born to migrant parents, Irish citizens born to Irish citizen parents, 
and/or children who are citizens of countries other than Ireland) needs to be differentiated 
in ways which are often ignored in existing discussions about the intersection of 
migration and citizenship. On one hand it points out that the category of ‘migrant 
children’ needs to be internally differentiated to take account of the manner in which 
immigration policies confer differing rights on children depending on both citizenship 
and migrant status. It emphasizes that this needs to be understood however, in terms of 
how these statuses are often conflicting and/or contradictory. One of the points 
emphasized, for example, is that “having Irish citizenship was not necessarily sufficient 
protection for the children against arguments made by others about whether they could 
legitimately claim to belong in Irish society”, especially in cases where these children did 
not have the correct accent or skin colour. The authors point out that this often 
contradicted their parent’s ‘non-migrant’ status (in the case of returning Irish citizens) or 
alternatively their parent’s ‘migrant’ status (in the case of parents who had 
immigrated).120 Similarly the authors of the report highlight the complexity of 
experiences within the migrant population in which these children are embedded more 
generally.121 The authors stress, for example, the manner in which a label such as 
‘African/Irish’ reflects a wide range of different types of experiences including those of 
children who “migrated from African countries at a very early age and have never 
returned; others were born in Ireland and have Irish and EU citizenship” as well as those 
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who have moved to Ireland at an older age and have been back to Africa.122 Most 
importantly perhaps, the study points out that the category ‘migrant children’ needs to be 
externally differentiated to take account of how the complex experiences of migrant 
children very rarely correspond to accepted understandings of the difference between 
‘Irish’ citizenship and ‘immigrant’ status.  As the study explains in one of its key 
insights,  
[b]eing a migrant’ is only one aspect of migrant children’s identities. It is also evident 
that migrant children and youth express their identities in ways which often diverge from 
the labels that are imposed upon them (usually by adults). Migrant children’s identity 
negotiations can challenge dominant assumptions about ethnic and national identities.123  
 
Rather than simply confirming, therefore, established understandings regarding 
how migrant and ethnic minority adults are perceived as culturally different to ‘Irish’ 
adults, what is emphasized in this study is how migrant children’s experiences rather 
confound the categories themselves of ‘Irish’ and ‘Migrant’ as well as existing 
“assumptions about hierarchies of sameness and difference which underlie these 
processes” of othering.124 What is stressed above all, however, is that there is often little 
conceptual room for migrant children to articulate their experiences and understandings 
of self outside of these dominant frameworks which prioritize an ability to be able to 
identify with nationality and ignore identifications with county, school, family or aspects 
of popular culture affiliation.125 The final insight from this study is accordingly that there 
needs to be a greater appreciation of how children’s own perspectives and experiences of 
migration, integration and living in Ireland “are often different to those of adults, or to the 
ways in which adults assume that children view and experience the world.”126  
These findings echo an exploration by Nicola Yau into the experiences of (what 
she refers to as) second generation Chinese in Ireland and the difficulty which she found 
many of these people were having in articulating their sense of identity and self within 
the existing statist conceptual framework.127 Yau defines ‘second generation Chinese’ as 
those people who were born in Ireland (and as such are Irish citizens) and/or migrated to 
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Ireland and have spent most of their lives there “either one or both of whose parents are 
ethnic Chinese.”128 Yau notes that as commonwealth citizens with free access to the 
United Kingdom, Chinese migration to Northern Ireland has been taking place since the 
1950s and 1960s.129 What Yau stresses is the contradictory way, however, in which 
second generation Chinese are both part of the main stream and of the margin according 
to different (often contradictory) contexts within Ireland. She explains, for example, that 
second-generation Chinese are often both racialized as Chinese yet remain invisible in a 
wider black-white dichotomous framework in Irish society where ‘black’ is associated 
with being African. Yau furthermore argues that these are people who experience both 
‘Irishness’ and ‘Chineseness’ in ways which are not immediately intelligible. For 
example, she explains that referencing ‘Chineseness’ often refers to a type of homing 
desire “without actually meaning a desire to return.”130 This, she points out, is because the 
concept of ‘return’ as normally used is problematic here insofar as some second 
generation Chinese living on the island of Ireland were neither born in nor, have they 
ever been to either China or Hong Kong: “so there is no possibility of return because you 
cannot return to where you have not been, whether that is a physical space or a state of 
mind.”131 This emphasizes the difficulty in categorizing the ‘connections’ which second 
generation Chinese – for whom there is often no real contact with family in Hong Kong 
or China – have to places and histories associated with ‘China’ and ‘Hong Kong’ as part 
of diasporic identities which nonetheless offer a sense of belonging. What is stressed here 
again is the notion of ‘home’ being both a physical and historical space and a personal 
space of identification, yet the inability of the boundaries and categorizations associated 
with the nation-state and appeals to state sovereignty to conceive of the uncertainty and 
‘fractions’ of personhood that this produces.132  
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What both the Ní Laoire et al and Yau studies show is the manner in which the 
children of migrants and their identities constantly move across, within and between 
political and cultural boundaries. Doing so, these children challenge these boundaries 
themselves and, most importantly, challenge the notion that inclusion and exclusion can 
be located in the first place by way of boundaries which differentiate ‘here’ from ‘there’, 
‘us’ from ‘them’, ‘past’ from ‘future’ as normally associated with the idea of 
‘individuals’ and groups thereof.  They confirm that there is a need to rethink how 
belonging is being experienced from this perspective rather than presuming that it can 
simply be equated with understandings of how it is experienced by migrant parents 
themselves. These studies indicate furthermore that this needs to be done by 
reconsidering how political community and identity are currently theorized as involving 
either a ‘transgression’ of the boundaries between inside (identity) and outside 
(difference) – as discussed in the gendered analysis – or a ‘bringing together’ of these 
boundaries by bonding those who are outside conceptions of the dominant imagined 
community (non-citizen guests) with those already inside (citizen hosts) – as discussed in 
the cosmopolitan/ human rights analysis. They imply that there is a need to try to 
reconceptualize belonging as a notion which is not only dictated by the image of an 
excluded citizen as individual which is positioned ‘outside’ the dominant political 
community and which can either transgress this or be brought ‘inside’. It is also that 
which is often experienced in a series of interruptions into existing temporal and spatial 
understandings, resulting in a fractious (less than whole) political subject.  
As discussed in chapters two and three, the notion of a fragmented self is not easy 
to imagine given how dominant political horizons are currently understood. Rather, (and 
despite a growing appreciation of the importance of recognising how identities are 
increasingly defined in hybrid, marginal and liminal terms), it remains a supremely 
difficult task given the manner in which political subjectivity is defined in the last 
instance in terms of the idea of clearly delineated boundaries (despite the emphasis on the 
fluidity of such boundaries) between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ and 
the need to specifically resolve these boundaries somehow in the notion of a coherent 
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subject which is defined in terms of presence. Yet as also discussed, Kristeva explores the 
notion of Otherness as this relates to the subconscious and thus as that which is within the 
specific self, but not in a tangible way which can be defined in terms of a ‘particular’ self. 
Nor, as that which has a definable ‘outside’ of itself which can be articulated as a 
‘universal’ self in opposition to this. In doing so, this concept of ‘Otherness’ begins to 
form the basis of an alternative conception of subjectivity which is no longer only 
articulated in the ‘resolution’ of the process of drawing lines between inside and outside, 
particular and universal, identity and difference. Rather it appears as that which is 
articulated and just as quickly rearticulated anew in the tension or border-space which is 
constitutive of, and constituted by, these very limits. Julia Kristeva’s work indicates, as 
such, how we can still think in terms of politics and political subjectivity (that we must 
do so) even when we think of “our self so poised and dense”, precisely because this no 
longer exists ever since Freud demonstrated that the self “shows itself to be a strange land 
of borders and otherness ceaselessly constructed and deconstructed” which present new 
meanings ‘of’ rather than ‘in’ time and space.133 
From the perspective of Kristeva’s work, the studies by Ní Laoire et al and Yau 
can be shown to do more therefore than simply highlight the need to conceptualize how 
certain migrant children are citizens in their own right. From the perspective of Kristeva’s 
work, they also succeed in beginning to do exactly that. This is insofar as the focus in 
these studies on the experiences of these children as cross-cutting and often contradictory 
yet simultaneous as “meaning-filled connections to [a variety of] different spaces and 
places”, can be seen in itself to rethink how ‘space’ (both subjective and territorial) 
citizenship is inhabitable other than in a coherent way (as inclusive and/or exclusive).134 
This particular reading of both Ni Laoire et al and Yau’s work is only possible, however, 
I argue, when the experiences of belonging of migrant youth in Ireland are more 
generally recast beyond the idea of the individual and ‘the-many-as-one’. It is only 
possible when the experience of belonging of these migrant youth is recast in light of the 
notion, as discussed by Kristeva, of the possibility of subjectivity itself as fragmented in 
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terms ‘of’ many different types of contingent spaces and temporal possibilities, rather 
than having to be guaranteed ‘in’ linear historical time and absolute space without limits.  
 
A New Starting Point? Subjectivity as ‘The Less-Than-One’  
The work looked at in the second part of this chapter is that which I have argued can be 
read in terms of a Kristevan focus on the notions of ‘space’ and ‘time’ in all their facets 
as undermined by patterns of mobility engendered by migration. In doing so,  I have 
argued that this work indicates how we might go beyond simply considering how 
migration has redrawn the map of what it is to be ‘Irish’ (nationality) in relation to 
particular subjectivities, to that of asking how it has redrawn the map of what it is to ‘be’ 
(subjectivity) more generally. In particular, it has focused attention away from that of 
having to understand ‘being’ as associated with an ability to be included in and thus as 
always already ‘separate’ from political community (the state) in the first place. Instead 
of such a metaphysics of presence defined in terms of spatial and temporal continuity, 
what has been explored is how the politics of citizenship might be posed from a starting 
point for human ‘being’ based on a metaphysics of process which incorporates ideas of 
temporal and spatial fragmentation (subjectivity as ‘the-less-than-one’).   
As Piaras MacÉinrí points out in his aptly entitled chapter ‘If I Wanted to Go 
There I Wouldn’t Start from Here’, the task envisaged has become that of needing to 
rethink our initial starting point in respect to the question of belonging. MacÉinrí explains 
that what is needed is a counter history  
which tells the history of the country and its multiple peoples and diasporas, not as 
overwhelmingly in the past, in the tribal sense of a ‘core nation’ beset by successive 
invasions, but in terms of an accretion of encounters and syntheses over many centuries, 
making the Irish people the already multi-ethnic, non-tribal nation they are today.135  
 
What has been emphasized in this chapter is the need more specifically, to think about 
belonging in these terms of as that which cuts across the physical and imaginative space 
itself of the ‘subject’ as individual (the one) and/or groups of individuals (the many-as-
one). I have argued this is needed in order to be able think the type of ‘politics’ which can 
account for the “shifting, multiple, hybrid, sometimes conflicting positions” which 
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MacÉinrí and others have identified.136 This exact rethinking is needed, I have pointed 
out, in order to respond to and engage with on its own terms, the complexity of 
experiences of belonging and of being citizen-subjects in Ireland which studies such as 
those by Yau and Ní Laoire et al have recorded.  
 The point of considering Homi Bhabha’s work in this chapter is that it follows 
Kristeva’s work in indicating the importance of understanding the distinction between the 
different manners in which cultural difference can be theorized. It can be theorized, on 
one hand, as in the gendered and cosmopolitan/ human rights analyses of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum through the existing dualism of modern subjectivity (between 
Woman and citizen, or Human and citizen) and therefore in terms of ‘individuals’ (the 
one) and groups of individuals (the many-as-one). It can also be conceptualized, 
however, as in the work of those such as White and Gilmartin and Ní Laoire et al, by 
retheorizing the existing space of individuality as that which connects ‘identity’ 
(subjectivity) to ‘place’ (sovereignty) and to a particular history (sovereign time). Here 
the idea of the less-than-one disturbs existing calculations of power and knowledge by 
undermining the dualism of modern subjectivity as this is understood ‘in’ time and 
space.137 In the latter, the notion of discrimination of particular (sovereign) subjects is 
rethought through the production of alternative (non-sovereign) spaces and temporal 
fragmentations of subject signification. Instead of the marginalized subject (‘individual’) 
at the centre of claims to citizenship which experiences citizenship in continuous 
narrative time and within clearly delineated spaces, political subjectivity is theorized as 
that which can be experienced through fragmented time and fractious spaces (the less-
than-one) by those who straddle the divide; existing as they do in the tension between 
humanity and citizenship, being both and neither at the same time. 
While not denying the political nature of both approaches, what this chapter has 
sought to emphasize is the manner in which the former approach does not challenge the 
basis of the claim by the Irish Government regarding the necessary link between 
reproduction (identity) and residency (place) and the notion therefore of the sovereign 
subject as that which can be included and excluded in political community and national 
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narrative. The chapter has instead sought to emphasize how, in continuing to think in 
terms of a coherent ‘who’ which can challenge and/or be included in dominant concepts 
of ‘Irish’ citizenship, this existing analysis ignores – given an inability to conceptualize 
the often fractious nature of the subject (the subject that adds ‘to’ but does not ‘add up’) 
at the centre of such claims to citizenship in the first place – precisely the complexity of 
the experiences of belonging focused on by those such as Yau and Ní Laoire et al. In 
contrast, the work of White and Gilmartin and Shandy has been shown to specifically 
problematize the necessary link between identity and that of territory and its associated 
notion of time as history. It has been shown to rethink disputes about reproduction and 
migration in terms of how these instead recast the notion itself of that very necessity of 
sovereign identity in the first place that must be pointed to as ‘individual’ (originary 
located presence).  
This chapter has therefore contrasted two approaches to the question of 
subjectivity in the context of migration. On the one hand, it has explored how subjectivity 
and the possibility of what it is to be a ‘subject’ with rights to citizenship has remained 
tied to a particular (sovereign) conception of space and time – articulated variously as 
‘migrant woman’, ‘ethnic minority’, ‘guest’, ‘Irish born child’. On the other hand, it has 
explored how this understanding, as the only space and time of subjectivity has been 
problematized and an alternative conceptual space of subjectivity has been envisaged 
whereby political subjectivity is still deemed possible even when “all institutional 
differences, even gender differences are in doubt, in question, in process of being 
imposed and resisted all at once.”138 It is this distinction which I have argued Kristeva’s 
work introduces. The alternative conceptual space which has been opened here and its 
implications for understanding more generally how citizenship and questions of 
‘political’ subjectivity can be retheorized, will be explored in the final chapter of this 
thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to contrast existing Citizenship Referendum critical analysis to 
the question of rethinking the politics of citizenship in respect of the issue of reproduction 
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and its representations, with the work of Julia Kristeva which addresses a similar range of 
issues encompassed in the idea of motherhood and femininity. What has been 
emphasized is that while existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
attempts to merely think ‘different’ times and spaces of existing statist concepts of 
politics and thereby ultimately maintains the dual nature of modern subjectivity 
(theorized this time as Woman or Human and citizen, as opposed simply to Man and 
citizen), Kristeva’s work emphasizes how this dualism (between a particular and a 
universal identity) is based on a specific understanding of time and space which can also 
be problematized in its own right. It is the importance which Kristeva places on 
recognising this distinction and the need the to think about time and space more generally 
in order to redraw the conditions of possibility for ‘politics’ here, which has been traced 
through this chapter. 
What the chapter has attempted to do is to is to demonstrate how starting with the 
question of how we might establish a bond or challenge the existing lack of a bond 
between us – between those inside the Irish state and those outside of it, between migrant 
and non-migrant mother, between us and them – as has been done in existing analysis of 
the Citizenship Referendum, privileges an understanding of subjectivity in terms of the 
sovereign, autonomous individual. It ignores the question of how it is that we consider 
ourselves as ‘separate’ in the first place.139 What has been discussed is how this assumes 
rather than interrogates the manner in which citizenship and being ‘citizens’ has become 
associated with a particularly modern conception of subjectivity in time and space as the 
necessary basis for all subjectivity. Focusing specifically on the subjectivity of citizen-
children born to migrant parents, the second part of this chapter has sought to consider 
the need to move away from the notion that foreignness and otherness must always be 
articulated in sovereign dualisms through the resolution of the process of drawing lines 
between inside and outside, particular and universal, identity and difference, past and 
present in terms of a modern subject. And the need instead to recognize how foreignness 
and otherness is often articulated and just as quickly rearticulated anew in the tension or 
border-space which is as much constitutive of, as it is constituted by, these limits. 
Emphasizing the ambiguous and decidedly indeterminate nature of how solidarity is 
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experienced by the children of migrants in contrast to that of how it is experienced by 
their migrant parents, what has been explored is how the subjectivity of Irish citizen 
children does not require the building of bonds or the challenging of a lack of existing 
bonds but rather an exploration of how these children are always already bound in many 
ways to each other, to Irishness and non-Irishness alike, as well as to all types of 
m(Others). The notion of subjectivity as ‘the-less-than-one’, as expressed by Homi 
Bhabha, has been explored as a way of beginning to conceptualize this alternative way of 
thinking subjectivity outside of a sovereign framework. This is on the basis that it 
captures a more fractious and fragmented experience of being citizen than currently 
encompassed in ‘the one’ (as individual) and the ‘the-many-as-one’ dominant framework. 
The next chapter explores the implications of opening up the question of political 
subjectivity beyond the one and the-many-as-one (temporality contained within absolute 
space) to that of the less-than-one (fractious spacetime) in this manner.  
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Chapter 5 
Citizenship as Contingent Trace Rather Than Absolute Space: 
Retheorizing the ‘politics’ of citizenship1 
 
 
Introduction  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum conceptualizes political 
subjectivity as that which is defined first and foremost in terms of (state) sovereignty. In 
contrast to this, chapter four considered the need – given the highly complex range of 
spatial and social as well as temporal contexts according to which citizen children born to 
migrant parents experience citizenship – to think how political subjectivity can be 
reconceptualized outside the question of state sovereignty and thus on less stable and 
fixed foundations than that of a coherent self. It was suggested that Julia Kristeva’s work 
presents a way of considering how the relationship which has been posited between 
citizenship and the modern sovereign territorial state facilitates (as opposed to merely 
reflects) a particular conception of politics which reproduces an understanding of 
subjectivity as ‘the one’ or ‘the many-as-one’. Her work emphasizes that this relationship 
is problematic because it assumes subjectivity must be located in homogenous as opposed 
to (and thus ignoring the concept of) heterogeneous space and time. This final chapter 
aims to further tease out these issues and in doing so explore what is at stake in opening 
up the conceptual (sovereign) space in which citizenship is currently thought to questions 
about how space can be understood as other than infinitely divisible by lines extended in 
continuous, progressive time.  
Essentially, this chapter argues that what is at stake in doing so is a move away 
from the question of ‘where’ boundaries are drawn per se and the resultant focus on the 
idea of various contending (if not always contradictory) theories – for example, gendered, 
cosmopolitanism, racial, economic and nationalist/bounded – which each provide 
different solutions as to how the tension between statehood (sovereignty) and identity 
(subjectivity) should be negotiated. The challenge to the citizenship debate (outlined in 
chapter four) is instead a move towards considering how it has become necessary to think 
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about boundaries via the notion of statehood and state sovereignty in the first place.2  
What the chapter looks at is how, in opening up the question of political subjectivity 
beyond the one and the-many-as-one (temporality contained within absolute space) to 
that of the less-than-one (fractious spacetime), we can better conceptualize the manner in 
which migration is challenging dominant conceptions of citizenship. This is insofar as it 
allows us to focus more specifically on how being ‘citizen’ in the context of migration 
need not necessarily be understood as that which transcends a series of (pre)existing 
boundaries (“lines that do nothing at all”3). It can also be understood as a site in and of 
itself which reproduces alternative forms of political life which also redraw the nature of 
these lines and therefore the possibility of ‘being’ itself.  
I argue that the move away from emphasizing where boundaries are drawn (as 
less or more inclusive) to that of emphasizing the ‘how’ of boundary drawing itself needs 
therefore to be understood in terms of how it ultimately enables a reconceptualization of 
the possibilities of be(com)ing citizen in the context of migration in the Republic of 
Ireland. Becoming citizen and therefore the question of the politics of citizenship itself is 
no longer exclusively conceptualized as extended in time across the absolute space of 
modern subjectivity (in terms of an us/them dualism), but is reconceptualized as also 
conceivably based upon disruptions and discontinuities in its own right; figuring in 
indeterminate times and spaces as that which can only be “traced in the blur…or in 
mediation”.4 It is this highly unique understanding of citizenship as trace, rather than 
simply as absolute space, which is developed in this final chapter. The concept of trace as 
metaphor enables us to imagine how be(com)ing ‘citizen’ is no longer only achieved in 
unified time and extended in space, but can also manifest as a cluster of time-space 
coordinates which are constantly changing within and across what is normally 
conceptualized as the absolute space and horizontal time of sovereign political 
community.  
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Theorizing Political Subjectivity  
 
if you ask me about identity I think our kids are going to be very – they are not going to 
be Irish, they are not going to be African – they are going to be very global. Migrant 
Parent5  
 
A growing number of people living in Europe do not seem to inhabit the social space 
which corresponds to the expansion of citizenship rights, that is ‘civil society’. Rather, 
their lives are increasingly the targets of the technologies of governmentality which 
define what Partha Chatterjee has called the heterogeneous space of political society, and 
which often predate the nations-state…The postcolonial migratory movements of the 
present are in this sense a challenge not only to the borders of European citizenship, but 
also to the borders of our imagination. Sandro Mezzadra6 
 
When it comes to the question of ‘being’ as mediated via cultural difference in the 
twenty-first century, the above quotations indicate scepticism that political possibility is 
always necessarily extended by thinking about political life in terms of “a continuum” 
within and between modern territorial states.7 This is the assumption, as insisted by 
Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, that “[t]he solution [to cultural diversity] must lie 
in a mode of citizenship that reconciles the pressures of globalization with the reality that 
states will continue for the foreseeable future, to exist as the most important political 
unit.”8 Contrary to this, the quotations above both question in their own ways the 
plausibility of continuing to frame “the tractable puzzles of modern politics…in terms of 
horizontal or territorial relations between self and world, self and other, this community 
here and that community there.”9 These quotations emphasize the importance rather of 
understanding how certain experiences no longer fit “with the regularity of so-called 
‘politics’” but need to be retheorized in terms of how they appear to occupy another form 
of time and space.10 In identifying the shortcomings of both the categories of ‘African’ 
and ‘Irish’ (as well as combinations thereof) to capture the essence of subjectivity of 
children of African origin growing up in Ireland, the first quotation challenges the need 
itself of posing the question of political subjectivity in terms of its relationship with the 
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modern sovereignty territorial political community.11 In suggesting that children growing 
up in Ireland of African origin will be neither ‘Irish’ nor ‘African’, it does not imply that 
these territorial categories do not apply at all to these children. Rather that they are 
insufficient to capture their experiences and that other spaces exist beyond these (or 
simply hyphenated versions thereof) in which these experiences are being lived.12 
Echoing this, the second quotation by Sandro Mezzadra similarly rejects taking the 
relationship between political subjectivity and the modern territorial political community 
as a natural starting point for questions about the politics of citizenship. It suggests 
instead that it is this relationship in itself that needs to be explored in terms of how it 
facilitates a particular understanding of ‘politics’ in the first place as that associated with 
homogenous as opposed to heterogeneous space.  
The implication – coming back to Homi Bhabha’s discussion about how Kristeva 
urges us to think about cultural difference (discussed in the previous chapter) – is that 
there is a need to think about the manner in which a ‘supplementary’ space of subjectivity 
is opened up in respect of those such as the children of migrant parents. This is an 
alternative time-space of being ‘citizen’ to that which is normally associated with 
situations in which an ‘Irish/immigrant’ dualism is more immediately prevalent (if never 
completely unproblematic). The point is that this supplementary space is not a different 
coordinate in existing time-space understandings which simply ‘adds up’ to another space 
in time in which the sovereign subject experiences citizenship – as is, for example, the 
concept of ‘new Irish’ or ‘new guest of the nation’ suggested in existing analysis of the 
2004 Citizenship Referendum. Rather, as implied by the above migrant parent quotation, 
what is produced is a supplementary space which is based on the understanding that 
adding African to Irish need not ‘add up’ to African-Irish or Irish/African, but rather may 
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interrupt the existing calculation and “successive seriality of the narrative of plurals and 
pluralism” associated with these concepts.13 This, as Bhabha explains is because  
the ‘supplementary question’ of cultural signification, alienates the synchronicity of the 
imaginined community. From the place of the ‘meanwhile’, where cultural homogeneity 
and democratic anonymity articulate the national community, there emerges a more 
instantaneous and subaltern voice of the people, minority discourse that speak betwixt 
and between times and places.14 
 
What Bhabha emphasizes here is the manner in which some people (for example, citizen-
child born to migrant parents) speak from a non-place, somewhere in-between the normal 
time and space of ‘nation’, thereby undermining the ability of the nation to maintain and 
reproduce its clearly delineated spatial coherency and historical continuity. They 
supplement the nation insofar as they are both an addition to the idea of the nation (as a 
type of member) but also emphasize what is missing insofar as they highlight the inability 
of the nation to clearly delineate its membership in the last instance, given that they are 
not and cannot simply be recognized just as another regular member (citizen) of that 
nation either.  
 
Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty: Two Different Types of ‘Critical’ Response  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum emphasizes the need for 
‘critical’ analysis of this event and of the subsequent questions which it raises regarding 
immigration, integration and social change in the Republic of Ireland. It juxtaposes this 
with a more traditional analysis provided by the Irish state and those in favour of the 
referendum in 2004.15 Yet, the previous chapter explored how Julia Kristeva’s work 
emphasizes the potential for critical scholarship to make a further choice. This is whether 
to work within the existing time and space of the dualism of modern subjectivity 
(theorized variously as Wo/Man and citizen or Human and citizen), or whether to 
problematize the specific understanding of time and space upon which this dualism is 
based. I suggest that the distinction which Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker once 
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drew between two possible critical responses to crisis and the question of sovereignty is 
useful in order to conceptualize what is at stake in this choice.16  
 
One critical response 
The first response Ashley and Walker look at is based on imagining the world in terms of 
spatially opposed positions of inside and outside and temporal continuity which is then 
interrupted by a unique moment of discontinuity “that opens up when…continuous time, 
homogeneous place, and coherent and well-bounded textual inheritance breaks up or 
gives away.”17 They explain that this line of reasoning posits the boundaries demarcating 
‘us’ from ‘them’ in the twenty-first century as sharply brought into focus and now highly 
contested, but ultimately retains the basic notion of the ontological foundation of this 
dichotomy. In other words, despite the concepts of ‘us’ and ‘them’ now constantly 
undergoing deconstruction, identity (inside) continues here to be conceptualized as 
ontologically against difference (outside) as two separate, albeit interlinked, analytical 
categories which remain “constitutive of our modern understanding of political space.”18 
Because the subject continues in this response to be conceptualized as unitary (by 
theorizing similarity in difference via autonomous subjectivities), ‘difference’ remains 
defined in terms (always) of an(other) as one who can be ‘included’. This means that 
political arrangements of sovereignty (the symbolic or social order) are seen in the last 
instance as separate from the processes of inscription of (an originary located) 
subjectivity.19 The result is that sovereignty is seen as that which is required for reality to 
have meaning and thus political possibility, as opposed to that which merely facilitates a 
particular type of meaningful reality in terms of what has come to be understood as 
‘political’ possibility. I argue that the critical approach presented in existing analysis of 
the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum corresponds with this first response which Walker 
and Ashley identify. 
As Walker discusses in Inside/Outside, what can be identified in this first 
response is the assumption that the image of the sovereign state as “fixed within precise 
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ontological coordinates” can be applied universally.20 This is because, despite a move 
away from the notion of pre-given groups and instead towards a successful interrogation 
of the notions themselves of ‘individual’ and ‘state’ – in particular, the manner in which 
the former is constructed by the latter according to degrees of inclusion and exclusion – 
the persistent idea that the state exists as an analytical category in its own right which can 
be juxtaposed with the ‘individual’ retains a very specific (homogenous) understanding 
of the possible configuration of spatio-temporality. Pierre Maxime Schuhl once identified 
this as the ‘the theme of Gulliver’ in order to emphasize how it embodies the idea that the 
human world has essential characteristics which remain the same no matter the 
magnitude in question: both micro and macro physical space are presumed to be “just like 
the space of the commonsense world” merely reduced or increased in magnification.21 
Yet, as Walker specifically points out in ‘Citizenship after the Modern Subject’, to 
assume that the (individual) self must be conceptualized in terms of similar spatio-
temporal relations as the state is to ignore the question of the historically constituted 
nature of subjectivity as that which only came to be understood in this way at a particular 
point in time. It is to take for granted that the limits of the modern state have always been 
analogous to the limits of subjectivity.  
As outlined in chapter one, Walker focuses on the manner in which a particular 
conception of time and space associated with the principle of state sovereignty, can be 
understood to have emerged as a particular way of ordering understandings about 
subjectivity as well as those about political society.22 For Walker, focusing on the 
question of the politics of citizenship primarily vis-à-vis its relationship with the modern 
territorial state (claims to statehood), ignores how the question of what it is to ‘be’ citizen 
came to be defined in the first place. It ignores how it came to be defined vis-à-vis its 
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relationship with the state in terms of a very specific concept of space (infinite and 
homogenous) and time (progressive, continuous and linear – understood as “a historical 
process by which peoples develop shared characteristics”23). It is based on the 
understanding of a decisive demarcation between inside and outside, between self and 
other, between presence and absence.24 As discussed in chapters one, two and three, his 
work therefore results in an emphasis on the need to go beyond rethinking the statist 
monopoly on understandings of the nature and possibility of/for political community to 
that of also rethinking the statist political discourse through which political subjectivity 
(‘being’) came to be understood. 
 
A second critical response  
The alternative response which Ashley and Walker envisage to crisis and the question of 
sovereignty is based on specifically questioning what current imaginations of borders and 
territories tell us about what political community and identity can(not) be. Unlike 
existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum which presents only one type 
of ‘critical’ response to crisis and the question of sovereignty – based on emphasizing 
how normal politics is ‘interrupted’ by migration thereby continuing to take state 
sovereignty as the regulative principle guiding all contemporary political practice – 
Walker and Ashley indicate here the potential for another response. This is one which 
considers how migration might be theorized as that which actually undermines the 
understanding that state sovereignty constitutes the basis for all forms of political life 
(and the capacity to identify an understanding of who ‘we’ are) in the first place. This 
notion of a second critical response indicates a further line of inquiry which explores how 
modern understanding of ‘borders’ in terms of infinite, invariable and homogenous space 
which exist in continuous, progressive time – concentrated in claims to statehood and the 
idea of the (in)complete Cartesian subject – are not the only way of imagining political 
possibility. It is one which argues rather that this certain dominant understanding merely 
became dominant  
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because it was possible for a time…actively to marginalize, forget and defer encounters 
with paradoxes, contesting themes, and resistant interpretations that…transgress all 
imaginable boundaries, and that render radically unstable all renditions of unequivocal 
voice.25 
 
In contrast to the first response, in this type of deconstructive account the point is 
that no borders or territories are presumed to be already in place which are then 
contested, challenged and ‘politicized’. All drawing of boundaries is rather problematized 
by showing that the margins which were once taken for granted (for example, between 
‘the state’ and other institutions or, between ‘the state’ and ‘individuals’) were never in 
fact fixed solidly. Rather, these are shown to have (always) been based on slippages 
down through history. As Shapiro explains, what is argued is that “the familiar world 
cannot be separated from the [various contingent] interpretive practices through which it 
is made”.26 The contention instead is that meaning is always imposed and is therefore 
always political. As such, there is simply no pre-political or ‘non-political’ realm but 
rather everything is understood to come within ‘the political’ – including subjectivity. On 
the basis of this understanding, a move is effectively made to leave the more 
epistemologically driven understanding of social enquiry – which is primarily concerned 
with, for example, how structure and agency can be theorized as interdependent rather 
then separate – to begin specifically to rethink existing possibilities of being, acting and 
knowing according to which “epistemology came to be constructed as a dualistic 
encounter between subject and object in the first place.”27 Unlike in the first response 
here it is the idea itself of how we draw boundaries (the presumed convergence between 
boundaries and territorial space, and boundaries and subjectivity), and therefore our 
understanding of the nature of the limits of modern political life as within and between 
modern states, that is problematized.28  
Rather than starting from the assumption that sovereignty has been ‘interrupted’ 
by a moment of discontinuity, this response can be seen as an attempt to interrogate the 
notion itself of sovereignty (sovereign statehood and sovereign subjectivity) understood 
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as unproblematically divisible and continuous. In doing so, it emphasizes that asking 
‘where’ the margins of modern political life should be drawn – as more or less 
inclusively between the state and citizenship or, as more or less inclusively between 
identity (inside) and difference (outside) – presumes precisely the continuity and 
divisibility which it purportedly attempts to interrogate. As an alternative to this, it 
considers the necessity of reconceptualizing how we have been told that we must “think 
about the delineation of political possibility in both time and space”29 as always within or 
between states and therefore in terms specifically of progressive time (historical 
narratives) and “inviolable and sharply delimited space.”30 For Walker and others this 
question needs to be specifically explored by reflecting on the manner in which our 
current understanding of time and space continue to be intimately related to ideas about 
state sovereignty (the resolution of the question of ‘politics’ within and between states) 
which were crystallized in early-modern Europe and which are associated specifically 
with classic Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry.31 They argue that we need to 
look at how classical physics, which assumes the independence of space from the matter 
which it contains and “the linearity of historical, narrativised time, time which has 
beginnings and ends”, is also constitutive of our understanding of modern ‘political’ 
subjectivity.32  
As discussed in chapter one, Walker’s argument is that the question of how the 
politics of citizenship is being challenged cannot be divorced from this specific modern 
account of individual subjectivity that forms, to begin with, the basis for our 
understanding of ‘political’ (im)possibility in contemporary circumstances.33 Instead he 
implies that it must be embedded in an understanding of the difference between ‘modern’ 
and other understandings of time and space. In particular, in an understanding of how the 
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former has come to dominate our understanding of all types of being as ‘calculable’ 
spatio-temporal relations. This is to urge us to begin to differentiate between on one hand, 
‘absolute’ spatio-temporal relations as the “the space of Newton and Descartes” as 
against ‘relational’ spatio-temporalization as the space and time of “Albert Einstein and 
the non-Euclidean geometries that began to be constructed most systematically in the 
nineteenth century.”34 As David Harvey notes, the former is defined in terms of how it is 
“amenable to standardized measurement and open to calculation” and as that which is “a 
primary space of individuation” and unitary measurement (the one and the many-as-one), 
everything clearly identified by their unique location.35 In contrast, the latter interrupts 
this emphasis on spatial and temporal ordering, highlighting instead the plurality of 
spatio-temporal possibilities which undermine the ability to calculate, count and identify 
what clearly belongs here, not there. “Relational conceptions bring us to the point where 
mathematics, poetry, and music merge, where dreams, daydreams, memories, and 
fantasies flourish.”36   
 
Retheorizing Political Subjectivity 
Stuart Elden has suggested that the manner in which time and space inform political 
(im)possibilities in contemporary circumstances can be best understood via an 
examination of the distinction which Heidegger drew between ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ 
knowledge: the former which relates to the knowledge of entities and their properties, the 
latter which relates to the question of the a priori conditions “on which any such theory 
(of ontic knowledge) could be constructed”.37 This distinction is important according to 
Elden because it allows us to distinguish between the theory of ‘beings’ (ontic 
knowledge) and the theory of ‘being’ (ontological knowledge). The latter outlines the 
conditions by which it is possible to construct such a theory of ‘beings’ in the first place. 
In his work Elden identifies through Heidegger a historical Cartesian notion of space (“as 
mathematical, geometric, viewed in terms of spatial location, [and] measurable by co-
ordinates”) as the dominant notion of space and, an Aristotelian view of temporality (as 
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‘succession’) as the dominant notion of time. He points out that together these form the 
basis for the theory of ‘beings’.38 His work insists, as such, that there is need to consider 
how space and time are both objects of analysis (with different meanings across time and 
within space) as well as forming part of the conceptual basis for analyzing subjectivity 
itself – as that which is understood as existing in time and space in the first place.  
Insofar as migration is understood to present a challenge to dominant ideals and 
existing practices of solidarity conceptualized in terms of the narrowly defined 
parameters of the Irish statist project as embodied in the 1937 Constitution, this adds 
depth to the nature of how this challenge could be understood. It indicates that it might be 
understood not only in terms of how the ambiguous subjectivity of citizen-children born 
to migrant parents affects the manner in which spatio-temporal coordinates are attributed 
with meaning (whether or not existing boundaries are understood to be shifting). But that 
it might also be understood in terms of how it potentially affects the notion of ‘political’ 
subjectivity as identifiable vis-à-vis a series of points or lines visualized similarly to 
those on a map and existing in temporal sequence (understood as having beginnings, 
middles and ends). In other words, that migration might affect how political subjectivity 
has been articulated in terms of the spatio-temporal imagery of movement from one point 
to another.39  
I do not argue here that this is something which is necessarily easy to come to 
grips with. For example, as Milič Čapek points out in The Philosophical Impact of 
Contemporary Physics, although it is increasingly understood that contemporary 
(quantum) physics does present alternative ways of conceiving of time and space, there is 
also a need to recognize that outside of physics (in particular in biology, psychology and 
the social sciences), “the classical habits of thought persist…driven into 
subconsciousness”.40 Indeed, instead of thinking that we can simply ‘catch up’ with ways 
of thinking about time and space in light of contemporary scientific analysis, following 
Edkins I suggest that there is a need to understand how classical conceptions of time and 
space are themselves integral to structures of sovereign power, “the power of the modern 
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nation-state.”41 This is to reassert once again that we cannot simply move ‘beyond’ 
sovereign power (a modern conception of subjectivity as sovereign and autonomous) in 
order to respond to this challenge. To aim to do so would simply, as Walker points out, 
be to continue to remain within the particular conception of time and space which locates 
different political conditions within different spaces and times which can be travelled to 
and from.42 Rather what is suggested is that we need to ask ourselves how we can engage 
with the conceptual difficulties which the subjectivity of citizen-children pose to the 
continuing dominance of this sovereign power structure by exploring how this power 
structure (re)constructs the notion of political possibility through a particular conception 
of the idea of ‘boundary’ itself.  
 
Rethinking the notion of ‘boundary’  
As seen in chapter four, Irish citizen children born to migrant parents experience 
citizenship in temporal inconsistencies (for example, often through retrospective 
adjustment) and spatial discontinuities (being ‘citizen’ only in certain situations) as 
opposed to progressively within a particular space or series of spaces. In so doing they 
interrupt the historical trajectory that normally testifies to collective coherence of the 
nation as made up of one people or many peoples. This indicates a need to acknowledge 
profound structural transformations which are due to migration and the necessity to 
engage with the complete uncertainty of the character and location of ‘political’ life as a 
result, as opposed to presuming we can continue to think about political life within 
existing spatio-temporal settings. It prompts us to consider how the supplementary space 
which the quotations at the start of this section allude to is not simply an(other) space of 
plurality wherein many wholes (individuals or groups of individuals and stages of 
development of a people or nation) come together in a politics of coexisting differences 
as citizens, but a “supplementary space of doubling” which produces a politics of 
difference of fracticious spaces and disjunctive times of ‘being’ citizen.43 As Shapiro 
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points out, what is indicated here is the need to reengage with “an alternative way of 
scripting the meaning of selves”.44 
From a starting point of the dominant political imagination it is very difficult to 
theorize this type of existence as it is not based on a decisive demarcation between inside 
and outside, them and us, identity and difference, before and after. Yet, as outlined in the 
preceding chapters, Julia Kristeva’s work offers an alternative to dominant political 
imagination by presenting a different way of theorizing the question of the politics of 
‘being’ itself. This is one which does not start with the necessity of a coherent ‘I’ which 
is bonded with the otherness of a foreigner or which seeks to find the otherness of a 
foreigner in the self. Rather, it is one which starts with “the harmonious repetition of the 
differences it [otherness] implies and spreads…without goal, without boundary, without 
end” as the condition of being with others in the first place.45 The crucial point is that 
Kristeva’s work on the notions of ‘strangeness’, ‘Other’ and ‘otherness’ is not focused on 
how these concepts merely disturb, and in so doing subsequently reinforce in a different 
manner, understandings of the dual nature of modern subjectivity as divided between the 
sovereign space of particularism (citizenship) on one hand and universalism (humanity) 
on the other. Rather it focuses on how these concepts can be understood to permeate both 
citizenship and humanity and in doing so, to destroy the basis for this spatial and 
temporal distinction more generally. The result is a re-reading of the ontological status of 
subjectivity in terms other than that of unity (a metaphysics of presence). In Kristeva’s 
work the supplementary question of cultural signification presents the notion of a 
‘fractured’ subject which does not merely “negate the preconstituted social contradictions 
of the past and present” but renegotiates “the space and time from which the narrative of 
the nation [of ‘being’] must begin.”46  
Kristeva’s work must be seen as pointing therefore in a different direction than 
the type of ‘cultural critique’ advocated in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum. The latter cultural critique insists on an engagement with the ‘other’ which 
acknowledges either pre-existing fears of economic destitution engrained in the Irish 
psyche as a result of past experiences such as the famine (as argued by Fanning and 
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Mutwarasibo47); that ‘we’ must be generous to ‘them’ given our experiences of migration 
(this argument is captured nicely in a letter to the editor of The Sunday Independent 
entitled ‘We were emigrants once, too’48); or, that ‘they’ as outsiders (migrant m(Others)) 
can challenge the boundaries according to which we as ‘Irish’ have been defined (as 
argued by Lentin and Luibhéid49). This type of critique assumes to some extent the 
already existing world of many distinct ‘cultures’ insofar as categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(albeit neutralized) still make sense.50 In contrast to this, Kristeva’s call for the 
recognition of ‘our own foreignness’ is not for the understanding of difference outside of 
self and thereby a call to brotherhood, but emphasizes the need to understand how 
difference is set within the self as the condition for the self ‘being’ with others.51 In doing 
so it problematizes the more general idea that politics must be based upon an ability to 
distinguish inside from outside, past from present, identity from difference. The result is 
an interrogation of how the principle of state sovereignty has told us the ‘boundary’ (of 
political community and by implication of self) should be conceptualized as a temporal 
problem which can be resolved in space – what Walker calls “the spatiotemporal 
container of modern politics.”52  
Unlike existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, the line of 
inquiry advocated in Kristeva’s work can seen to emphasize the importance of the second 
type of ‘critical’ response identified by Ashley and Walker in 1990 to crisis and the 
question of sovereignty. This is one which, unlike the first response, considers the need to 
reflect on how our understanding of social, cultural and economic political possibility is 
limited by our need to think about political life as either within, between or beyond 
modern states.53 This is the response which indicates that we might focus on how our 
imagination is limited by our need to conceptualize the only possible ground for the 
politics of citizenship as that which is defined in terms of the relationship between 
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autonomous individuals (subjectivity) and the state (sovereignty). It is not merely the 
location (i.e. the rightful parameters) of political space and time (for example, whether 
these should be trans or intra statist) which is being questioned here. This is because, it is 
recognized that doing so continues to assume a conception of both as homogenous, 
insofar as we continue to think of ‘being’ in space and time in different ways and to 
different degrees, rather than ‘of’ different conceptions of space and time.54 Instead, what 
is implied is that understandings themselves as to what political space and time can be 
need to be reconceptualized. This is in terms of how both are playing out in often 
unexpected ways at a multiplicity of sites which challenges the notion itself of 
instantaneous static space and linear time (us/them, past/present framework) as the only 
possible type of ‘politics’.55 The result is to ask, as the Mezzadra quotation at the 
beginning of this chapter does, how this reconceptualization of political space and time 
challenges the existing dominant understanding of political life (as within or between 
states) as the only way of ‘being’ when it comes to the question of citizenship and the 
relationship between citizenship and migration. It is to ask, as he does, how migration 
challenges not only the temporal and spatial location and authenticity of territorial 
borders but also “the borders of our imagination.”56  
The understanding put forward in this chapter is that this second response does 
not simply set out to ignore the significance of statist time and space, however. For 
example, it does not set out to ignore how linear progressive time (history) linked to the 
idea of bounded space (territory) provides an important link to the eternal in a manner 
similar to that of religion but which was lost with the rationalist secularism of the 
Enlightment.57 The persistence and popularity of this statist spatio-temporal conception 
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of being is not denied here. Nor is it being argued that a politics based on this is simply 
bad or negative in contrast to alternative non-statist conceptions which are good and 
positive; merely that such a politics cannot be taken for granted. Similarly, it is not 
suggested here that such a sovereign spatio-temporal basis for politics can simply be 
‘replaced’ with another understanding. Rather, as stated in the conclusion to chapter one 
of this thesis, there is a need to forget about moving ‘beyond’ the state and instead to start 
to consider how we can replay and recite statist spatio-temporal configurations in order to 
reveal their instabilities. Our choices are not limited to being ‘in favour’ of linear 
progressive time (seeking to include citizen-children born to migrant parents); being 
‘against’ linear progressive time (demanding citizen-children’s right to remain outside 
history and politics); or simply attempting to reconcile these two options (a politics of 
plurality). What is emphasized following Julia Kristeva is the need to conceptualize a 
politics which is based on “an intermingling of all three approaches…all three concepts 
of time within the same historical moment.”58 The emphasis of this fifth chapter is on 
how, in other words, by reengaging with the idea of ‘boundary’ (with the idea of what a 
boundary must be), the second response forces us to think time and space differently (thus 
redrawing the conditions of possibility for ‘politics’) and not merely to think ‘different’ 
times and spaces (of existing statist conceptions of politics).  
The next section of this chapter will explore in more detail the claim that what we 
normally call ‘politics’ draws on a particular notion of time and space which privileges 
the narrative of the autonomous state, and which goes unchallenged by those critical 
inquiries in migration studies which continue to afford the state a central role in their 
research. What is emphasized is how the sovereign regulative idea of what a boundary 
must be in relation to the question of the politics of citizenship is one which must be 
constantly reproduced if it is to be maintained. I then seek to contrast the approach by 
critical inquiries in migration scholarship in the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
which implicitly accept this core spatio-temporal ordering principle, with an attempt 
within migration scholarship to challenge this principle. What is looked at is migration 
scholarship which does not prioritize this centralizing role of the state but which instead 
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rethinks citizenship in terms of how the centralizing strategies of the state are an effect in 
and of themselves of more radically decentralizing struggles. This scholarship 
emphasizes the need to understand that increasingly, when it comes to the question of 
migration, although political struggles work through the state, these can nonetheless no 
longer be traced back to the state nor to the idea of located presence as the ‘necessary’ 
basis of politics.  
 
 
The Privileging Narrative of the Autonomous State  
As discussed in previous chapters, existing ‘critical’ analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum concentrates in the first and last instances on how the state 
regulates migration. It focuses variously on whether this is through racialization and/or 
through nationalism. In doing so and in emphasizing the need to rethink citizenship in 
terms of post-racial state or post-national imaginary, it reconfirms what Closs-Stephens 
points out is “the significant dimension of modern citizenship”.59 This is the 
understanding that ‘being political’ is realized vis-à-vis the state. This existing analysis of 
the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum presents a picture of various groups which are 
divided into dominant (the included) and the dominated (those who are excluded) 
according to various configurations of gender, class, migration status, ethnicity and race. 
Calls for ‘inclusion’ are presented always via appeals for the inclusion of a coherent 
subject (‘immigrants’, ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘migrant m(Others)’) in the last instance. In 
so doing subjectivity is conceptualized in a similar manner to that of how sovereign 
political community is conceived; as having fluid margins, but also edges which can be 
filled. For example, appeals to a common humanity and the need to treat those who live 
in Ireland equally reproduces the idea that people (as humans) share something in 
common, such as is expressed in a nation conceptualized as a territorialized entity with 
(not unproblematic but nonetheless) calculable boundaries demarcating inside from 
outside. The conception of space presented here – insofar as it is presumed to stay the 
same whether the focus is small or large scale – is absolute, infinite but most importantly, 
homogenous.   
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This idea of space as existing objectively and independently of its physical 
content is one which is accepted as obvious in most Western cultures insofar as this in 
keeping with immediate sensory experience.60 However, there are examples of other 
cultures where this has been problematized – for example, in Australian Aboriginal 
culture much of what is understood as ‘reality’ or ‘the world’ is mediated through extra-
sensory experience known as ‘dreamtime’.61  Furthermore, within Western culture itself 
the primacy of immediate sensory experience has been challenged by the alternative 
understandings of the non-sensory world of subatomic particles. As Edkins points out, 
absolute notions of time and space are not always taken for granted in popular culture in 
the West either – evidenced in the ready acceptance of the idea of time travel and parallel 
universes in science fiction.62 Yet, references regarding the need to ‘include’ new guests 
in the nation in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum (re)present the 
possibilities of time associated with citizenship uniquely as progressive, linear and 
unified. We are told about the shift from ‘old’ forms of citizenship and groups of old 
citizens to ‘new’ forms of citizenship and groups of new citizens.63 The emphasis here is 
on becoming entitled to an increasingly broader range of rights through a move from, for 
example, a working visa, to that of long-term residency status, to that eventually of 
‘citizen’. One is presumed here to always become a citizen having not previously been 
one. The increasing emphasis on conceptualizing migrants as ‘the new Irish’ (albeit not 
always unproblematically so) indicates this understanding of a self-evident separation of 
the present (new) from past (old).64 What is assumed is “that objects or things have a 
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basic nature or essence that persists in time.”65 These objects are individuals and groups 
of individuals who have their own language and/or history but come together within “a 
larger, higher or improved political community” to realize their rights and full 
capacities.66 There is little room made for the aforementioned alternative conceptions of 
time outside of linear progressive time which are recognized both within certain realms 
of (contemporary as opposed to classical) ‘scientific’ Western culture, as well as in other 
cultures.  
The point is that despite their critical nature, the attempts made by the existing 
analysis of the Citizenship Referendum to deconstruct ‘Irishness’ and its association with 
the idea of an originary identity, through the alternative emphasis on ‘guest’ versus ‘host’ 
or ‘migrant m(other)’ versus ‘Irish mother’, can be seen nonetheless to reinforce the idea 
itself of how we are supposed to (continue to) think about the relationship between 
immigration and what it means to be(come) a citizen. This is the idea that we must think 
this relationship via a specific statist spatial and temporal notion of difference and 
identity: where difference is understood to intersect with, but remains in the last instance, 
spatially external to, and following temporally in the wake of identity. As Angharad 
Closs Stephens points out, the emphasis on a shift from the importance of a demos (the 
assumption of the privilege of sovereignty in a bounded space) to an ethnos (the 
assumption of the privilege of sovereignty in time), continues to assume “that political 
life should follow a distinct journey” across uniform, infinite time and immutable and 
qualitatively constant space.67 In existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum, as elsewhere where a similar type of critical response is applied, this 
journey remains, apparently, the only option.  
 
State Time, State Space  
In order to understand why a particular conception of time and space can be said to 
specifically privilege the narrative of the autonomous state (modern nation), we need to 
consider again the shift – outlined in chapter one through the work of R.B.J. Walker – 
from a medieval hierarchical framing, to a modern territorial framing of sovereignty in 
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early-modern Europe. The claim which is made is that the modern concept of subjectivity 
and statehood as a system of selves and states separate from but linked to (and therefore 
existing simultaneously with) other selves and other states, was born at this particular 
moment. “This was the new modern world of spatial separations, of subjects separated 
from objects, of men separated from nature.”68 The shift identified is one from an 
emphasis on hierarchical exclusions and the understanding that past, present and future 
come together in an “instantaneous present”69 to a world of spatial exclusions and 
temporal progressions associated with a broader unifying trend of Descartes’ philosophy, 
Newton’s physics and Mercator’s map.70 The linking of events temporally and causally is 
understood to have replaced the existing trend of linking events “by reference to divine 
providence” (Messianic time).71 What is emphasized here is the shift, in other words, 
from the framing of sovereignty (what politics can be) in terms of Messianic time and 
hierarchical space to that of “homogenous empty time…measured by clock and calendar” 
and territorial space characterized by spatial partition.72 What is argued is that it is in this 
shift that we see the importance of a particular conception of space and time associated 
with the modern nation-state as that which embodies the spatial and temporal conditions 
for ‘modern’ politics. This is a conception of space and time necessary for our 
understanding of the modern nation as an ‘imagined community’ conceptualized as a 
sovereign body spatially separated but existing in parallel (co-existing) with and along 
side other nations.73 As Benedict Anderson points out, it defines our understanding of 
subjectivity in terms of ‘individuality’ insofar as it defines this in terms of persons and 
groups of persons existing in parallel with and alongside each other across nations.  
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The importance of a particular understanding of space (as ‘territory’) associated 
with statist politics has been explored by Stuart Elden who demonstrates how this 
(re)produces a very particular conception of space as something which can be “owned, 
distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled.”74 Elden discusses in detail how 
this understanding has been instrumental in the construction of ‘population’ “as the object 
of political rule.”75 He emphasizes the importance of understanding how politics and 
political possibility more generally has become and remained associated in dominant 
accounts with “what is learnable, what is perceivable, the basis for later understanding of 
the mathematical”.76 Michael Shapiro discusses elsewhere the importance not only of 
space (territorial control) but also of temporal continuity (narrative history) of this 
understanding of politics.77 He emphasizes the continuities between the use of historical 
trajectory to testify to the collective coherence of the nation as made up of one particular 
‘people’, and the use of this to testify to the collective coherence of the nation as made up 
of various particular ‘peoples’.78 Shapiro’s work here highlights the importance of 
Walker’s insistence that it is by virtue of the linking together of modern space, modern 
time and modern identity in the image of the modern territorial state that a very specific 
understanding of ‘political’ subjectivity has been conceptualized as ‘truth’.79   
Benedict Anderson considers two types of pre-modern (read: non-statist) 
space/time/identity configurations. These are the religious community and the dynastic 
realm. He points out that in the religious community “social groups were centripetal and 
hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal.”80 Instead of a specific 
language associated with a particular territory which in turn could be traced back to 
particular identities, there were many different languages spoken in conjunction with 
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Latin (which was taken as the sign by all). Language as such did not distinguish between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘now’ and ‘then’ as it does today in statist political 
communities but “[t]he bilingual intelligentsia, by mediating between vernacular and 
Latin, mediated between earth and heaven”.81 In the dynastic realm Anderson points out 
that there were similarly no borders in the modern sense which could be clearly 
‘mapped’. Instead, populations were conceptualized as porous, discontinuous and 
therefore indistinct. Unlike in the modern statist discourse where people are differentiated 
vis-à-vis the state and therefore divisible from politics and each other as ‘individuals’, in 
both the religious and the dynastic realms people were differentiated only by their status 
under God (as the divine) and under King (as he who embodied divinity).  
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all examples of alternative modes 
of resolving the time/space/identity configuration can be confined to historical or ‘pre-
modern’ examples. This is insofar as it would reaffirm the supposed common sense of 
linear time (a clearly defined distinction between past, present and future) and ignore the 
manner in which modern and pre-modern configurations interact with each other in the 
present. The example I would like to take is that of Australian Aboriginal culture which is 
both pre-modern and modern (if not also post-modern) given that it is recognized as one 
of the oldest surviving cultures in the world today.82 It intersects with Western culture 
norms, as opposed to lying entirely outside of modernity. For example, the unity between 
humans, plants and animals which Australian Aboriginal culture espouses is not 
dissimilar to the emphasis on the interdependency of ecological systems as expressed in 
‘modern’ post Enlightenment environmental sciences.  
A key concept of Australian Aboriginal culture is that aboriginals and the land 
that surrounds them are one; as a people they are defined by their environment. This 
means that they and their thoughts cannot be separated from the environment in the way 
that mind and matter are understood as distinct in Western Enlightenment thinking, but 
the mind is rather seen as inextricably bound up in the possibility of the environment 
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itself. The notion of ‘dreamtime’ (or ‘the Dreaming’) is used to try to capture this 
relationship in aboriginal culture between consciousness, dream and outer reality and the 
manner in which the former is seen to produce the latter – to ‘dream’ it into existence.83 
As Penny Tripcony tries to explain, dreamtime is the process through which “the spiritual 
and political identities of groups and individuals are formed.”84 Unlike the way in which 
dreaming is understood in secular society dreamtime is not confined to sleep nor should it 
be understood as that which merely invokes something past in Aboriginal culture. Rather 
as Wildman and Blomeley discuss  
Aborigine’s undertaking present day walkabouts are, in effect, dreamtending their 
collective dream (their myth) as they re-trace the mythic pathways of their Dreamtime 
ancestors. In their waking state they are the dreaming of their ancestors. In turn, the 
Dreaming of the present day Aboriginal peoples becomes the waking state of their 
ancestors.85  
 
Reality is understood here, in other words, as enfolding in moments between 
consciousness and outer reality following the seasons, rather than in terms of linear 
progressive time. Through the Dreaming, aboriginal history becomes that which is 
defined in the future (yet to come – dreamtime as ‘tomorrowtime’) at the same time as 
the idea of ‘future’ folds back on itself to become present reality.86  
Through the notion of ‘dreamtime’, Australian Aboriginal culture can be seen to 
present a very different configuration of time, space and identity than is normally taken 
for granted in western secular cultures where statist (and therefore classical scientific) 
political imaginary prevails. This is insofar as it does not recognize the notion of 
environment (and accordingly ‘self’) as blocks of absolute space “hemmed in by 
frontiers: but rather as an interlocking network of ‘lines’ or ‘ways through’.”87 Instead of 
frontiers which demarcate different spaces, there are stops and “since each was the work 
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of a different ancestor, there…[is] no way of linking them sideways to form a modern 
political frontier.”88 Given the highly relational understanding of space (as ‘environment’ 
rather than ‘territory’ and therefore as that which defines what it is to be human rather 
than that which exists for/in relation to ‘humans’) and time (as cyclical as opposed to 
linear), the understanding of political self which is presented is one which defies 
calculation and clear distinction. It runs into concepts such as ‘other’, ‘absence’, ‘dead’, 
‘environment’, ‘animal’, ‘outside’, ‘difference’. These are concepts against which 
political self is normally juxtaposed when conceptualized vis-à-vis state sovereignty.  
This all indicates that starting with how citizenship is regulated first and foremost 
by the state is not a ‘natural’ (or, the only realistic) starting point as advocated in existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. It is one which requires ignoring the 
interruptions into the dominant conception of ‘politics’ as that which has come to be 
understood as something that can always be traced back to state sovereignty and to the 
image of the political subject as a sovereign autonomous citizen-subject. The examples of 
religious community, dynastic realm and Australian Aboriginal culture confirms that the 
sovereign regulative idea of what a boundary must be in relation to the question of the 
politics of citizenship is one instead which, precisely in light of these interruptions, must 
be constantly reproduced, if it is to be maintained. This in turn begs the question as to 
whether those attempting to respond to the need to rethink citizenship as a result of 
migration are actually seeking to engage in novel ways with the existing statist regulative 
ideal of politics and understand how it has changed as a result of migration, or simply 
“working within a particular account of what and where [we have already been told] the 
political must be”.89 As Walker points out, the former involves specifically 
problematizing (as opposed to moving backwards and forwards between) how state 
sovereignty is understood to always already respond to claims about the possibilities for 
political community and identity in terms of universalism and particularism, inside and 
outside, identity and difference.  
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Interrupting/Interrupted Sovereign Politics 
In their appraisal of what they refer to as “the scholarly discussions” surrounding the 
2004 Citizenship Referendum, Maguire and Cassidy conclude that these are “transfixed 
by the state…[and] the problematic assumption that the state must be accorded a central 
role in research”.90 What is missing, Maguire and Cassidy insist, is an appreciation of, 
and an ability to theorize “the configurations of space, power and knowledge that run 
through and beyond the nation-state and manifest themselves in citizenship.”91 In 
stressing this, they point to alternative lines of investigation which might be pursued by 
contemporary scholarship on migration in Ireland. They indicate that there is a need to 
consider work by those who focus on systems and processes which operate through new 
decentralized and highly fragmented forms of othering, as opposed to through new 
decentralized-centralized (i.e. sovereign state-orientated) forms of othering, such as 
gendered and racialized nationalisms.92  
Aihwa Ong is someone who has specifically focused on how the management of 
migration can be understood as a highly fragmented decentralized effect of neoliberal 
political rationality, rather than a dominant centralized statist strategy. I suggest that her 
work therefore presents an interesting comparison with existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum of the type suggested by Maguire and Cassidy. Existing analysis 
of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, as already discussed, can be shown to have 
problematized the idea that the state has a monopoly on understandings of political 
belonging. However, it does not challenge the principle of state sovereignty and the 
manner in which it also tells us where political subjectivity is to be found anew: in “the 
centered space of the territorial state...[and] the mediation of differences…within the 
[temporally] unified apparatus of the national political community.”93 If we accept that 
linear progressive time and absolute space should be viewed as conditions of the 
possibility of sovereign power, we begin to recognize that approaches which don’t 
challenge this thereby implicitly accept this core ordering principle of contemporary 
sovereign citizenship. Yet, Ong does not take for granted a conception of citizenship 
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which is defined in terms of a relationship between ‘state’ and ‘individual’. She does not 
therefore focus on the trajectory of national identities across different territories and 
histories which eventually come together as national political communities. Instead, 
Ong’s work focuses on the processes through which forms of belonging and their 
regulation are enabled and articulated through competing versions of ‘politics’. She 
considers how these “are integrated at the level of the state” and work through the state 
but often by way of non-statist (non-centralized) means such as global capitalism.94 
Ong’s work specifically considers forms of belonging which implicate the 
inhabitants of Asia and which result in highly intricate global relationships in and across 
mobile (as opposed to sovereign) bodies and territories.95 One of the places which Ong 
notes is especially implicated in the flows of migrant labour from Asia is that of 
California. Here she notes the very different migrant streams travelling to and from this 
one site: Taiwanese engineers, Indian technomigrants, Chinese waiters, Hispanic janitors 
and Southeast Asian electronic workers. Within California, Ong takes the example of 
Silicon Valley to explore different spaces of governability which have been given 
intelligibility through neoliberal rationalities in California. She emphasizes above all the 
situation of highly differently regulated mobile bodies and flexible subjects as the 
different types of ‘spaces’ of citizenship which are (re)produced within and across 
various migrant national streams. She does so by highlighting the different experiences 
within as well as across the highly skilled (linked to Taiwanese and Indian national 
streams) and lesser skilled (linked to Thai and Vietnamese national streams) labour 
streams. In relation to the former she points, for example, to a system of labour 
contracting (body-shops) which results in employers retaining the visas of many highly 
skilled workers who are then left vulnerable to exploitation.96 In relation to the latter, Ong 
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alternatively points to the reality of coethnic bosses in electronic factories who 
themselves often exist very comfortably as business migrants in contrast to the poor 
unskilled Southeast Asian immigrants whom they employ. Ong also talks briefly, finally, 
about the excluded status of African-American populations living in inner-city California 
as a (former) migrant group also left out of the information and communication structures 
which flourish in Silicon Valley. She points out that this group loses out to immigrant 
ethnic networks (which are often better organized) when it comes to successfully 
applying for the less-skilled jobs which both groups compete for in the high-tech 
industries.  
 Here Ong emphasizes the importance of understanding how you can have one 
‘place’ both in California and in Asia but many different ‘spaces’ of citizen-subject; how 
you can have one narrative history (the historical trajectory of the USA) but many 
competing counter-memories through which subjects make claims as ‘citizens’, none of 
which are any less “critical to sustaining the quality of life in California”.97 Unlike others 
who take the logic of space as their starting point and explore how these differ (for 
example, contrasting the global city with the nation-state), Ong points to the need to 
disassociate understandings of the characteristics of what is going on – for example, the 
reduction in conceptions of space and the speeding up of time identified as 
‘globalization’ – from understanding that this must be going on in a particular type of 
space (a sovereign territory and/or body). She points out that global interactions are not 
simply predetermined by a given geography but that “particular global assemblages of 
technical, political, social and ethical relationships extract and give intelligibility to new 
spaces” as sovereign or as other-than-sovereign and that this often happens within the 
same place.98  
Ong’s work here not only emphasizes the fractured spaces of governance within 
Silicon Valley regarding claims to political subjectivity, however. It also emphasizes the 
various fractured temporal coherency of these spaces. In other words, given the instability 
in citizenship and sovereignty resulting from the vast array of cross-cutting and 
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contradictory alignments among government, capital and ideal citizen-subjects in Silicon 
Valley, she paints a picture of a system which also lacks the basis for a coherent image of 
a trajectory of national identities across different territories and histories which 
eventually come together as a people or a series of peoples within a national political 
community. Instead, the neoliberal practices explored by her and the highly flexible 
modes of subjectivity which they produce in the form of cross-cutting and multi-layering 
migrant groups and the identities these sustain, interrupt the linear narrative of time (what 
Shapiro calls ‘national time’). It is precisely this which remains untouched in existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum.  
Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum tells the story (albeit 
in terms of highly internally differentiated groups) of ‘Irish’ versus ‘migrant’ and the 
journey of both towards a more progressive, universal politics and broadened political 
community. In doing so it (re)produces an understanding of citizenship in terms of 
(absolute) spaces of inclusion and exclusion and sovereign bodies which inhabit these 
spaces within particular historical trajectories of continuous and progressive time – a shift 
from older, more exclusive, ‘particular’ conceptions of citizenship to newer, more 
inclusive, ‘universal’ conceptions of citizenship. In contrast to this, the picture Ong paints 
is one which emphasizes breaks, change, disruption, unpredictability and upheaval. 
Instead of shared understandings of authority clearly defined in terms of dominant and 
dominated groups, the result is a form of political community and identity which is based 
on multiple fragments and linkages which make impossible the notion of identity 
coherence within the idea of a particular sovereign space which exists vis-à-vis other 
sovereign spaces – for example, of an older ‘Irish’ identity as distinct from a newer 
‘African’ identity – which are then brought together (as Irish-African or African-Irish). 
The spaces which Ong presents in Silicon Valley do not ‘add up’ in the way that an 
understanding of politics as calculative would suggest they should. Indian 
technomigrants, Vietnamese factory workers and inner-city African-American 
populations rather “encounter one another, mix with one another, alter one another, 
reconfigure one another.”99 In so doing what is undermined is the spatial distinction and 
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temporal sequence through which these groups were presumed to have emerged in the 
first place. There is no longer an emphasis on different types of sovereign subjects 
defined according to ethnic origin (migrant and black versus Irish and white) as ‘citizen’ 
or as ‘non-citizen’, as is the case with the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, and thus on 
racialized continuities in time and space. Instead, in Silicon Valley you have an emphasis 
on the constitution of different citizen-subjects within similar (ethnic, gendered, religious) 
groups and across long-term (marginalized African Americans), medium term (migrant 
residents) and short-term (temporary migrant) citizenship status. This results in 
undermining the notion of continuity given that past, present and future are collapsed into 
the immediate present where all possible combinations of particularism and universalism 
are instantaneously (im)possible. Whether American citizen from birth, a long-term 
resident, a recent arrival or an illegal migrant, the end result is a supplementary space 
involving all that defies calculation or accumulation.100 As Ong herself highlights: by 
pinpointing “the permutations of citizenship and cosmopolitan advantage for different 
streams of migrants”, what is shown is “that the migrant, the nonwhite, and the female 
refugee cannot be represented by a single or imposed language of political power.”101  
By looking at how political subjectivity is defined through interaction with the 
rationality of market flexibility rather than vis-à-vis the state, Ong’s work emphasizes the 
need to understand how migration results in undermining the dominant conception of 
‘politics’ as something that can be traced back to state sovereignty (with the 
corresponding image of a sovereign autonomous subject) and to the idea of a necessary 
centralized basis of political power. As opposed to ‘sovereign’ citizenship, what is 
highlighted is the alternative subject-citizen space of fragmented (‘splintering’ and/or 
‘flexible’) political subjectivity. The result is that we are forced to confront the difficulty 
of always thinking in terms of sovereign marginalized subjects (‘individuals’ or groups 
thereof) when instead faced with the image of the “uneasy coexistence of subjects who 
live in overlapping but different temporal traces”102 of past struggles, present concerns 
and future aspirations.  
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Unlike the existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum which has been 
shown to successfully reproduce the narrative of the autonomous state, Ong’s work 
emphasizes the impossibility of always containing the expression of temporality within 
spatial coordinates. It indicates how migration has contributed to the reconfiguring of 
what politics can be in terms of what have become understood as ‘territory’ and ‘bodies’, 
as opposed to simply reconfiguring the question of politics through the understanding of 
already existing sovereign territory and bodies. Unlike analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum, Ong’s work does not reemphasize the need to think how new 
forms of marginalization (for example, biopolitics) work through the state and manifest 
themselves as state racism and/or statist neoliberal exclusions, thereby reaffirming the 
primacy of sovereign spatio-temporal configurations. Instead it allows us to rethink how 
we have come to presume time and space must work by rethinking how we assume that 
the state is the primary basis of politics in the first place. The result is to allow us to begin 
to engage with the different ways in which people are both marginalized from, and 
bonded with each other (and therefore exist as political subjects) outside an 
inclusion/exclusion (sovereign) framework.  
The notion of ‘trace’ is presented in the final section of this chapter as a way of 
conceptualizing the type of political subjectivity which is embodied in references to such 
relative and contingent spacetime of ‘being’. What I will argue is that being citizen itself 
can be reconceptualized here as ‘trace’ in order to capture how it is increasingly based 
upon disruptions and discontinuities, figuring in indeterminate times and spaces as 
opposed to always exclusively extended in time across the absolute space of modern 
subjectivity, as is normally presumed. This section reiterates the importance of an 
awareness of the constant need for reproduction of the sovereign regulative idea of what a 
boundary must be. I argue that this awareness allows us to see those instances in which 
the boundaries through which citizenship is theorized are recognized (if only fleetingly) 
as sites and moments in which a great deal happens to produce and reproduce specific 
forms of political life as ‘trace’ rather than simply “as distinct entities distinguished by 
lines that do nothing at all.”103  
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Retheorizing Citizenship as Contingent Trace Rather than Absolute Space  
The previous section considered how the time and space of ‘politics’ is theorized in a 
very specific way when the state is accorded a central role in research in comparison to 
when this is not the case. What was pointed out was that attempts to rethink the politics 
of citizenship vis-à-vis the former results in a privileging of the notion of political 
subjectivity as that which exists in a bounded space within the idea of a national 
communal time. Where the state is accorded a central role in research, it was shown that 
the emphasis is on a series of groups coming together across time and within particular 
spaces to form a broader conception of citizenship. Here the notion of an us/them dualism 
therefore continues to makes sense, albeit in a neutralized rather than antagonistic sense. 
In contrast to this, where the state is not accorded a central role in research, it was shown 
that the conception of an us/them dualism no longer necessarily makes sense (whether 
neutral or not) insofar as a conception is introduced of citizenship and being ‘citizen’ 
which is conceived of in terms of encounters and confrontations which undermine the 
possibility of temporal progression within bounded co-existing spaces.  
The result is two understandings of politics – the first which (unproblematically) 
assumes that this is associated with identifying boundaries as lines drawn between inside 
and outside, self and other, past and present etc. and mobilities which can be anticipated; 
the second which instead specifically questions the manner in which ‘politics’ and 
‘political subjectivity’ has been conceptualized vis-à-vis an ability to envisage boundaries 
as lines drawn in time and space in a linear fashion. In keeping with the latter 
understanding of politics, the aim of this final section is to highlight moments in existing 
analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum where the inevitability of being able to 
draw lines in respect of the question of citizenship can be seen to be problematic and to 
think through these moments as opposed to ignoring them (as is currently done in 
existing analysis, by making sense of them in terms of statist conceptions of political 
community and identity). I consider the implications of thinking through as opposed to 
ignoring these moments on the understanding that to do so is to actually contest and not 
to simply reframe (thus maintaining) dominant accounts of ‘political’ belonging. The 
result, as I discuss, is the need to reconceptualize how processes of migration can be 
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shown to impact not only ‘who’ gets to qualify as citizen, and therefore the manner in 
which certain lines are drawn and redrawn, but also the terms themselves according to 
which political belonging (being ‘citizen’) itself can be negotiated. I argue that the notion 
of ‘trace’ provides a way of conceiving of the alternative notions of political belonging 
which are being experienced here. This is insofar as it recognizes how they implicate 
alternative notions of political belonging which are based on the recognition of political 
subjectivity as that which also manifests as contingent spaces and fragmented 
temporalities (traces), rather than only as absolute spaces within linear history.  
 
Politics Of (as Opposed To ‘On’) the Line  
R.B.J. Walker suggests that the association of politics with processes of drawing lines can 
be traced back to the understanding that “Euclidean lines have zero width. Hobbesian 
sovereigns are constituted in a single instant. Hobbesian sovereign authorizations are 
absolute.”104 He points out that in early-modern Europe Cartesian lines drawn from Man 
to the world came to indicate the relationship between Man and the world and the myriad 
of ways this can be negotiated but that the drawing of these lines became insignificant in 
and of itself. The issue is that at some point the problem of origins and limits became 
indistinguishable from that of the regulative principle of state sovereignty and the need 
which this invoked to think in terms of an ability to draw lines between us and them, 
outside and inside, particularism and universalism, the past and the present.  
This process arguably has to be understood, however, in light of the very tangible 
nature of the reality which is invoked here through references to political life as 
something which exists vis-à-vis particular points, lines and planes connecting ‘us’ to 
‘them’, ‘inside’ to ‘outside’, ‘identity’ to ‘difference’, the ‘present’ to the ‘future’. It is a 
particular understanding which corresponds to embodiment itself which has, for the most 
part, tangible borders, a beginning and an end point.105 Attempts to problematize the 
assumption that conceptions of time and space are exhausted by Euclidean geometry and 
Newtonian physics and the resulting understandings of political possibility articulated via 
geometry and measurable distance as well as sequential time, face a more difficult task in 
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this regard insofar as they seek to move beyond immediate visual and tactual experiences. 
As Čapek points out, however, this is not an impossible task.  Rather, he suggests that we 
need to keep in mind the following:  
What will eventually emerge will certainly not be a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ in the old 
classical and pictoral sense, but this does not mean that the resulting view must 
necessarily be divorced from every aspect of our immediate experience, provided that the 
term ‘experience’ is understood more broadly than in its usual narrow sensualistic, and 
more specifically visual-tactile sense.106 
 
With this in mind, I would like to point out that psychoanalysis is an example of 
an area of considerable credibility in which the notion of experience as other than 
immediately sensualistic or visually-tactile has been explored. Here, the idea itself of the 
subconscious is not something which can be either seen or touched yet, most people 
agree (although to varying degrees) on its significance. In other words, it is not an idea 
which can be easily dismissed due simply to its intangible quality. Rather, in line with 
Čapek’s comment above, it is something whose understanding has required a rethinking 
of the idea of what experience can consist of beyond the immediately visual and tactile. 
Furthermore, while psychoanalysis’ contribution to politics (and in particular 
international politics) might still be questioned given the public/private distinction 
through which the dominant understanding of politics has been theorized, what has been 
emphasized in this thesis is the manner in which the work of Julia Kristeva has 
successfully introduced ‘intimacy’, as implied in the notion of the subconscious, into the 
political realm through the issue of migration.107  
What has been emphasized is how Kristeva’s work has introduced an element of 
the intangibility inherent in the notion of the unconscious and intimacy – which is 
normally understood as that which distinguishes itself ‘from’ politics – into how political 
subjectivity itself (being ‘citizen’) can be conceptualized in relation to migration. Most 
significantly, this has not, however, been based on reinforcing the initial distinction 
between (and thus reinforcing the notion of having to define subjectivity as a resolution 
of) the particular and intimate (citizenship) on one hand and the universal and public 
(humanity) on the other. Instead, I have highlighted that what Kristeva’s work explores is 
the incompleteness of the subject and its fragmented being before lines are drawn along 
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hierarchies of class, status, social order and territorial place and it becomes possible to 
speak authoritatively about how particular groups have been constructed as belonging or 
as not belonging, as ‘here’ or as ‘there’. As Jabri points out, “the Kristevan subject is 
always at once both self and other, self and society, self and history, the historical and 
historicized self”.108 This is a complex subject whose articulations of identity precisely 
cannot be understood via the idea of lines extended in time and across the space of 
universalism and particularism because the subject can no longer be reduced to a singular 
representation of place and time in this manner.109 The main contribution of Kristeva’s 
work as such, I would like to point out, is that she not only emphasizes the shifting 
location of the borderline as a result of migration, from the geographic boundaries of the 
state to society within and in turn to the self, but that in so doing, the lines which are 
traversed in the making of this move become significant in themselves as sites of political 
(im)possibility. In other words, political subjectivity is reconceptualized, not simply 
across borders or boundaries, but in terms of how such boundaries are articulated 
temporally and spatially as processes of subjectivity.110 This is to point out that Kristeva’s 
contribution is that she provides us with a way of thinking the politics of the line itself.   
 
Not on any Map and Without a Place in History111   
Through Kristeva’s work we thus come to the question of the importance in discussions 
about citizenship of the need to consider not only where lines have become problematic 
in terms of ‘where’ they should be drawn (between ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
between ‘nation’ ‘self’) but also how they are understood in themselves to enable 
particular types of subjectivity. In order to consider this question I would like to focus on 
the instances where particular lines have not been taken as insignificant in themselves in 
the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. These moments 
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should not be understood as mutually exclusive from those instances in which lines have 
been taken as mere limits in and of themselves which need to be either obeyed or 
transcended, but as moments which interweave with these other instances. The former 
moments open up different sites of engagement with political life which are then closed 
down by the latter moments when these are made sense of in terms of the already 
identified need to think about political possibility via the understanding of time as 
containable within spatial coordinates. I suggest that what these former moments indicate 
is an important challenge to the presumption that political being can only be ensured 
through a place on the map of a history of sovereign states as bounded spaces which exist 
in linear then-this-happened-next time. Whether or not this challenge is taken up or 
acknowledged is another story. As discussed at length already, in existing analysis of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum this has not tended to be the case. Yet, the point is 
that in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum it is possible to 
see important moments in which there were serious doubts raised about the ability to 
think in terms of spatio-temporal coordinates which are analogous to lines on a map of 
history running from past, to present, to future within bounded spaces.  
The first example which I would like to take is the frequent use of the general 
category ‘children’ by the Children’s Rights Alliance when calling for a No vote in the 
2004 Citizenship Referendum. What is noteworthy is that this category is not 
differentiated here by immigrant status and thus according to the categories of statist 
political discourse but only in terms of reference to “some children” as opposed to “other 
children”112 The Children’s Rights Alliance was one of the bodies which was central to 
the referendum discussions and its use over and again of the general term ‘children’ in 
respect of the question as to who was affected by the referendum proposal indicates that 
modern political spatio-temporal imagery was not always immediately understood in 
these discussions as particularly useful, even as something which needed to be 
‘challenged’. Although press releases by the Children’s Rights Alliance do refer in 
passing to “non-citizen children”,113 the more general call for a No vote in the 
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referendum by the Children Rights Alliance which appeal specifically to the “the rights 
of children”114 indicates the doubts raised about the value of always differentiating this in 
terms of modern subjectivity; of differentiating in terms of a particular sub group such as 
‘non-Irish’ or ‘non-Irish national’ on one hand, and/or something which necessarily 
transcends this such as ‘human’, on the other. ‘Children’ hangs here as something which 
is instead potentially defined in the tension between these categories, not defined across a 
line merely distinguishing between ‘citizen’ and ‘human’ but as a line which is also a 
boundary in itself.  
Adding to this problematizing of the seemingly natural association with the 
(continuing) ability to draw coherent lines, is the issue raised elsewhere in referendum 
discussions regarding the contradiction arising out of the amendment of article 9 of 
Bunreacht na hÉireann – which states that birthright citizenship will be conditional – as 
against that of the existing Article 2 (remaining unamended) which confirms the 
unconditional right of nationality to those born in Ireland. This is something which Ronit 
Lentin points out “created a bizarre new category of people who remain ‘part of the Irish 
nation’ (article 2 of the Constitution…), yet have their citizenship removed, deemed to 
have insufficient connection to the island of Ireland to qualify for citizenship.”115 This 
emphasis on the resulting two (seemingly contradictory) types of children in Ireland – 
those who are Irish nationals by birth but not Irish citizens and those who are both Irish 
nationals and Irish citizens by birth – is echoed by the ICCL in their briefing document 
(point 1.4) on the referendum proposal.116 Unfortunately, both Lentin and the ICCL 
interpret this contradiction as an attempt by the Irish state (Lentin referring to it as “an act 
of political brutality”117) to impose bloodline criteria for citizenship. In so doing, they 
move swiftly from that of focusing on the category of ‘children’ as a site in itself where 
this contradiction plays out to that of thinking about how it can be understood as a 
category which extends across already existing (pre)given statist limits between identity 
(inside) and difference (outside), the immediate present and the (potential) future.  
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Not everyone is so quick to make this move however. A report commissioned by 
the non-governmental organization network ‘Integrating Ireland’ to explore the 
implications of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum can be seen to have emphasized that the 
category ‘children’ can be understood as the location of the production of two further 
contradictory categories of citizen children (those who can be deported and those who 
can not), as well as the previously mentioned initial two contradictory categories of 
national child (citizen-national and non-citizen national).118 Unlike previously, this 
contradiction is not immediately plugged back into existing sovereign political horizons 
and understandings regarding how belonging is defined in terms of ‘migrant’ and ‘non-
migrant’. Instead there ensues a discussion about the difficulty of conceptualizing 
‘children’ as a distinct entity which can be understood as existing across, as opposed to 
redefining, these lines themselves and the idea itself of the type of boundary that is 
possible here. What is alluded to is the manner in which neither category of possible 
deportation status is sufficient to capture how ‘children’ refers to those citizens whose 
“country of origin” is Ireland (and not automatically elsewhere) regardless of their other 
lack of entitlements.119 Bryan Fanning perhaps best captures the difficulty of the 
challenge presented here, describing it as “the conundrum of the Irish-born non-Irish 
child…a perverse twenty-first century civics lesson.”120  
A different report commissioned by CADIC can similarly be seen to highlight 
again this difficulty, albeit briefly. It highlights it through a case in the High Court and 
attempts in this case to define “the rights and entitlements of the Irish child” in terms of 
supposed differences between the rights of ‘non-migrants’ to live in Ireland 
unconditionally in comparison to that of ‘migrants’.121 The report points out that contrary 
to normal procedure in this area where an individual person is either dictated by the rules 
of one or other of these statuses, in this case the Irish High Court ruled that IBC/05 status 
could not be denied given a migrant parents’ inability to prove continuous residence in 
the state (despite this being the rule for ‘migrants’). This was on the basis that “it failed to 
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consider the rights and entitlements of the Irish child”.122 Once again what is implied is 
that ‘children’ has become a site which is being fought over here rather than an entity 
which exists across lines. It is envisaged as that which has become a boundary in itself, 
and which is productive of new interpretations of various categories pertaining to notions 
of belonging and the political possibilities associated therewith.  
On their own, none of these moments are necessarily sufficient to force us to 
rethink our understanding of what it is to be ‘citizen’, given that at best they involve only 
short-lived reflections upon, and mild disruptions into, the sovereign regulative idea itself 
of what a boundary must be in relation to the question of the politics of citizenship. 
However, the point being made in this chapter is that they, and others like them, indicate 
that conceptions of political subjectivity are not always exhausted by sovereign politics in 
which boundaries exist as lines of zero width across which categories such as ‘migrant’ 
and ‘non-migrant’, ‘national’ and ‘non-national’ move. What is emphasized instead is 
that they present the potential to rethink being ‘citizen’ (political subjectivity) as that 
which is also produced in boundaries as spaces of tension.  
Attempts thus far to focus specifically on how these disruptions might be 
significant in their own right in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum call for more (not less) sovereign calculative politics. A three year fully 
funded project by the Irish Council of Humanities and Social Studies (IRCHSS) entitled 
‘Immigration and Integration in the Republic of Ireland’ illustrates this. Ignoring the 
challenge which these disruptions present to the dominant statist conception of politics, 
the aforementioned ruptures and inconsistencies have rather been identified as indicating 
“an urgent need to promote a longitudinal analysis of census and survey data capable of 
tracking the distinct needs and circumstances of diverse immigrant communities.”123 
What this ignores however, is the manner in which these moments present (or, at the very 
least indicate) a politics which does not conceptualize ‘population’ (subjectivity) and its 
experiences in terms of how they can be quantified, qualified, disaggregated, measured 
and calculated: rather these are moments which precisely escape calculation. Calling for 
                                                 
122
 Referring to the decision of Bode and Ors. v. the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] 
No. 102 J.R. Cited in Integrating Ireland, Looking Forward, Looking Back, p.27 
123
 Fanning, B. and Boyle, N. (2009) Immigration and Integration: The Irish Knowledge Gap, Overview of 
3 year Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) funded project (April 
2008-2011)  
 242 
further statistical information and further disaggregation of existing statistical 
information, the issue has been interpreted here as a “knowledge gap” regarding how 
individual subject-citizens experience citizenship in different ways,124 as opposed to a 
need to interrogate the manner in which such knowledge is produced as political in the 
first place. The presumption that people are self-evidently constituted as ‘political’ first 
and foremost vis-à-vis the state remains unproblematized here.  
While I do not mean to completely dismiss such forms of inquiry in favour of so-
called ‘better’ ones, I would like to point out that in continuing to discuss the relationship 
between citizenship and migration in terms of individuals and groups of individuals 
(“migrant” and “indigenous”125) whose identities unfold across time within particular 
spaces, studies such as this three year IRCHSS study ignore, as opposed to actually 
engaging with, the difficulty of being able to ‘count’ children in this way. In particular, to 
count those who fall into the gaps which result from all the contradictions discussed 
above and who thereby become inhabitants of the line itself which has come to demarcate 
so many subcategories of ‘children’. What these types of studies continue to ignore is 
how the category of ‘children’ in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum often invokes many different conceptions of time which are often not 
contained or containable within, but transcend particular spaces as well as the concept 
itself of absolute space. The example looked at in this chapter and the previous chapter 
has been that of children who are born in Ireland to African citizen parents who – unlike 
their parents who do often look backwards to Africa and forwards to Ireland – embody 
the past that is ‘Africa’ and the future that is ‘Ireland’ in an instantaneous present. They 
look forward and backwards (experience time) across ‘Ireland’ and ‘Africa’ as opposed 
to within these territorial spaces. The argument here therefore is not that the approach 
taken by the aforementioned IRCHSS project is necessarily wrong. Rather I suggest that 
it cannot account for how the possibility for be(com)ing ‘citizen’ for the children of 
migrants plays out in terms other than the highly familiar image of horizontal or 
territorial relations and temporal co-presence between self and other, self and the world, 
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this community and that community. It cannot account for how the possibility of 
becoming ‘citizen’ cannot necessarily be anticipated in advance.  
 
Citizenship as Contingent ‘Trace’  
The alternative, as Bhabha points out, is to seek to understand how “the boundary 
becomes the place from which something begins its presencing in a movement…of the 
beyond”.126 Here we have a moment in which cultural knowledge adds together but 
which cannot be ‘added up’ as it does not take place in sequential time and cannot 
therefore be located vis-à-vis the idea of origin or pre-given causality. It becomes “the 
enemy of the implicit generalization of knowledge or the implicit homogenization of 
experience”.127 Outside of the 2004 Irish Citizenship context, explorations into this new 
supplementary space of ‘being’ as that which begins its presencing in (as opposed to by 
traversing) the boundary can be seen in the work of a small few who have refused to 
ignore the aforementioned potential to rethink being ‘citizen’ vis-à-vis the gaps or 
disruptions into sovereign subjectivity. These are theorists who have sought to emphasize 
the manner in which being ‘citizen’ is remade in these gaps through experiences such as 
those of ‘irregularization’ and/or ‘non-documentation’, as opposed to always through the 
more straightforward processes of jus soli, jus sanguine and naturalization. They have 
sought to demonstrate how this undermines the notion of a coherent ‘self’ which 
corresponds to a solid body always containable “within a unified narrative or bounded 
political community.”128 Theirs is work which indicates that the possibility for 
be(com)ing ‘citizen’ is always already being reconceived outside of absolute space where 
boundaries are understood as insignificant lines in themselves.  
Peter Nyers’ work is exemplary in this regard. One of the ways Nyers considers 
how birthright citizenship is remade in the boundary itself is through discussions about 
‘accidental citizenship’. He explains that “[l]ike the terms ‘citizenship tourists’, ‘instant 
citizens’, or ‘anchor babies’, the phrase ‘accidental citizenship’ is increasingly being 
deployed as a pejorative term to describe the ‘birthright’ citizenship of individuals born 
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on US territory to non-citizen parents.”129 Nyers is interested here in how citizenship 
need not always be revoked per se but is increasingly being “rendered inoperable, or 
irregularized”.130 Focusing on these moments of irregularization, Nyers points to the 
importance of understanding the “disaggregation of citizenship” but not in terms of how 
different sovereign subjects (for example, migrant, non-migrant) experience citizenship 
in different ways.131 Rather, he focuses on how the differential application of civil, 
political and social rights of citizenship undermines the notion itself of a coherent citizen-
subject who can be reduced either to a politics of exception and control, or alternatively a 
politics of regularity. Nyers insists that the notion of ‘irregularization’ is one which needs 
to be understood in terms of how it destabilizes the distinction between ‘citizen’ and 
‘migrant’ producing new forms of political subjectivity which are traces of both but 
cannot be reduced to either.132  
The type of citizen-subject which Nyers invokes here could arguably be said to be 
further developed in the work of Anne McNevin who has most recently focused on the 
highly contradictory notion of “undocumented citizens” as it is being used in the state of 
California in the USA.133 This notion, as McNevin is quick to point out, is a contradiction 
in terms according to dominant territorially defined accounts of ‘political’ belonging 
where citizenship has come to signify that which precisely differentiates the newcomers 
(migrants) from the existing population (citizens). Nonetheless, McNevin discusses 
several examples (namely student activism, worker cooperatives and parent 
mobilizations) which involve undocumented migrants who are also long-term residents in 
the USA who have made political claims on the communities from which they are 
supposedly excluded (for example, by going to college or setting up their own 
businesses). She considers how these have gone some way towards renegotiating the 
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terms of political association outside of the norms associated with sovereign citizenship. 
The notion of ‘undocumented citizen’ is thus explored here by McNevin as an alternative 
form of political belonging to that associated with the state, which today implicates those 
with ambiguous or insecure forms of immigrant status. McNevin points out that in many 
cases the forms of political subjectivity produced here – for example, that of 
undocumented students who have grown up in the USA and therefore do not 
unambiguously belong elsewhere but nonetheless will graduate from USA universities 
without the right to work in the USA – do not make sense in terms of existing fixed 
territorial identities whether these are trans, intra or supra statist. She points out that they 
need rather to be understood in terms of how they “are incommensurable with the 
national territorial-baggage attached to the language of [sovereign] citizenship.”134 With 
this in mind McNevin demonstrates here how people such as those who are the children 
of migrants should not be thought of as people who have been ‘left out’ of political 
community but as people who contest the grounds for the basis of the clear distinction 
between inside and outside, between illegal and legal, between us and them and between 
now and then, which dominant conceptions of politics rely upon in the first place.135 
As a whole Nyers and McNevin’s work in conjunction with that of Ong’s all 
contrast starkly with that of existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
which continues to think within the understanding of a particular type of politics: this is 
“the politics of drawing lines” and anticipating mobilities between here and there, 
between identity and difference, between us and them.136 Insofar as they specifically 
focus on the manner in which certain people “inhabit the border… of national [as well as 
spatial and temporal] boundaries”,137 they instead facilitate our ability to see how Irish 
citizen children, as those who are neither inside or outside the state and who are neither 
part of its past or present, but who occupy both positions at once, can still be 
conceptualized as ‘citizens’. This is because unlike in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum where the notion of an us/them dualism is merely neutralized, 
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this dualism is collapsed in their work. It is no longer taken for granted that subjectivity 
must be defined in terms of (a universal humanity that transcends or compliments) the 
state, and therefore as coherent and sovereign in time and place. Instead, through an 
exploration of how the question itself of what constitutes ‘the subject’ of politics is 
contested when associated with the children of migrants, they emphasize how it is 
possible (and above all, necessary) to think ‘citizens’ outside this type of (modern) 
subject.  
The result is that we are left with the recognition that needing to bring ‘migrant’ 
and ‘Irish’ together within a more ‘inclusive’ conception of citizenship is no longer the 
only way of thinking about the relationship between migration and what it means to be a 
citizen. Instead, because the notion of ‘citizen’ is reconceptualized as lacking in itself a 
unified basis, the relationship between identity (citizen) and difference (migrant) 
becomes more ambiguous. Citizenship becomes less recognizable in terms of an ability to 
draw lines in the final instance between those outside and those inside the dominant 
imagined community, between ‘migrant’ and ‘non-migrant’, between ‘host’ and 
‘newcomer’, between the past (old Irish) and the present (new Irish). These spaces are no 
longer so easily idealized as solid bodies analogous to the image of the sovereign 
territorial state which exists in linear time moving from the past to the present and back 
again, but rather as often retrospectively produced, highly ambiguous ‘traces’. What is 
replaced is the assumption of the self as a territorial sovereign being which needs to be 
bonded with another, with an understanding of the various ways in which citizenship can 
be thought of as a condition of rupture within the notion of the (coherent) self and within 
(coherent) ‘selves’ across time and space. This in turn results in the articulation and 
rearticulation of various contingent bonds. Here citizenship experienced in terms of these 
spatial and temporal inconsistencies (traces), of presence and absence, is conceptualized 
also as ‘political’ subjectivity. As opposed to needing to consider how the experience of 
citizen children born to migrant parents can be made sense of in relation to existing 
imaginaries of political community which are based on sovereign notions of inclusion 
and exclusion, such ambiguous subjectivities can thus be considered (often for the first 
time) in their own right.  
 
 247 
Conclusion 
 
I…saw a humanity that asks not to be included or excluded from universalism, but 
encourages us to consider different ways to be or to signify. Julia Kristeva138 
 
Existing critical analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum emphasizes the 
challenge which migration poses to dominant conceptions of belonging located in a 
national statist community which assumes a common civic history and culture. In so 
doing it has focused on the question of how migration challenges what it is to be an 
‘Irish’ citizen. This chapter has considered how Julia Kristeva’s work, however, presents 
an alternative type of critical approach to this existing analysis. What has been 
highlighted is how her work attempts to emphasize the impact of migration beyond how 
it merely challenges the modern assumption of the coherence of (trans)national histories 
(Irishness, Africanness, etc.) to how it also challenges the assumption of the coherence of 
‘being’ more generally. What I have argued within this chapter is that in doing so, the 
emphasis shifts from that of ‘where’ lines are redrawn and mobilities re-anticipated in 
respect of the question of citizenship, to that of ‘how’ political belonging (being ‘citizen’) 
itself can be renegotiated in terms of sovereign politics, or in other terms. This indicates 
the importance of theorizing the experiences of those such as citizen-children born to 
migrant parents as those who experience citizenship in the intersections through which 
citizenship is divided into other sub-groupings, rather than through the sub-groupings 
themselves which are presumed to traverse (pre)existing lines in linear fashion.   
Instead of different spaces of citizenship such as ‘old’ and ‘new’, ‘inclusive’ and 
‘exclusive’ – which is to conceive of being ‘citizen’ (matter) as that which exists in time 
and space which act as ‘containers’ or the ‘backdrop’ for social life – the concept of 
citizenship as trace has been introduced here to attempt to capture the alternative 
conception of political subjectivity enabled by the work of Julia Kristeva. For, as Bhabha 
points out, “what is crucial to such a vision….is the belief that we must not merely 
change the narratives of our histories, but transform our sense of what it means to live, to 
be, in other times and different spaces, both human and historical.”139 What is challenged 
in this concept of ‘trace’ is the image of political space as having to be understood as 
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something to be achieved in unified time and extended in space and thus always in terms 
of the oscillation between continuing presence and imminent absence. Through this 
notion we are rather left to imagine ‘citizens’ as a form of subjectivity which can also 
manifest as a cluster of time-space coordinates which are constantly changing within and 
across what is normally conceptualized as the absolute space and horizontal time of 
sovereign political community. It is not my intention to argue that a more robust ontology 
necessarily gives us a better politics. What I do argue, however, is that a more robust 
ontology gives us the ability to see the different ways in which the ‘politics’ of 
citizenship can, and more importantly, is being experienced outside the spatio-temporal 
limits of modernity. 
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Conclusion: 
Repoliticizing the Boundaries of the Citizen-Subject 
 
 
so many stories to tell…such an excess of intertwined lives 
events miracles places rumours, so dense a commingling of the 
improbable and the mundane…I have been a swallower of lives; 
and to know me, just the one of me, you'll have to swallow the 
lot as well. Saleem Sinai1 
 
 
The above observation is made by the main protagonist of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s 
Children who describes himself as mysteriously, yet irrevocably “handcuffed to 
history”.2 Born at the dawn of Indian independence (exactly on the stroke of midnight) 
Saleem Sinai tells the story of how he came to represent the entirety of India and all its 
religious and national diversity within and across (as opposed to in terms of) his unitary 
self. In order to explore the diversity of his being (“all kinds of 
everywhichthing…jumbled up inside”3), Saleem is forced to resist the idea of wholeness 
associated with “[t]he body…homogenous as anything. Indivisible, a one-piece suit, a 
sacred temple if you will”.4 He is forced to resist attempts by others “to bully…[him] 
back into the world of linear narrative, the universe of what-happened-next”.5 Ultimately, 
it is only by hovering “at the apex, above past and present”6 in a body which is born with 
“two heads but you will see only one”7 that he manages to tell the story of the lives of six 
hundred million people bound up inside in one single self. 
This thesis has explored another way in which people are handcuffed to history: 
this time as citizen children born to migrant parents. It has explored how their 
subjectivity is inextricable from, as opposed to merely linked to the diversity of the 
symbolic order. What it has emphasized is how these children similarly need to be 
understood as disjointed rather than coherent presence; as individual selves which contain 
a huge diversity within and across the notion of a coherent ‘I’. As those whose citizen-
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subjectivity cannot therefore be understood merely in terms of the physical and 
imaginative space of the political subject as individual (the one) and/or groups of 
individuals (the many-as-one). What has been argued is that theirs are important stories 
which rather tell of the diversity of ‘being’ which exists outside of a world of linear 
narrative and absolute spatial wholes. This is an understanding of ‘being’ which is 
currently taken for granted as the only basis for ‘political’ possibility in existing analysis 
of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, as well as in much of the critical citizenship 
studies literature more generally. Conceptualizing these alternative experiences which sit 
at the intersection of migration and claims to belonging in terms of ‘trace’ rather than 
absolute space, this thesis underlines the need to recognize the manner in which these 
experiences cannot be made sense of according to existing imaginaries of political 
community and identity which are based on clearly demarcated (sovereign) notions of 
inclusion and exclusion. It highlights how they require instead a rethinking of what 
counts as ‘political’ possibility in respect of citizenship by forcing us to revisit 
(repoliticize) the boundaries of what we have come to know as the citizen-subject and 
how this is being experienced ‘of’ (as well as ‘in’) different times and spaces.  
An ethos of repoliticizing the self as citizen-subject and the manner in which we 
have come to know the citizen-subject as ‘self’, emerges from R.B.J. Walker’s 
perspective on the notion of the constitutive subject of (sovereign) politics. By regarding 
politics and subjectivity as intimately related and emphasizing the manner in which 
political possibility has come to be defined according to a particular understanding of 
being ‘in’ time and space associated with appeals to state sovereignty, Walker argues that 
there is a need to rethink what we have been told citizen-subjectivity can be. He points 
out that political subjectivity needs to be understood in terms of how it has come to be 
associated with a dominant ‘particular versus universal’ framework, and an assumption 
regarding the need to resolve this via the idea of a sovereign self as both ‘citizen’ and 
‘human’.  Existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, as based on this 
‘particular versus universal’ opposition (conceptualized as a clash between conceptions 
of jus soli and jus sanguine) is therefore no longer simply representative of infinite 
possible understandings about what it is to become a citizen, but is rather part of a 
specific framework for thinking about and talking about what it is to ‘be’ (citizen) in the 
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context of how this has already been defined vis-à-vis the modern territorial state. The 
challenge which is supposedly presented in this analysis from universal models of 
citizenship to particular models of citizenship can be qualified as a challenge which 
instead reproduces, in the final instance, the manner in which the possibilities of being 
citizen have been posed since early-modern times in terms of sovereign autonomous 
subjectivity.  
By drawing on R.B.J. Walker’s work, this thesis offers a way of moving beyond 
the existing parameters of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Debate and the framework within 
which the question of political subjectivity in the context of migration has been posed in 
citizenship studies more generally via appeals to state sovereignty. It draws on Walker’s 
work to consider how state sovereignty implicates a particularly modern way of knowing 
and being in relation to the question of citizenship, rather than a necessary starting point 
from which we must begin in order to theorize political subjectivity in respect of this 
referendum and the question of migration more generally. Instead of starting with the 
state as ‘particularism’ and the idea of something beyond (or against) the state as 
‘universalism’, and therefore with existing understandings about how people (citizen-
subjects) are, or are not, included ‘in’ political community according to different patterns 
or combinations of particularism and universalism, this thesis emphasizes the need to 
inquire into the understanding itself that political subjectivity must be conceptualized as 
resolvable in time within a horizontally compartmentalized spatial terrain. It questions the 
assumption more specifically that there is necessarily a sovereign autonomous ‘we’ or ‘I’ 
(whether ‘wo/man’, ‘child’ or ‘migrant’) which exists separate from the boundaries of the 
state in the first place which can be taken as a starting point in discussions about 
citizenship.  
Emphasizing the limits of sovereignty as a particular way of knowing and being 
highlights the constructed nature of the notion of the individual as sovereign autonomous 
presence which exists vis-à-vis the state. This is insofar as individuality is no longer a 
natural state of being that can be pointed to. Instead, the idea of a located authorizing 
presence (an essence which exists ‘in’ time and space) is reconceived as a practice and a 
problem in its own right which constantly needs to be reproduced if it is to be maintained. 
Instead of assuming that subjects always already are individuals who engage in discourse 
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as autonomous selves, which are subsequently culturally circumscribed (as belonging or 
not) as is done in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum, a 
distinction is drawn in this thesis between being a (citizen)subject and being an 
‘individual’. The result is to emphasize how subjectivity has become associated with an 
understanding of ‘being’ as sovereign autonomy through discourse as an object in its own 
right and the manner in which this is ignored in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum. Attempts in this analysis to challenge exclusivity (defined in 
terms of appeals to state sovereignty) with inclusivity (associated with appeals beyond or 
against the statist monopoly on conceptions of community and identity) are shown to be 
limited by their reliance on the idea of subjectivity as which always can be included or 
excluded ‘in’ political community.  
Psychoanalysis, and in particular the work of Julia Kristeva has been presented as 
providing a way of thinking about how the idea of the subject is reworked here as 
inherently bound up in the symbolic or social order, rather than simply engaging ‘in’ it 
according to varying degrees of inclusivity and exclusivity. Kristeva’s work permits us to 
move away from defining the politics of citizenship in terms of the way we draw the lines 
in time and space between us and them, here and there, old and new Irish, selves and 
others. It forces us to rethink the need to associate the politics of citizenship with the 
ability to draw lines in this manner in the first place. Kristeva does so by exploring how 
foreignness is integral to the formation of the self and the possibility of being with others, 
as opposed to that which merely undermines the self and its coherency and/or 
distinguishes the self from the ‘other’. Unlike existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum and the dominant citizenship literature which it draws upon, that 
start with the idea of a sovereign and autonomous (albeit intersubjectively formed) 
subject which holds rights against the state, Kristeva’s work starts with a 
psychoanalytically informed incomplete and fragmented subject: “the subject whose 
present is always co-present with the past, fragments of a recollection brought forth as the 
subject shifts and moves through the interstices of life.”8  
Kristeva presents an alternative notion of ‘being’ which is based on rupture rather 
than unity. It is through her work that this thesis reconceptualizes political subjectivity. It 
                                                 
8
 Jabri, ‘Julia Kristeva’, p.224 
 253 
is no longer defined in terms of, or across, borders or boundaries as lines which are 
presumed simply to exist, but by looking at how processes of subjectivity are articulated 
through the drawing of these boundaries as spatio-temporal coordinates themselves. It is 
through her work that this thesis repoliticizes the boundary according to which we have 
come to know the self as citizen-subject and how it is connected to the world. Kristeva’s 
work is not taken as indicating the end of the subject here but rather “a call to rework that 
notion outside the terms of an epistemological given”.9 It is taken as a call to rework the 
notion of ‘subject’ outside of the given dominant theory of knowledge which says that 
this can always be reduced to a singular representation (albeit allowing for various 
combinations of this representation) of time and place as envisaged through gender, class, 
or culture.10 
Given its reliance on sovereign subjectivity, existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum is shown in this thesis to be limited by its need to conceptualize 
being, even when challenging the statist monopoly on understandings about community 
and identity, as infinitely divisible by lines extended in continuous, progressive time 
which necessarily demarcate self from the world, the universal (humanity) from the 
particular (citizenship), here from there, us from them. This analysis has been shown to 
be limited by its inability to separate conceptions of political possibility from “the 
practices through which state sovereignty was articulated in the first place.”11 For, despite 
highlighting the challenges that migration places upon the dominant ideals and practices 
of solidarity conceptualized in terms of the narrowly defined parameters of the 1937 Irish 
statist project, this analysis continues to understand these challenges in terms of how the 
state defines the parameters of solidarity in the twenty-first century as that which must be 
transcended (via a post-statist political community) or reconfigured anew (via a post-
national political community).  
While this critical citizenship scholarship opposes existing dominant 
understandings – insofar as it problematizes how belonging has been located in a national 
statist community which assumes common history and culture of citizens – it can be 
shown to share with non-critical positions a common approach to the question of how a 
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new politics of citizenship (what ‘citizen’ can be) should be theorized in relation to the 
issue of migration. This is via the identification of, and a narrative involving, a sovereign 
self which has a beginning and an end ‘in’ (linear) time and (absolute) space. The result, I 
have argued, is that despite taking away the supposition of conflict, the ‘politics’ of 
citizenship (the understandings of what it means to become ‘citizen’ in the context of 
migration) continues to be conceptualized in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish 
Citizenship Referendum in terms of “a form of inclusion that depends on a clear pattern 
of spatial exclusion”.12 This analysis has produced several alternative histories of Ireland 
as a multi-ethnic society which is made up of various identities – old Irish/new Irish, 
host/guest, minority/majority, migrant mothers/non-migrant mothers – rather than a 
history in which there is just one authentic identity (Celtic). However, what has been 
emphasized is that this has been done without ultimately undermining the opposition 
itself (conceptualized in terms of homogenous, invariable space and linear, progressive 
time) between notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, this community and that community, between 
‘here’ and ‘there’. No longer a world of aliens versus citizens, what is presented is a 
world nonetheless in which belonging continues to be based on the notion of absolute 
spatial and linear progressive exclusion in the last instance; this is merely an exclusion 
which no longer involves treating the other as adversary (as ‘Other’). 
In contrast to this, as chapters four and five have shown, the experiences of 
citizen-children born to migrant parents present a very different image of what it is to 
‘be’ citizen and of the relationship between citizenship and migration. This is one which 
specifically challenges the idea of citizenship as that which is experienced as a continuum 
between here and there, past and present. Emphasizing instead the temporally 
discontinuous and spatially fractious manner in which subjectivity is produced, what has 
been considered is how their experiences present an ambiguous paradoxical subjectivity 
which actually collapses the idea of an us/them, self/other, past/present dualism. Their 
experiences undermine the idea that politics can (only) be articulated according to a 
dominant understanding of time as resolved within space, which appeals to sovereignty 
assume and reproduce.  
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What has been demonstrated by exploring the experiences of these citizen-
children born to migrant parents is that political subjectivity can also be experienced as 
fractious in and of itself (‘less-than-one’ spatio-temporalities). This is where it is 
recognized, following Kristeva, as that which is experienced as (rather than ‘against’) 
foreignness. Foreignness here is understood as “the hidden face of our identity, the space 
that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder.”13 This is a 
form of being that haunts the relationship between citizenship and the sovereign territorial 
state and the presumption that citizen-subjectivity can only be identified in terms of the 
modern spatio-temporal principle of subjectivity as individual (‘the-one’ and ‘the-many-
as-one’). As many people have pointed out, using Kristevan theory is not without its 
controversies.14 In particular, there is a need to remain aware of the role of 
psychoanalysis and psychiatry more generally in the production of the excluded and the 
marginalized. There is also a need to be aware of how this discursive and institutional 
backdrop that constitutes the symbolic order becomes secondary to the focus in 
Kristeva’s work on the speaking subject and their reflections on the world around them. 
These reflections should furthermore not be taken as subversive in their own right but as 
those which can be just as easily conform to the given order as they can to be being 
resistant and dissident.15 With this in mind, political subjectivity is retheorized through 
psychoanalysis theory somewhat cautiously in this thesis. It is used as a way of 
considering how an alternative to the dominant conception of subjectivity is being 
imagined and experienced. It is not intended to act here as a new alternative totalizing 
conception of experience and practice, but merely as a challenge to the existing dominant 
conception which asks after its limitations. 
Chapter five introduced the notion of citizenship as ‘trace’ as a way of 
conceptualizing the move made by opening up the (sovereign) space in which citizenship 
is currently thought, and where temporality is presumed to be containable within absolute 
space, to understandings about the alternative possibilities of relative and contingent 
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spacetime of being associated with the experiences of citizen-children born to migrant 
parents. It is important to note, as such, that this ability to reconceptualize how we think 
about being citizen (the politics of citizenship) is not tied in this thesis to some 
aspirational or ‘new’ political subjectivity. It is tied instead to existing experiences of 
citizenship which are currently marginalized given their operation outside dominant 
‘political’ horizons. It is not argued, furthermore, that these experiences necessarily lead 
to better politics. Indeed, as Alina Sajed points out, having identified the migrant as the 
figure which attests to the limits of sovereign subjectivity, it would be a mistake to 
presume that ambiguous citizenship-subjectivity (such as that of the children of migrants) 
necessarily disrupts hegemonic practices of capital and state-centric citizenship.16 Indeed 
Ong’s work shows the interweaving of dominant and dominated forms of subjectivity and 
the manner in which these can work through, as much as they interrupt, state-centric 
citizenship.  
Rather, what is being argued in this thesis is that an awareness of contingent 
timespace as the basis of an alternative ontology leads to a better understanding of how 
the politics of citizenship is being experienced outside of sovereign politics through 
immanent difference as well as within sovereign politics through exterior difference.17 In 
the latter, foreignness defines the self as coherent I – as that which can oppose otherness 
via the lines which divide absolute space into ‘us’ and ‘them’, the included and the 
excluded. Whereas in the former, foreignness is recognized as integral to ‘being’ – as that 
which implicates oppositional otherness without boundary and without end. I argue that 
awareness of this second alternative ontology permits us to work “with a different 
mapping where patterns of inclusion and exclusion transverse and are multiple rather than 
absolute” while nonetheless remaining aware of the existing dominant sovereign mapping 
of the self.18 This thesis, as such, needs to be seen as increasing the range of possible 
political subjectivities and not attempting to replace one ontology with another. 
Conceptualizing citizenship as trace as opposed to absolute space is not being taken as 
good or bad in and of itself. Rather, what is being argued is that the question of the 
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politics of citizenship itself (this includes the concerns themselves about gender and 
biopolitics which are raised in the discussions surrounding the 2004 Irish Citizenship 
Referendum) needs to be theorized in terms of how it can operate through fragmentary, 
splintered, and arbitrary time-space coordinates, as well as through modern absolute 
spatial and linear temporal coordinates.  
The limitations of how existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum 
conceptualizes political subjectivity can, as such, be contextualized in direct relation to its 
inability to be able to combine a necessary understanding of citizenship in terms of an 
inclusion/exclusion framework (absolute space) with that of understanding citizenship 
also in terms of disruptions, discontinuities and fractions (as ‘trace’). Existing analysis of 
the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum as that which mirrors the accepted (particular 
versus universal) framework for posing the question of the politics of citizenship has 
been shown to rely on the idea that subjectivity can always be included or excluded ‘in’ 
political community. Doing so, it ignores how subjectivity is not necessarily synonymous 
with individuality but only came to be associated with sovereign autonomy at a particular 
point in history when spatial differentiations replaced hierarchical modes of allegiance, as 
the necessary conditions for the possibility of expressions of political identity. Despite 
specifically setting out to demonstrate how migration challenges the idea that the state 
has a monopoly on understandings about how political community and political identity 
should be conceptualized, what has been highlighted in this thesis is that this analysis 
continues to define political necessity via a regulative statist idea of the modern subject 
which is the idea of ‘being’ as reducible to spaces which are infinitely divisible by lines 
extended in continuous, progressive time. Although political subjectivity is recognized as 
having fluid margins, it is nonetheless conceptualized as having calculable boundaries 
demarcating inside from outside, past from present analogous to the spatial and temporal 
imagery of the modern state inherent in the concept of ‘territory’ (as located space) and 
understandings of national time (as the time of start, middle and ends). Essentially what 
has been argued is that existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum is 
limited by its failure to differentiate between political possibility in general and how we 
have come to think of ‘possibility’ in terms of a certain conception of politics which 
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came to be associated with (state) sovereignty and the ability to divide space infinitely by 
lines extended in continuous linear time.  
By “resist[ing] the eternal return of the spatial differentiations of early-modern 
Europe”,19 the notion of citizenship as trace presents an alternative conception of what 
politics can be. It does so by challenging the idea that all understandings of politics can 
necessarily be traced back to the modern statist political imaginary and the associated 
spatio-temporal understandings of a clearly located presence which can be demarcated in 
terms of inside and outside, as ‘excluded’ or ‘included’. Thinking about citizenship as 
trace allows for an alternative understanding of what it is to be a citizen-subject. It allows 
us to move beyond the question of how this needs to be related to sovereign spaces of 
inclusion and exclusion which exist vis-à-vis other sovereign spaces. Instead of reducing 
citizenship-subjectivity to singular representations of time and space such as ‘woman’, 
‘migrant’ or ‘racialized’ which in turn are grounded in either humanity or citizenship, it 
can be reconceptualized as that which is also and increasingly based on situations which 
combine fragments (often in inconsistent ways) of these subject positions but cannot be 
reduced primarily to any single one defining time and space of self (modern subjectivity).  
The benefit of thinking of citizen-subjectivity as trace, as such, is that it 
undermines the idea that citizen-subjectivity can only be defined in terms of a coherent 
‘who’. It allows us to move beyond the endless discussions about who is or who is not 
abusing citizenship, who is or who is not entitled to citizenship which take place in the 
citizenship debate and concentrate instead on the increasingly momentary fragments of 
self through which citizenship can operate, beyond the idea of a sovereign marginalized 
subject that can be pointed to. Conceptualizing citizenship as trace succeeds, as such, in 
undermining the importance of the distinction between the human (migrant) and the 
citizen (native) as the basis upon which all questions about political subjectivity must 
begin in the context of migration. It forces us to consider instead how migrants and 
citizens can be connected to each other through contingent timespaces. It allows us to 
rethink the possible understandings of political community: as something which can be 
conceptualized through fragmented as well as continuous moments of ‘being’ in 
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common.20 This is the opposite of the understanding of possibilities for citizenship 
discussed in the citizenship debate which continue to rely on the idea of the centralization 
of power in a particular time and place of the self, characteristic of the modern state.  
The original contribution of this research lies in four principal areas. First, by 
approaching existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum from the perspective 
of R.B.J. Walker’s work it argues that existing analysis of this referendum – which is 
presented as a clash between particular and universal conceptions of citizenship – can be 
taken as representative of a more general debate.  This is one which reflects important 
assumptions about what a ‘politics’ of citizenship must look which can be traced back to 
the idea of sovereign autonomous subjectivity (the individual citizen-subject). Secondly, 
it advances a Kristevan understanding of human ‘being’ as based on a metaphysics of 
process in the context of citizen-subjectivity and uses this to develop further the 
implications of R.B.J. Walker’s work which emphasize the need to think about political 
subjectivity other than as that which is defined in terms of sovereign presence. Julia 
Kristeva’s work has been used here to provide an example of how we can rethink 
political subjectivity outside of appeals to state sovereignty (a metaphysics of presence) 
as the dominant framing of subjectivity. In doing so this thesis repoliticizes how to think 
about the boundaries of citizen-subjectivity in time and space. Thirdly, the thesis 
develops an important empirical contribution to discussions about the politics of 
citizenship in Ireland by demonstrating how citizen-children born to migrant parents (as 
those who are neither just migrants nor alternatively just citizens) interrupt these 
discussions. What is demonstrated is how these children interrupt such discussions by 
challenging the idea that their experiences can be theorized similar to their parent’s 
experiences of belonging – as those who have been positioned ‘outside’ (excluded from) 
the dominant community and who are in need of being brought into (included in) this 
community. What is demonstrated is that unlike their migrant parents, these citizen 
children are not simply marginalized subjects who have been positioned ‘outside’ the 
dominant political community and who are in need of ‘inclusion’, but people whose 
subjectivity is defined in the tension between inclusion and exclusion, particularism and 
universalism. It is subjectivity which is experienced in a disruptive contingent temporal 
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and spatial framework, rather than a sovereign one. Fourthly, this thesis argues that the 
shift which is made here from presuming that political subjectivity must be theorized in 
terms of a metaphysics of presence to recognizing how it can also be experienced as a 
metaphysics of process, can be understood as a shift from conceptualizing citizenship as 
absolute space to conceptualizing it in terms of contingent trace. The understanding of 
citizenship as trace provides an alternative way of thinking about citizenship in the 
context of migration in terms of how it is being re-experienced beyond prescriptive 
sovereign dualisms, yet without ignoring the significance of such dualistic concepts. It 
provides an alternative to the determinative dominant logic of the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion binary by allowing for the possibility that subjectivity comes into 
play via processes of differentiation which are irregular, discontinuous and strange as 
well as sovereign and continuous.  
The original contribution of this thesis is therefore both empirical and theoretical. 
It contributes not only to our understanding of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum and 
the limitations of how subjectivity has been conceptualized in existing analysis of this 
event, but also to broader theoretical attempts to recognize how political subjectivity is 
being experienced outside of a statist political discourse. As such, it refuses to subscribe 
to a clear-cut separation between theory and practice. Following R.B.J. Walker, it instead 
emphasizes the manner in which political theory must be engaged with at the level of the 
‘real world’ given our inability to separate the subject from the way in which we 
recognize the self as (sovereign) subject here in the first place.21 
This thesis set out to account for the limitations of how political subjectivity is 
conceptualized in existing analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum in terms of 
inclusion and exclusion. It recognizes that this is the accepted framework within which 
the question of political subjectivity in the context of migration has been posed in critical 
citizenship studies more generally. The conclusion it has reached is that this citizenship 
debate is limited by its inability to account for political possibility outside of a specific 
conception of space as independent of its physical content and of time as linear and 
progressive. These are the spatio-temporal understandings through which practices of 
state sovereignty were produced and through which they continue to be reaffirmed 
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through the conception of the modern subject. The experiences of citizen-children born to 
migrant parents challenge the limited nature of this understanding of the necessary basis 
of political subjectivity, however. Theirs are experiences which undermine the ‘truth’ that 
the citizen-subject can always be conceptualized in terms of singular representations of 
time and space associated with the ideal of the sovereign autonomous modern subject. 
They confirm the need for citizenship studies to have to engage with the idea of always 
already existing and acting citizen-subjects outside of the spatio-temporal ideal of 
modernity. This is a necessity if the study of citizenship is to have any chance of 
capturing the complexity of the contemporary period which it so often purports to 
highlight. 
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